

SPIRIT'S PHILOSOPHICAL *Bildung*

Image and
Rhetoric in Hegel's
Phenomenology
of Spirit and
Science of Logic

DANIEL HORACE FERNALD

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of Spirit and Science of Logic***

Daniel Horace Fernald


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This work is dedicated in loving memory of

Professor Eléanor H. Kuykendall.

*An inspired teacher, a kindly mentor,
and my first philosophical friend.*

We agreed on almost nothing, except the truth.

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Foreword

The rhetorical and imaginative aspects of Hegel's works have only begun to receive proper attention. Traditionally, interpreters of Hegel's thought have approached it from the perspective of logic, metaphysics, and politics. Such approaches are not wrong because much of Hegel's greatness lies in his contributions to these fields and much has been learned from these ways of reading Hegel. A great deal has come to be understood of his dialectical method, his conception of being and becoming, his grasp of freedom as self-determination, and his comprehension of history, religion, and fine art.

The achievements of these approaches come at the expense of giving little or no attention to the way in which Hegel's works are composed, to the form of Hegel's thought, its style. The Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico observed that a great philosopher is an entire university; such a philosopher offers a complete education to those who study his works fully. A. N. Whitehead claimed that style is the end of education. Prior to the full mastery of a subject one's thought comes at the subject in any way it can. Upon mastery, one's thoughts are put in just the right way. Putting Vico's and Whitehead's observations together, it is a mistake not to include in one's study of a great philosopher the way in which the philosopher conveys his thoughts. In Hegel's case not to explore the nature and significance of his style is to violate his greatest principle: that the True is the whole.

Attention to the role that images and tropes play in Hegel's thought most likely has its beginning in J. N. Findlay's *Hegel: A Re-Examination* (1958), in the prominence Findlay gives to Hegel's images in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Quentin Lauer, in his 1982 presidential address to the Hegel Society of America, "Hegel as Poet," directly challenged Hegel's "prosaic-minded commentators." Lauer claimed that we are sure to misread Hegel if we read his works as

prose and only prose. Lauer regards the *Phenomenology* as the most obviously poetic of Hegel's works. Lauer's view of how to approach Hegel's works fits R. G. Collingwood's description, in *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, of philosophy as a branch of literature, as prose containing moments of poetry.

I attempted to employ this principle in *Hegel's Recollections* (1985), my study of Hegel's use of images in the *Phenomenology*. The counterpart to my approach is John H. Smith's extraordinary work, *The Spirit and its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of Bildung* (1988), first known to me as a doctoral dissertation (1983), which incorporates the perspectives of German studies, philosophy, and rhetoric. Daniel Fernald has taken this form of Hegel studies further. He has brought together Hegel as poet and Hegel as rhetorician, especially placing Hegel's thought within the history of classical and German rhetoric.

What impresses the reader of Hegel on a first reading and what brings the reader back in subsequent readings are Hegel's metaphors and ironies. Unforgettable are his comparison of truth with the Bacchanalian revel, his labeling of Schelling's absolute as "the night in which all cows are black," the inverted world, the master-servant, the phrenological skull, the beautiful soul, the "spiritual zoo" (to use Findlay's translation), the bad infinity, and his image of the philosopher as the owl of Minerva. To absorb these and other images and ironies is the key to Hegelian education. They are the *topoi* from which Hegel draws forth his system and they are the *topoi* from which the reader can remake the system for himself.

Hegel claims that the mark of an educated person is memory. Without these metaphysical memory-places the complete philosophical education Hegel offers is not possible. With them firmly in mind all the phenomena of the *Phenomenology*, all the ideas of the *Logic*, and all the forms of nature and society of the *Encyclopaedia* and the *Philosophy of Right* come forth in a complete speech that can provide the basis for one's own productions of the philosophic spirit, the journey of self-knowledge – the wisdom that requires the whole circle of circles that are human studies.

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Preface

Chief among the influences behind this work is Donald Phillip Verene, whose invaluable *Hegel's Recollection* helped me to see past the merely prosaic figure so often propped up both by and for the benefit of Hegel's *Buchstabenphilosophen* (literal-minded philosophers), like a 19th century plague victim being photographed for posterity. Hegel would certainly have appreciated the irony of being made into one of his reviled "dead men who carry off their dead."

None of this is to say, of course, that historical and comparative studies of Hegel have been of less than great importance. Indeed, without these previous efforts, their *Aufheben* in the course of a full exploration of the frequently overlooked imagistic and tropological elements of Hegel's thought would be quite literally impossible. The present work thus presupposes all of the valuable insights and labors that have preceded it.

Hegel famously claimed that the "True is the whole." According to the first century Roman rhetorician Quintilian, one of the orator's chief duties is that of *eloqui*, of saying all that is in the speaker's mind on a given subject. Hegel describes his *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the "science of the experience of consciousness." In embarking on this project, Hegel thus takes upon himself the obligation to give a complete—and hence eloquent—account of Nature as it appears to the naïve philosophical consciousness on its way toward full realization as self-knowing Spirit.

Read from the perspective of the rhetorically-based educational system in which the young Hegel was reared, the *Phenomenology* emerges as the first link in the chain, or *Kette*, of the greater system to which Hegel alludes in his *Science of Logic*, of which the *Phenomenology* is the necessary precondition. In the *Phenomenology*, the image is the medium through which philosophy

takes place, as each successive stage of the *Phenomenology's* "highway of despair" proves unequal to the task of bringing about the desired reconciliation between Spirit and Nature, the for-itself and the in-itself.

In his Foreword to the present work, Verene quite rightly points out that Hegel's images are both "the *topoi* from which Hegel draws forth his system and . . . the *topoi* from which the reader can remake the system for himself." Since the *Phenomenology* is the account that a still-naïve philosophical consciousness gives of its own experience, the resulting narrative will quite naturally take the form appropriate to such a stage of consciousness—the image (*Bild*). To approach the *Phenomenology* without accounting for the substantive role played by images is to read past the work, thereby largely missing the point in the search for the things themselves.

In contrast, *The Science of Logic* is the speech that a now-mature philosophical consciousness gives on its own terms, that of the Concept (*Begriff*). The Concept replaces the Image (*Bild*) in the *Science of Logic*. In the drama of consciousness' development in the *Phenomenology*, the Concept is always somewhere just off stage, alternately observing and directing the images through which the naïve philosophical consciousness is obliged to think. Once this "succession of Spirits" is revealed as equally a "Gallery of Images" (*Galerie von Bildern*), and hence as merely formal, the philosophical education of this eidetic naïf has reached a critical stage, and the Concept can finally emerge as the medium of truly philosophical thought.

Having recognized the emptiness of picture-thinking (*Vorstellung*) in this consummatory image of the *Phenomenology*—this image constructed out of images—the now-journeyman consciousness is ready to abandon the *Phenomenology's* highway of despair in favor of the *Logic's* pathway of hope, in which *Vorstellung* gives way to thinking in terms of the Concept.

As the acorn must die to create the oak, so too must the Image perish in order to enliven the Concept. The oak is greater than the acorn, but until the acorn dies the oak will remain merely an unrealized possibility. The "death" of the image in Absolute Knowing is likewise a necessary precondition for the "birth" of the Concept in the *Science of Logic*. Much as the Roman rhetoricians maintained that the matter at hand (*Res*) could only be seen clearly through the medium of appropriately ornate language (*Verba*), the Hegelian *Begriff* is only attainable after the *Aufheben* of the *Bilder* that make up the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Acknowledgements

It is at once an honor and a formidable duty to attempt to thank all of the people whose contributions to this work, and to the life behind it, alone made it possible. I begin by remembering the professors and students of philosophy at the State University of New York at New Paltz. Chief among these was the late Professor Eléanor H. Kuykendall, whose kindness and commitment to genuine intellectual diversity allowed her to be an exemplary mentor to a rather brash young man with whom she disagreed on almost everything, and who may even have gone out of his way from time to time to exaggerate the already existing philosophical divisions, in his role as self-appointed devil's advocate.

I am also grateful to all of the long-lost friends I made in my undergraduate classes, whose companionship along the road to becoming a philosopher were instrumental in permitting me to follow the path that had been laid out for me. These early philosophical friends made the "one road we traveled" seem worth following. I remember with particular fondness Laurie Hornsberger and Patrick Gallagher. As the folk singer alternately croons and screeches in the eponymous "Bob Dylan's Dream":

*I wish I wish I wish in vain
That we could sit simply in that room again.
Ten thousand dollars at the drop of a hat,
I'd give it all gladly if our lives could be like that.*

(If any of you long-lost "first friends" read this, I'm not that hard to find. You can look me up, if you've got the time.)

I am also indebted to my dear friend and mentor, Elmer Sprague, Professor Emeritus and Retired Chair of the Brooklyn College Philosophy Department. Professor Sprague taught me the value of debate, dialogue, and respect for opposing points of view. He is also one of the best men I have ever known, and I am deeply grateful to be able to call him my friend.

The greatest single influence on this book was my graduate mentor Professor Donald Phillip Verene, who generously offered to write the foreword to this work. His well-known book on the use of images in Hegel, *Hegel's Recollection*, serves at the basis for my own thinking on the subject.

Zachary Parmley earned my undying gratitude by finishing the formatting for the book and doing the indexing, as well as performing the seemingly unending, miscellaneous tasks required to get a book ready for publication.

Last but certainly not least, I owe a profound debt of gratitude to my wife, Kyunghyo Kim Fernald, whose love and support have always seen me through the difficult times. Our two sons, Isaiah and Gideon, have been at once a welcome distraction and an inspiration for completing the present work.

Chapter One: Introduction

Hegel as Rhetor, System as Oration

Hegel presented his first public declamation at the age of eighteen in Stuttgart, as valedictorian of the Gymnasium Illustre, also known as the Eberhard-Ludwig Gymnasium. His audience included, in addition to his teachers and fellow students, Karl Eugen, Duke of Württemberg. Hegel praised the virtues of his alma mater, his education, and the wisdom of the illustrious Duke.¹ This first oration contains little of philosophic interest, and therefore has found little place in Hegel scholarship.²

This neglected performance is significant, however, for its rhetorical character. It was laudatory, of the *genus demonstrativum*,³ and represented the culmination of the rhetorically-based education offered at the Gymnasium Illustre. The poetic and mythic origins of the rhetorical tradition which informed Hegel's curriculum were the product of well over two millennia of pedagogy. The roots of this tradition can be traced back some four to five centuries earlier, to the time of Hesiod and Homer.

This rhetorical tradition was pedagogical in nature, and began (at the latest) with Isocrates, the student of Socrates and Gorgias, and rival of Aristotle. In the first century B.C., Cicero gave teeth to the rather theoretical oratory of Isocrates, who had a notoriously weak voice and timid disposition. In the first century A.D., Quintilian further systematized the work of earlier rhetoricians in his *Institutio Oratoria*, which provided for the first time a complete rhetorical pedagogy, with detailed instructions for different stages of the

education of youth.

Quintilian's influence continued during the Middle Ages (during which all original manuscripts of the *Institutio Oratoria* were lost) in the curricula and pedagogy of the church schools. As late as the twelfth century, John of Salisbury detailed and defended a system of education derived directly from the still-extant fragments of Quintilian's *Institutio*. In the sixteenth century, Reformation leader and pedagogue Phillip Melanchthon—the "Protestant Preceptor of Germany"—instituted a system of formal instruction in the same tradition, thus forming a pedagogical genealogy extending from the rhetorical education of ancient Greece to that of nineteenth century Germany.

As a student at the *Gymnasium Illustre*, the young Hegel drank deeply from the ancient waters of this inexhaustible rhetorical well. His masters led him through extensive rhetorical exercises, some of which—e.g., reading and commenting on Aesop's fables—were directly commended by Quintilian, who is the pivotal figure in the rhetorical tradition that still formed the foundation of curricula at many schools in late 18th century Germany, including the *Gymnasium Illustre*. Ardently embracing this rhetorical approach to learning, Hegel went so far as to keep a diary in which he described his curriculum and engaged in advanced rhetorical exercises, such as making translations to and from German, Latin, and Greek, and writing declamations of the kind recorded by Isocrates. After years of such rhetorical education, Hegel was well prepared for his valedictory oration.

Hegel's early training in rhetoric, and especially his embrace of it, casts his earliest masterwork, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in a light seldom recognized by Hegelians and other students of Hegel.⁴ Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* abounds with rhetorical flourishes and complex stylistic constructions. It expresses a philosophy based in images; indeed, it is the images of the *Phenomenology* that do the greatest share of the "talking." Were one to heed the counsel of those who see the imagistic elements of the *Phenomenology* as unfortunate stylistic excesses—and treat these as merely illustrative of deeper, more strictly "philosophical" points—it is difficult to fathom what would remain. Images are the bearers of meaning in the *Phenomenology*, and are not immediately reducible to anything else.

As I will show in subsequent chapters, it is the mediation of speculative thought through the tropological images of the

Phenomenology that distinguishes Hegel's Absolute from that of Schelling (which Hegel famously described as the proverbial "night in which all cows are black") and others. Such an Absolute represents a kind of unmediated monism. All things are not merely one (a position which in fact resembles Hegel's actual view); they possess this total uniformity with the benefit of neither mediation nor differentiation.

In this sort of unmediated monism, the Absolute becomes in principle unknowable, since even the knower in the very act of knowing is separated from the "One" of which he is immediately a part. The paradox engendered by this sort of monism is that at least some *apparent* differences must be present in order even to notice that there are no *real* differences. At a minimum, there must be at least a rudimentary awareness of difference on the part of a conscious being even to make the statement "all is one." The allegedly illusory appearance which sets itself against the underlying reality is a precondition for its own rejection. To put the matter somewhat differently, the experience necessary for any affirmative knowledge of the Absolute cannot by definition be "real," since to claim that a part of the whole was real apart from the whole, would be to deny the necessity of the whole, and hence to undermine the central tenet of monism. The question becomes, then, how to arrive at truth by means of illusion, i.e. how to understand the ontologically prior "Whole" by means of its ancillary, and merely partial, manifestations.

Thus, the problem facing any philosophy which seeks to establish the Absolute is how to account for experience within the context of a world in which distinctions and differences are not fully real. Such a philosophy must bridge the gap between experience, which (if even possible in a monistic universe) is necessarily illusory, and the "real." The articulation between experience and the world appears on first consideration to be impossible in principle. How can illusory experience of manifold particulars ever yield actual knowledge of the unified Whole? One might as well attempt to divine the nature of the world by staring at the shadows on the wall of Plato's cave. What connection can there be between the "real" and its illusory manifestations? How can we ever get at the truth by means of illusion?

Adopting a modified view of the relationship of particulars and universals, such as Plato's theory of forms (or even Leibniz's monadology), will not solve the problem either, since the goal is to know the Absolute in its entirety. Simply to accept the world as an

imperfect copy of a higher order of pure ideas or forms (or as an infinite series of windowless "monads") is a hard pill to swallow for someone whose goal is an all-encompassing comprehension of the Absolute.

Other responses to this daunting problem fail as well. For instance, positing a nebulous "thing-in-itself" places the Absolute forever out of reach, since our attempts at knowledge will be only an approximation of the Absolute, never an actual comprehension of it. The "solution" offered by Schelling and others, which makes of the Absolute something immediately—though merely intuitively—graspable, will not do either, since it makes experience itself the philosopher's Grail. This is precisely the trap into which phenomenology (and existentialism, though for different reasons) fell in the 20th century. Having failed to gain affirmative knowledge of the Absolute, the philosopher is left with appearances, a soul lost in a hall of mirrors whose infinite reflections of each other leave the Absolute unknown, and perhaps unknowable.

Such a situation signifies the surrender, after a long and costly battle, to the same skeptical dragon that Descartes undertook to defeat. To accept this surrender is to acquiesce to both the failure and, paradoxically, the sufficiency of the Cartesian answer to the skeptical dragon. Having established the *cogito*, it may indeed be true that we cannot get outside of it again; centuries after the *Meditations* and *Discourse on the Method*, this philosophical cul-de-sac begins to look like the only path to truth. We now find ourselves in the position of a blind man painting a landscape with roofing tar. We cannot trust our senses to pierce the veil separating the merely apparent from the real, and we lack the words to describe what little we do see.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic* offer a different (and arguably sufficient) solution to the problem of how to account for experience within the context of a world in which distinctions and differences are not fully real. These works seek, in short, to reconcile the acknowledged illusory nature of experience with the fact that it is only via experience that we have any knowledge of truth. The solution which Hegel offers is both ingenious and practical. The *Phenomenology*, as the "science of the experience of consciousness," gives an account of the Whole in human terms. This account relies on the representation of images typical of the picture-thinking which is natural to man. Spirit leads consciousness on a grand tour of human experience, culminating in Absolute Knowing's

Gallery of Images (*Gallerie von Bildern*). In the Gallery of Images, consciousness enjoys its first truly reflective moment, as it sees each of its pictorial representations of the Whole cut out, framed, and nailed to the wall—lifeless, futile efforts at the merely illustrative depiction of the bounty and plenitude of Spirit.

The result of the conscious individual's education (*Bildung*) through the image (*Bild*), and its ultimate loss of faith in picture-thinking (*Vorstellung* or *bildhaftes Denken*) is the deduction of the Concept (*der Begriff*), with which the *Science of Logic* begins. The *Science of Logic* addresses the same fundamental issue as the *Phenomenology*, viz., how to grasp the Whole without allowing it to fall back into Schelling's undifferentiated Absolute. In both the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, Spirit plays the schoolmaster to the student represented by consciousness. Since consciousness—as a single, individual being possessed of philosophical awareness—is seeking the True which is the Whole, it may also be called a philosophical pilgrim, whose Grail is the all-encompassing Absolute of Spirit. Our pilgrim seeks the Grail of Spirit, longs to hold the philosopher's Cup in his hands, and drink from its salvational plenitude.

With the sublation (*die Aufhebung, das Aufheben*) of picture-thinking in the *Phenomenology* as its sole presupposition, the *Science of Logic* sees Spirit take its pupil—the individual consciousness or philosophical pilgrim—through another series of stages wherein our pilgrim tarries with a negative which he no longer understands in a literal-minded or pictorial manner. The problem in each work is the same, only viewed and conducted from a different perspective. Both works aim to create a mediated Absolute, i.e. a Whole in which the parts will be known as parts, and whose incomplete nature will stand in stark contrast to the Whole itself. The *Phenomenology* attempts to accomplish this goal by successively considering and rejecting various forms of appearance as the True, and by summarizing the sublation of each individual stage of consciousness by means of the Gallery of Images in "Absolute Knowing." This lays the foundation for the *Science of Logic*, which considers the Absolute from a truly philosophical standpoint, rather than a phenomenological one.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* address essentially the same topics, however different they may be in appearance. In each case, the central problem is the same: How to generate a *mediated* Absolute, a Whole whose parts will be knowable.

What truly distinguishes these two works is that there is no substantive difference between the form and the content of the *Logic*. The *Logic* is philosophical in terms of both presentation and subject matter. It is the speech that philosophy gives to itself, on its own terms.

In contrast to the *Logic*, the *Phenomenology* is structured rhetorically, rather than dialectically. It is the speech the philosophy gives to the uninitiated, to the naive philosophical consciousness, which has not yet understood its position as the standard-bearer of Spirit. The philosophical consciousness embodied in the *Logic* aims to free itself from the limitations of picture-thinking, whereas in the *Phenomenology* consciousness thinks only by means of the image.

Images are the heart and soul of the *Phenomenology*. The manner of representing the world in the *Phenomenology* is imagistic. The *Vorstellung*, or picture-thinking, of the *Phenomenology* is thought (*Denken*) that is in thrall to the image. Such *Denken* is literally *bildhaft*—held in captivity (*Haft*) by the image (*das Bild*). This *bildhaftes Denken* both defines and circumscribes the sphere of the Whole, and hence the True, to which consciousness has access in the *Phenomenology*. Consciousness trapped within *bildhaftes Denken* sees only the image, not the reality which it simultaneously reveals and conceals. Absent a proper understanding and appreciation of the role of images in this work, the reader will quite literally miss the point, reading right past it in the vain search for an unmediated comprehension of the things themselves.⁵

Without the images and accompanying tropes of the *Phenomenology*, it is difficult to see what would remain. For example, “Sense Certainty,” the opening section of the main body of the work, begins with the images presented to the mind via the senses, and describes the process of attempting to render them intelligible to the intellect. Were one to remove any the images from this section, nothing substantive would remain. The substance of the *Phenomenology* is to be found in its images.

Nor does the role of images in any sense wane throughout the work. In numerous sections of the *Phenomenology*, most notably “Lordship and Bondage,” the images presented leap off the page and take shape in our own world. Such was their power that, in the hands of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and others, they did precisely that, with lasting effect. The master and the slave are employed as rhetorical tropes, specifically the trope of metonymy, by which an imaginative symbol is substituted for a concept.

Understood literally, "Lordship and Bondage" is at best entertaining reading and at worst incomprehensible rubbish. Whatever philosopher's stone Kojève and those influenced by him (including Sartre and French existentialism in general) might have thought they found here, it remains no less true that Hegel never intended this or any other part of the *Phenomenology* to be read in abstraction from the other parts. To claim otherwise is to see gold where there is in fact only iron pyrites. Via metonymy, however, we grasp Hegel's point that the master and slave stand for the independence and dependence, respectively, of self-consciousness, and that their struggle is a symbol for the emergence of self-consciousness from mere consciousness. This allows the reader to continue reading, without allowing himself to believe that what he has just read is simply a kind of philosophical "short story," that may be read in abstraction from the rest of the work. It is only on this sort of rhetorical reading of the *Phenomenology* that the attentive reader understands Hegel's purpose, and is driven to continue through the entire Gallery of Images to 'Absolute Knowing.' The rhetorical structure of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is key to grasping the full significance of the repeated *Aufheben* (sublation) in the work.

A literal-minded philosopher, one of Hegel's *Buchstaben-philosophen*, looking for clarity, will find none here. The "distorted" images thereby revealed would be clear, he might say, if only we could strip the *Phenomenology* of its imagistic, quasi-rhetorical clothing and reveal the thing-itself, concealed by all of Hegel's unfortunate Swabian verbiage. If only Hegel would speak clearly, he would be a nineteenth century Kant. Or would he? Hegel is, after all, the self-proclaimed philosophical successor to Kant, adapting and expanding on the ideas of the great hermit of Königsberg. Hegel is simply Kant with a jaunty, if over-blown, prose style. Or is he?

Even Kantian readers of Hegel grant that the *Phenomenology* is replete, even rife, with metaphors. What appears as an unfortunate stylistic self-indulgence to a literal-minded philosopher, eager to rush off to the things themselves, emerges upon closer consideration as an integral part of Hegel's System. On what shall a philosophy built upon and around images most centrally depend, if not metaphor? As I shall argue in succeeding chapters, the *Phenomenology* is metaphoric because in it philosophy attempts to give an account of itself in human terms, in the ways which are most readily comprehensible to men who lack philosophy. This, as I will argue in chapters eight and nine, explains the great stylistic differences between the *Phenomenology*

and the *Science of Logic*, this latter work being the speech that philosophy gives to itself, on its own terms, liberated from the constraints of picture-thinking.

The precise role of rhetoric in the *Phenomenology*, and in the articulation between the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, is the focus of the present work, not because the *Phenomenology* is merely or even principally about rhetoric (it is not), or because the *Phenomenology* is of greater philosophic significance than the *Science of Logic*, which also comes in for detailed treatment. The rhetoric of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the focus of this work because it reveals, in effect, "another Hegel,"⁶ one given short shrift (if any) in the literature.

Kant's famous attack on rhetoric, and the notion (accepted axiomatically by many Hegelians) that Hegel was a Kantian, makes minimizing Hegel's use of and reliance upon rhetoric a matter of great importance in some circles. Let us, however, consider the possibility of anathema: That not only was Hegel's philosophy, as propounded in the *Phenomenology*, rhetorically based, but that Hegel himself was a rhetor, concerned not merely with the *res nudas* of dialectic, but with the "clothing" of truth in eloquence, in the rhetorically presented *verba*, as well.

The nine remaining chapters of this work address, in turn, various rhetorical and non-rhetorical aspects of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic*. I will endeavor to demonstrate that the *Phenomenology* is necessarily and integrally rhetorical in structure as well as tone, and that consequently there are no legitimate grounds to assimilate Hegel into the largely Kantian tradition which whirled all about him, like rapids around an eddy.

I will also argue, however, that in the *Phenomenology* Hegel uses rhetoric to overcome rhetoric, by means of a rhetorical device known as *rhetorica contra rhetoricam* (rhetoric against rhetoric). The sublation (*die Aufhebung, das Aufheben*) of the various stages of the *Phenomenology*, which has received such extensive coverage in the literature, is at work here as well. As each stage of the *Phenomenology* exhausts itself in its search for the truth, it discards its previous form and assumes another, and another, and another. Thus, Sense-Certainty becomes Perception, which becomes Force and the Understanding, and so on until consciousness reaches Revealed Religion and Absolute Knowing.

When finally Spirit has, finally, arrived at the last of its

possible representations, "Absolute Knowing," it turns back on itself in the "Gallery of Images" (*Galerie von Bildern*). In the Gallery, it understands that its entire pilgrim's progress has been but an illusion, with no more substance than the two-dimensional images by which it finds its past re-presented in the Gallery. The *Phenomenology* ends with the image of the chalice, the cup of Christ, ever-flowing, ever-filled, and ever-filling—a final metonymous image symbolizing the infinitude which the individual wandering the halls of the Gallery has finally understood Spirit to be.

Once the individual has grasped that he himself has been the source of these illusory images all along, and has been disabused of the naïve stance that led him to accept these images as the True, he is ready to hear the speech that philosophy gives on its own terms—that found in the *Science of Logic*. Having used rhetoric, and the images which are her handmaidens, to overcome rhetoric, Hegel is free in the *Science of Logic* to let philosophy speak in its own language, and on its own terms, rather than in the visual-rhetorical language of men.

The Death of the Image

There is still much to say about the relationship between the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, however. If the *Phenomenology* is a work of philosophical anthropology, intended to illustrate man's self-realization as the standard-bearer of Spirit, what, then, is the *Science of Logic*? Merely to repeat that it is the speech that philosophy gives to itself, on its own terms, is not very helpful, so some further explanation is called for.

To pose this question is to raise the thorny, difficult, and awkward issue of the difference between rhetoric and dialectic, and to ask whether we are seeking the truth or the True. Hegel's famous claim in the Preface of the *Phenomenology* that "the True is the Whole" ("Das Wahre ist das Ganze.") is, in significant part, an injunction not to stop at partial representations of the truth, such as are offered in the *Phenomenology*.⁷ The *Phenomenology* ends with two significant images. The first is its "master image"—the "Gallery of Images"—an image which is itself composed of images, and is nothing apart from them. The other is the cornucopian chalice, which promises a never-ending infinitude, an eternity which avoids stasis, being always the same yet ever-changing. These images are, however,

philosophically insufficient to bear the weight of Hegel's System. The enigmatic character of "Absolute Knowing," which appears to end Hegel's self-described "science of the experience of consciousness," is profoundly unfulfilling. What are we to do with the chalice? Are we to drink from it, or merely observe its plenitude from a safe distance? What of the Gallery? Are we to wander through its circular chambers, until we tire of returning to the same point, time and again? Alternately drinking from the chalice and strolling about the Gallery's halls might prove entertaining for a time, but where will it lead us?

The answer, quite simply, is "nowhere." The *Phenomenology* is a philosophical *cul-de-sac*, and Absolute Knowing, with its celebrated images, is the end of the first link in the chain (*Kette*) of Hegel's system. Indeed, the entire purpose of the Gallery of Images is precisely to be a *cul-de-sac*, to show in imagistic terms the futility of picture-thinking. The Preface to the *Phenomenology*, written after the completion of the main body of the work, and prior to the composition of the *Science of Logic*, provides the link between the first Hegelian *magnum opus* and the second. It is in the Preface that the speculative sentence (*der spekulative Satz*) receives its fullest explication, and the rhetorical image of the Gallery provides the middle term in the speculative sentence of which the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic* are the major and minor terms.

Much as the Death of the Mediator in "Revealed Religion" led to "Absolute Knowing"—in which man understands himself as Spirit and Spirit as man—so too does the implicit Death of the Image in Absolute Knowing lead to the *Science of Logic*. Absolute Knowing, via the Gallery of Images and the Chalice, represents Spirit's (or, perhaps, Hegel's) final joke at the reader's expense. In the Gallery of Images, man sees the stages of consciousness through which he has passed cut out, framed, and hung on a wall—as dead as the proverbial doornail. "Let these dead men tarry with such dead things, until they tire of them and finally carry them off," Hegel seems to say, "but let he who is able, follow me."

The Chalice gives us an image of a never-ending infinitude, which, like the Cup of Christ, has been found only in myth and legend. Man, even as a fully self-consciousness being, cannot arrive at his full self-realization as Spirit, unless and until he surrenders and overcomes his dependence on imagistic thought and the rhetorical stance which accompanies it. He cannot attain the *True* without surrendering his attachment to, and his faith in, the *truth*, which is in fact merely a

collection of discrete observations about the world of men. Thus, the speech of the rhetor, conducted via images and tropes, must give way to that of the dialectician, whose concern is explicitly not to compose a science of the *experience* of consciousness, but rather a science of consciousness, or Spirit, itself. The would-be philosopher must be persuaded to relinquish his attachment to (though not his belief in) the many, in order to grasp the one.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a masterpiece of both philosophy and rhetoric, but it is only a partial account of the whole, given from the standpoint of the imagistic thinking (*bildhaftes Denken*) that is natural to man. In the end, it must give way to the speech of the Concept (*der Begriff*), if it is to encompass the whole, and thus become the True.⁸ The *Phenomenology* does not give us the True, for the simple reason that it does not give us the Whole; its eloquence leads the pilgrim only as far as the city gate, from which poets and rhetors are denied ingress. The ever-flowing Chalice, the one true Grail of the philosopher, appears above the city, challenging his *Logos* to talk its way in.

The *Phenomenology* leads the philosopher to within sight of Spirit, and the Chalice which alone can contain it, but this traveler must first learn to reason without images, if he is ever to hold the Cup in his hands. In order to grasp (*greifen, ergreifen*) the Chalice, man must learn to speak and reason in terms of the Concept (*der Begriff*). This is precisely what takes place in the many pages of the *Science of Logic*.

Why the *Phenomenology*?

I have already suggested that the *Phenomenology* is the account of the overcoming of picture-thinking (*bildhaftes Denken*) in favor of thinking in terms of the Concept (*der Begriff*). If this were really the case, why would Hegel have bothered with the *Phenomenology*? Why not simply skip the preliminary rhetorical approach to Spirit exemplified in the *Phenomenology*, and jump right in with the dialectical speech of the Concept, shown in the *Science of Logic*?

These questions provide their own answers. The speech of the Concept cannot be given unless and until man, *qua* self-consciousness on its way toward Spirit, has overcome his dependence

on picture-thinking and the merely rhetorical and experiential consciousness which is its inseparable companion. It is certainly true that Hegel could, following Kant, have begun with the sort of abstruse ratiocinative argumentation seen in the first and second *Critiques*, but this approach would have led Hegel, at best, to Schelling's undifferentiated Absolute. Hegel's famous opposition to, and indeed ridicule of, abstract philosophy, strongly mitigates against this view, and helps us better to understand Hegel's approach.⁹

Considering how much ink has been spilled over Hegel's use of Sublation (*Aufheben*) in the *Phenomenology*, it is odd that relatively little attention has been given to the idea of applying *Aufheben* to the *Phenomenology* as a whole. If each stage is sublated (*aufgehoben*), why not consider that the entire work might be, as well? William Maker's *Philosophy Without Foundations*¹⁰ and Donald Phillip Verene's *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* come closest to this view.

Maker's view (with which I agree) is that the *Phenomenology* is a self-sublating mediation which provides the presuppositional basis for the *Science of Logic*. Once it is complete, the *Phenomenology* is sublated (*aufgehoben*), and without it, the *Logic* would not be possible. Verene claims that every stage of the *Phenomenology* until Absolute Knowing is an illusion, and indeed each a grander illusion than the one preceding it. Consciousness finally runs out of illusions, and finds itself revealed as Spirit.

Absolute Knowing escapes being an illusion *only* by exposing each preceding stage as an illusion. *Contra* Baillie and others, I claim that Absolute Knowing provides no affirmative knowledge of any type. Such is the entire point of the Gallery of Images, which is itself nothing but an image constructed in images, a meta-image with even less actual content than the images which it exposes as illusory. Absolute Knowing is Hegel's skeptical, and perhaps cynical, moment—Hegel's final abuse of his readers before drawing them farther along the *Kette* to the next link in the grand chain of his system, the *Science of Logic*.

Where the *telos*, or goal, of the *Phenomenology* is negative, that of the *Logic* is affirmative. The *Phenomenology* aims to provide the basis for the *Logic* by clearing away the rhetorical and imagistic debris that could impede the development of Hegel's System. The mere fact of Hegel's extensive use of rhetoric and tropes does not necessarily entail any special philosophical affinity for them on

Hegel's part. Rhetoric, an art in which Hegel developed considerable skill at the *Gymnasium Illustre*, is here used instrumentally in the gradual revelation of Spirit, in keeping with Hegel's extensive use of *rhetorica contra rhetoricam*.

The *Phenomenology* is not about rhetoric; it is, however, a rhetorical exposition of human experience. As such, it relies on the image as its principal pedagogical medium because this best represents the naïve philosophical consciousness which Hegel is attempting to sublate. The *Phenomenology*, as the self-sublating pre-condition for Science, is the first step on the long march to the Absolute. In it, rhetoric and its associated picture thinking are overthrown in favor of the dialectical thinking of speculative philosophy, the philosophy of the *speculum* (mirror).

Hegel comes not to praise rhetoric, but to bury it. The *Phenomenology* is, in this sense, Spirit's eulogy for *bildhaftes Denken*. Those who wish to remain stuck in picture-thinking are Hegel's dead men, who are best left to bury their own dead.¹¹

The philosophical character of the individual who emerges from this phenomenological highway of despair is wiser, wearier, and more worldly than the one who began the trek. He arrives back at the place from which he started, but is "none the less on a higher level" than he was at the beginning of his travels.¹² Through this journey, "Spirit has won the pure element of its existence, the Notion."¹³ The Concept, or Notion, deduced in the *Phenomenology* will serve as the basis for the *Science of Logic*.

System as Oration

The *Phenomenology* is the oration of the image, the complete, eloquent account given from the standpoint of Spirit to a naïve philosophical consciousness which must be led through the halls of the Gallery of Images before shedding his belief in the immediate truth of sensuous beings. He must relearn the wisdom of the animals, who "do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness . . . fall to without ceremony and eat them up."¹⁴ Only in so doing can he see the futility of attempting to know the world merely in terms of its sensuous appearance, and become the self-knowing Spirit which "knows not

only itself but also the negative of itself."¹⁵

The *Science of Logic*, in contrast, is the oration of the Concept, the speech that philosophy gives to itself on its own terms, rather than those of a still-pictorial consciousness. In it, as in the *Phenomenology*, the inquiry begins with an immediate unity which acquires mediation, and hence content, through its logical, speculative dialectic. Where the *Phenomenology* began with what appeared to be the immediate knowledge of sensuous beings in Sense Certainty, the *Science of Logic* begins with the opposition of Being and Nothing. This opposition is at the same time an immediate unity, an undifferentiated Absolute to whose ultimate mediation the rest of the *Logic* will be dedicated. Through this mediation, the Absolute will gain its content through the speculative method of the *Logic*.

Together, the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic* form the basis for the System of Science which follows them. The *Phenomenology* serves to unmask naïve philosophical prejudices which wrongly assert the reality of sensuous beings. Its *telos*, as mentioned earlier, is essentially negative. Absolute Knowing, which Hegel identifies as the goal of the *Phenomenology*, is "Spirit that knows itself as Spirit."¹⁶ This is Spirit that is, however, only implicitly what it is capable of becoming. Our pilgrim, standing in the Gallery of Images, sees that one journey has ended, but that another is about to begin. In the *Phenomenology*, he has merely been relieved of his metaphysical and epistemological misconceptions; in short, he has done little more than unlearn the falsehoods that he had previously been taught and had accepted as true. Miller's translation of "*das absolute Wissen*" is the correct one: "Absolute Knowing," not "Absolute Knowledge." The *Phenomenology* is not about knowledge; it is about knowing, or more precisely about the process of coming to know. Specifically, the *Phenomenology* clears away obstacles to knowing, barriers to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding. The belief in the epistemological primacy of sensuous beings is chief among the sins of naïve philosophical consciousness, but along with them come the vices of picture-thinking (*Vorstellung*, *bildhaftes Denken*) and, concomitantly, the rhetorical language, tropes, and figures of speech that accompany pictorial consciousness. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is, in effect, a lengthy *reductio ad absurdum* of picture-thinking; the Gallery of Images is its final moment of simultaneous *aporia* and epiphany. The individual philosophic consciousness is faced with the futility of continuing on its present

course, yet is offered a way out. The only product of the *Phenomenology* is the Concept, which is a necessary precondition, and the starting point, for the *Science of Logic*.

The *Science of Logic* takes the philosophical ground clearing of the *Phenomenology*, and its discovery of the Concept, as a presupposition, and indeed as its sole presupposition. With that single exception, the *Logic* is a presuppositionless circle, in which each advance is equally a return to what is primary. "The essential requirement for the science of logic is . . . that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first."¹⁷ There is, throughout the *Science of Logic* a circle of reciprocal presupposing that returns to itself.¹⁸ The *Logic* begins with the Concept inherited from the *Phenomenology* and, as a circle, returns to it.

The image and its sublation are the subject matter (*res*) of the *Phenomenology*, making it the oration of the image. The *res* of the *Science of Logic*, however, is the Concept itself, which makes it, accordingly, the oration of the Concept. Taken together, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* form the grand oration of Spirit, which will take the individual, our philosophical pilgrim, through the various possible representations of, first, consciousness and, second, Spirit itself.

The chapters to follow will explore in greater detail the themes presented in schematic form here. In chapters two and three, I will discuss the background of the educational system which produced the young Hegel. This system had its roots in the poetry and myth of the earliest oracles and rhapsodes, and evolved through a period of centuries into a discernible rhetorical pedagogy which survived essentially intact through to Hegel's day.

Chapters four through seven will show how this rhetorical educational program served as a training ground and inspiration for Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, especially insofar as Hegel's first major work is so obviously and heavily rhetorical, imagistic, and tropological in tone, form, and substance. Hegel's ironical use of rhetoric and tropological images is the key to understanding the transition to the *Science of Logic*. The images that are laid bare in the Gallery of Images as lifeless, inert, merely pictorial representations of the truth mark the end of the conscious individual's formative education (*Bildung*). He has learned the unreality of sensuous beings, and begun to understand his own role in the process of cognition.

Such understanding is merely implicit, however, until the philosophical pilgrim leaves the Gallery of Images and the highway of despair that led him to it, and enters the pathway of hope in the *Science of Logic*, which promises, if not exactly affirmative knowledge, at least the prospect of it. In chapter nine, the Gallery of Images will emerge as ¹⁹the middle term between the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, enabling the articulation between these two works. In chapter ten, finally, I will discuss the logical *telos*, and its implications for understanding the *Logic* as the oration of the Concept. The relationship of *res* and *verba* in the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* will also come in for detailed treatment

Notes

¹ Karl Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971; 1844), 18. See also Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 16.

² One noted Hegel scholar to devote some attention to this speech is H. S. Harris. Harris puts forward the argument that Hegel may have intended this first declamation to be a subtle, and ironical, abuse of his audience. See H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development, Volume I: Toward the Sunlight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 42f.

³ On *genus demonstrativum*, see Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetoric* (Munich: Max Hueber, 1960), pars. 62-3 and 239-54.

⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988).

⁵ For these reasons, I generally use "*bildhaftes Denken*" for "picture-thinking," even though "picture-thinking" is in most cases a translation of "*Vorstellung*" in the *Phenomenology*.

⁶ See Donald Phillip Verene, *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), Chapter One.

⁷ *Phenomenology*, 11; *Phänomenologie*, 15.

⁸ Throughout the present work, I will be using "Concept" to translate "*der Begriff*," despite Miller's unfortunate (in my view) use of the word "Notion." Where I quote directly from Miller's translation, I have kept "Notion." "Notion" and "Concept" are used interchangeably throughout this work.

⁹ This view is perhaps best expressed in his short work, *Wer Denkt Abstrakt?* See G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke*, 20 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970),

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- 2:575-81; G. W. F. Hegel, "Who Thinks Abstractly?" in Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 461-65.
- 10 William Maker, *Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
- 11 *Phenomenology*, 44-45; *Phänomenologie*, 53.
- 12 *Phenomenology*, 492; *Phänomenologie*, 530.
- 13 *Phenomenology*, 490; *Phänomenologie*, 528.
- 14 *Phenomenology*, 65; *Phänomenologie*, 77.
- 15 *Phenomenology*, 492; *Phänomenologie*, 529.
- 16 *Phenomenology*, 493; *Phänomenologie*, 531.
- 17 G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), 71; G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986), 37.
- 18 *Science of Logic*, 681; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994), 123.

Chapter Two

Roots in the Rhetorical Tradition

Poetic and Mythic Origins

Rhetoric began as the search for lost eloquence, when heaven and earth were sundered by man's arrogance and divine pretensions. Such, at least, is the implication of the story recounted by Hesiod, according to which the opening of Pandora's box brought with it, along with all of the other ills of the world, the loss of man's capacity for divine speech. Zeus' punishment of Prometheus for giving man the power to create fire—heretofore the exclusive province of the gods—was to deny mortals knowledge of divine words, forcing them to fend for themselves using only the fallen language of humanity.¹ As a result of her transgression, Pandora was limited to a knowledge of only human words; she was thus put in an unenviable position as the first human not to be possessed of the capacity for divine speech. Her desire to be more like the gods made her the first true human being, cut off from the divine *Logos*.

Hesiod alludes to some fragmentary knowledge of a few divine words as late as Homer, clearly attesting to both the existence of this fundamental linguistic division between divine and human speech and the merely derivative nature of human language.² Pandora's trespass compelled man to use what little remained of his nearly-forgotten knowledge of the language of the gods in order to reconstruct an imitation of that divinely ordered speech. Rhetoric was born in

order to mend this breach, to fill the void left by the gods' rescinding the power of divine language.

This notion is supported by the accounts of eloquent speech provided by Homer in the *Illiad* and the *Odyssey*. In these works, only two classes of men possess the capacity for eloquent speech. The first is the Royal or God-Descended, of whom Nestor, King of Pylos, is the exemplar, a model of eloquence.³ Achilles, the hero of the *Illiad*, "is not only god-born but has been raised in a kingly fashion," making him "a rhetor of speech and a doer of deeds."⁴ This first-known use of the term "rhetor" identifies Achilles as the first of his kind, the archetypal, god-blessed hero, who is far from a mere spinner of fair words.⁵

The second group of men to whom the power of eloquent speech is conceded is the *aidoi*, the bards or rhapsodes who compose and sing songs of praise to the gods. Homer describes the *aidoi* as "divine" or "god-like" and claims that they receive their power of eloquence from Zeus himself, who had earlier deprived Pandora and her descendents of that same power.⁶ Pindar called them weavers of chants, "singers of verses stitched together."⁷ The *aidoi* gradually evolved into the formal guild of rhapsodes referred to in Plato's *Ion*.⁸ The *aidoi* and their heirs, the rhapsodes, preserved these two great Homeric works (among others) as part of a continuous oral tradition, which still bore, according to Hesiod, some connection to the language of the gods. By the sixth century B.C., the rhapsodes began preserving these works in written form. This procedure was so successful and widespread that, by the fifth century B.C., "private texts of Homer were known to have existed in Athens."⁹

The discipline of rhetoric, as it began to emerge from the shadow of its mythic, heroic origins, over time divided into three types of discourse—*heuristic*, *protreptic*, and *eristic*. Heuristic discourse is, as its name implies, concerned with learning and discovery, especially in the structuring of language. Heuristic discourse was regarded as primary by Latin rhetoricians—including Cicero¹⁰ and the author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium*,¹¹ both of whom termed it *inventio* (invention) and "gave it primacy among the canons of rhetoric."¹² As the intermediate figure between the ancient Greek world and Quintilian, Cicero's approval of this first kind of rhetoric has far-reaching implications, extending to Hegel's *gymnasial* studies in Stuttgart.¹³

Plato, among others, practiced and approved of *protreptic* discourse, a didactic process whereby minds are directed for some instructive purpose. While virtually every Platonic dialogue

exemplifies this rhetorical approach, perhaps the clearest example of it is to be found in the *Meno*, in which Socrates leads the slave boy through the Euclidean proofs. Plato himself strongly endorsed protreptic rhetoric for use in philosophy "because it provides direction for thought leading to knowledge."¹⁴

Eristic discourse, finally, takes as its focus the advocacy for a particular point of view. It aims to present the subject matter (*res*) in the best possible light for the position being defended, even at the expense of a full, comprehensive, or even honest presentation. As such, eristic discourse is clearly to be distinguished from heuristic. Heuristic rhetoric takes the *res* as primary, and strives not for partisan advantage, but simply for an understanding of the *res* in less prosaic and discursive terms than is typical of protreptic discourse.

Plato called eristic rhetoric "sophistry," but applied this term with such a broad brush that it ultimately included at least some forms of heuristic discourse, as well.¹⁵ "Sophistry" would become the label of choice for all forms of philosophical inquiry that emphasized the importance of the presentation of speech. This odious label was applied even to those forms of rhetoric—like that of Isocrates—which awarded a higher place to the content of the speech than to the manner of its exposition.

Isocrates

One early practitioner of heuristic rhetoric was Isocrates, whose school of rhetoric was established in 393 B.C., some six years prior to the opening of Plato's school in the *Academy* in 387 B.C. He was one of the Attic orators, who have been conventionally numbered at ten—Antiphon, Lysias, Andocides, Isaeus, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Dinarchus, and Isocrates. They wrote in the Attic dialect, and contributed greatly to the practice of logography, the writing of court speeches for litigants in Athens' famously litigious society.¹⁶ Cicero would later praise the Attics, "whose purity is untainted," as the orators most worthy of emulation.¹⁷

Isocrates was also at one time a member of the Socratic circle, as evidenced by his mention in the *Phaedrus* as a "companion of Socrates," and the favorable comparison of Isocrates to Lysias, another of the Attic orators. Socrates, in fact, predicts a great future for the young Isocrates.¹⁸ In addition to Socrates, Isocrates probably studied with Theramenes, as well as Prodicus of Ceos, and certainly traveled to

Thessaly to study with the aging Gorgias of Syracuse, subject of the famous Platonic dialogue which bears his name.¹⁹ Gorgias, in fact, appears to have wooed Isocrates away from the Socratic circle; thus, becoming the teacher of the man who would go on to codify and expand the educational curriculum that would mold generations of students over two millennia, including the young Hegel.

There is no doubt that Socrates' teachings had some effect on Isocrates, but the chief influence on Isocrates' rhetorical theory and practice, as well as his educational curriculum, or *paideia*, was Gorgias. It was Gorgias who had earlier pioneered the use of poetic devices in prose, which anticipated Isocrates' emphasis on arrangement, presentation, and delivery of a speech.²⁰ From circa 415-410 until 403, Isocrates remained in Thessaly with Gorgias, absorbing both the skills and the ideas that would later so greatly influence his own teaching.²¹ Chief among these was Gorgias' use of poetic language in his public speaking and declamation. Indeed, Gorgias believed that the poet and the orator should use not only similar language, but similar rhythm and meter as well. His pupil Isocrates went so far as to set himself up as a rival to Pindar, marking an "invasion" of sorts of the realm of lyric poetry by the forces of rhetoric.²² (In fact, though, this represented little more than a reclamation of the rhetor's original poetic standing as either a son of the gods or, at least, a member of the *aidoi*, a divinely inspired singer of poetic verse.)

The dual influences of Socratic and Gorgian teachings on Isocrates are well summarized by James J. Murphy in *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*. "From Gorgias, Isocrates accepted the notion that abstract truth is elusive and that the unending search for absolute definitions advocated by Socrates is futile. . . . Isocrates adopted from Socrates . . . his criticism of the sophistic excesses in Athens, his focus on ideas as prefatory to rhetorical technique, and his belief that education should develop moral virtue above all else. Isocrates is, then, a practical man who believes that rational discourse is possible while accepting other forms of nonrational discourse such as poetry as legitimate modes of persuasion."²³

As a student of Gorgias, Isocrates held that the elusiveness of truth required that it be eloquently presented; otherwise, there would be nothing to distinguish truth from falsity. On this view, eloquence serves to clothe the subject matter (*res*) in appropriately eloquent language (*verba*). Far from concealing the truth, in this manner alone can the truth be seen in its full majesty. Since the truth possesses by its

very nature a greater luster and sheen than its doppelgangers, when eloquently presented it will shine far brighter than the numerous pretenders to its throne. Thus, the orator must possess good character; given the power of eloquent speech to persuade, it must only be entrusted to those who will use that power well and wisely.

Further, as a student of Socrates, Isocrates was rightly convinced that the cultivation of character and the development of the best citizen should be central to the task of the philosopher. Isocrates' orator would not, however, construct any cities in speech—like the *Kallipolis* of Plato's *Republic*—much less live in them, being content to live the best life possible in the cities that man had already made. Isocrates rejected the Socratic idealism behind such utopian projects (with the implicit belief in man's theoretical perfectibility), while retaining the Socratic focus on character and virtue, in order to guard against the ever-present danger of the abuse of speech by evil men.

Despite his adherence to significant elements of Gorgias' teachings, Isocrates did not fit the mold of a sophist. In addition to his insistence on the importance of the character of the speaker, he rejected the formal rhetoric of the handbooks of the day, whose eristic method promised to produce victory in an almost automatic way, even without benefit of extensive knowledge, training, or practice. Against the eristic sophists, Isocrates instead insisted on the need for practice, innate gifts, and personal qualities, such as inventiveness, capacity for work, memory, voice, and tact.²⁴ The mere possession and mastery of a formal method was not sufficient, on Isocrates' view, for the acquisition of knowledge and the pursuit of a good life wisely conducted.

It is true that Isocrates' view of *philosophia*—which differed principally from the Platonic model in its greater breadth and inclusiveness—brought him into conflict with Plato and his followers. Isocrates believed that the Socratic and Platonic ideal of attaining indubitable knowledge from the heavens made the philosopher into a ridiculous, absurd, and pointless figure.²⁵ Isocrates' view of the philosopher's task was considerably more modest. It is nevertheless true that Isocrates held Plato's teachings in far higher esteem than he did those of the sophists of the day (notably Polycrates), who receive harsh treatment in the *Helen*, *Busiris*, and *Against the Sophists*. He also denounced Alcidas "who opposed the whole idea of the marriage of careful literary composition with public declamation."²⁶ Despite misgivings, Isocrates believed that the more abstract teachings of the Academy had some value as mental exercises, even if they were

of relatively little use in the real world, and in general viewed the doctrines issuing forth from it as at worst quaint, arcane, or impractical, but not in the least pernicious or damnable.²⁷

Isocrates' view, in short, was embedded in the world and its affairs. Isocrates did not consider a wise man one who claimed to have achieved divine understanding, but rather one who generally makes sound judgments in practical affairs, based on often incomplete information or knowledge.²⁸ It should not be forgotten that Isocrates was occupying a difficult middle position between, on the one hand, the sophists and their successors—especially Alcidas—whose teachings he rejected outright, and the Socratics, on the other.²⁹ Isocrates sought to combine the rhetorical brilliance of Gorgias with his own notion of *philosophia*, which saw a deep connection between the act of rhetorical writing or speaking and the character of the speaker. While the form of Isocrates' teaching was indeed rhetorical, it was the moral education of the rhetorician (or lack thereof) that made his speech good or bad; a bad man might be a skillful speaker, but never a good one.

Here, Isocrates agreed fundamentally with both of his teachers, Gorgias and Socrates. Following Socrates, he emphasized the importance of the quality of the speaker's character, for the very reason that, following Gorgias, he recognized the power of speech to conceal or reveal.³⁰ A good man will not conceal the good, or make it appear to be the bad, but a bad man cannot be counted upon to exercise such discretion and moral rectitude. For Isocrates, excellence of character is at least as important as possessing a refined style.

Thus, these two "rival" traditions—the Gorgian-Isocratean and the Socratic-Platonic—are in fact not merely compatible, but deeply and profoundly complementary. Isocrates avoided being a sophist precisely by combining the Gorgian emphasis on proper style, designed to present the truth in the fullest and clearest possible light, with the Socratic insistence on the centrality of character. Without the latter, Isocrates would in fact be the sophist that he is often charged with being; without the former, he would be another Socratic, more concerned with the world beyond than the world below.

The end of the Peloponnesian War saw the loss of his father's fortune, and forced Isocrates, against his inclination, to work as a logographer, a writer of law-court speeches, from circa 403-402 B.C. to 391-390 B.C.³¹ While this professional detour may have delayed Isocrates' rise to prominence as a noteworthy teacher of rhetoric, it had a profound effect on his future educational program. Combining the

Gorgian emphasis on poetical turns of phrase and rhetorical figures with his own experience as a logographer, Isocrates created the "set speech." The set speech would later evolve into the oration, as his example was "quickly and enthusiastically copied, to such an extent that in the Hellenistic age the oration became one of the most popular branches of literature and as a result came to have a special place in education."³²

As his fortunes improved, Isocrates opened a school of rhetoric. His school boasted, at the end of some 55 years, over 100 alumni, among whom were the most accomplished and noteworthy in Greece. The curriculum was four years long, and the number of students at any given time was between four and nine. Isocrates' graduates included Androtion the historian, Eunomos, Lysitheides, Calippos, Oneter, Anticles, Philonides, Charmantides, Theodectes, the critic Asclepius, Theopompus, Ephorus, Hyperides, Isaeus, Lycurgus, Timotheus—the pride of the school—and, interestingly, Speusippus—Plato's nephew and successor as head of the Academy. (This last fact supports my view of the complementary nature of Platonic and Isocratean teaching. Indeed, it is doubtful that Plato could have regarded Isocrates as a sophist, if he viewed Speusippus—with his Isocratean background—as fit to replace him.) The great Attic orator, Demosthenes, was denied admission due to his inability to pay the required fee.³³

Notwithstanding his practical emphasis, and his embrace of the Gorgian ideal of combining poetic language with persuasive speech, Isocrates introduced into rhetoric a strongly ethical element, absent from the work of the eristic sophists, from whom Isocrates took great pains to distinguish himself. As he writes in *Against the Sophists*, "Indeed, who can fail to abhor, yes to condemn, those teachers, in the first place, who devote themselves to disputation, since they pretend to search for truth, but straightaway at the beginning of their professions attempt to deceive us with lies."³⁴

Isocrates' criticisms of the eristic sophists are most severe on the point of their unfounded and insincere claims to teach virtue.³⁵ For Isocrates, good character combined with the ability to speak well make a good man. Near the end of his life, Isocrates claimed that an educated man would possess, first, "judgment that meets each occasion," as well as decency, tolerance, self-control, and, especially, "equanimity in the face of both success and failure."³⁶

Given Isocrates' views on the relationship of poetry and rhetoric, it should come as no surprise that he taught his students, first

and foremost, via the use of classical models. As would be the case for the young Hegel at the *Gymnasium Illustre*, Isocrates' students developed both rhetorical skill and the moral and practical virtues necessary for a good man via reading and imitation. "The pupil was not left to his own devices: the essential part of the apprenticeship was the study and criticism of first-class models. As an inheritor of the oldest tradition, Isocrates adapted to literature the fundamental ideas of Homeric education: 'example' and 'imitation.' . . . By doing this, he in turn inaugurated a tradition, and one which was to last: this classical idea of the imitation of literary works now has a long history behind it."³⁷ The study of the written and spoken word, "with the thought and expression that accompanied it . . . was the main instrument of his teaching."³⁸

Isocrates' students spent the bulk of their time reading and writing. His emphasis on reading, noteworthy among early rhetoricians, may have been influenced by his own famously weak voice, and a neurotic shyness that may have been agoraphobia.³⁹ His curriculum included works of "Hellanicus, Thucydides, Herodotus, and other historians,"⁴⁰ in addition to the Homeric epics. Students also read examples of oratory, including some of Isocrates' speeches, which "provided them with their chief models of style; but, they also drew ideas from classical speeches like Antiphon *On the Revolution*, Lysias *12 Against Eratosthenes* and *25 Defence of the Charge of Subverting the Democracy*. Analysis of style and subject matter, comparison with other work, correction, perhaps some form of competition between pupils were the main features of Isocrates' teaching."⁴¹

Following the Gorgian model, Isocrates made his students learn model speeches by heart.⁴² This, combined with this own experience as a logographer, made written discourse his main teaching medium.⁴³ In addition to the study and memorization of these classical models, "Isocrates taught his students science, mathematics, geometry, philosophy, and rhetoric. In addition, his students were schooled in the arts and in gymnastics. Thus, when the student spoke, he was utilizing his mind and body completely in the speech."⁴⁴

The excellence of Isocrates' educational program was hailed by no less a figure than Cicero, the next link in the pedagogical chain connecting eighteenth century Stuttgart to fourth century B.C. Athens. Cicero referred to Isocrates' protégés and his school in most glowing terms, noting that from it, "as from the Trojan horse, none but real heroes proceeded."⁴⁵ Isocrates' ideas would remain a powerful force, whose weight and influence would increase with time, as his

pedagogical approach was refined and adapted by others, notably Cicero and Quintilian.

Cicero

Marcus Tullius Cicero, who lived from 106 to 43 B.C., is the next major figure in the pedagogical genealogy connecting Hegel with the ancient rhetorical tradition. His major rhetorical treatises, collectively known as *Rhetorica*, include *De Inventione* (c. 86 B.C.), *De Oratore* (55 B.C.), *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*, (46 B.C.) and *Orator* (46 B.C.), of which I will consider all but the last.⁴⁶ Cicero most likely wrote the earliest of these, *De Inventione*, between the ages of 15 and 19. This youthful work amounted to a creative summary of current Greek textbooks used in instruction in rhetoric, and is thus of principally historical interest, since it serves as an illustration of the rhetorical and pedagogical practices of the day.⁴⁷ In the earliest stages, literature was taught, as the young boys learned from these models how to formulate a good style, which was "fit for oratory. The boys thereupon were taken in hand by the rhetoricians, the professional teachers of speaking. And even the philosophers, who completed the education if it were not already considered complete, gave much of their time to oratory. . . . Young men, scarcely more than boys were taken to the forum . . . and there they were constantly listening to speeches."⁴⁸ Cicero received a thorough rhetorical education and engaged in "constant practise in declamation, both by himself and with his friends, as well as an almost daily attendance in the forum, where he observed the various speakers with a view to improving his own method."⁴⁹

Cicero defines the five parts of argument, and consequently the five duties of an orator, as Invention (*inventio*), Arrangement (*dispositio*), Expression (*elocutio*), Memory (*memoria*), and Delivery (*pronuntiatio*). "Invention is the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments to render one's cause plausible. Arrangement is the distribution of arguments thus discovered in the proper order. Expression is the fitting of the proper language to the invented matter. Memory is the firm mental grasp of matter and words. Delivery is the control of voice and body in a manner suitable to the dignity of the subject matter and the style."⁵⁰ In the same section, Cicero also clearly confirms the debt owed by Roman rhetoricians to the Greek tradition,⁵¹

a debt of which Cicero's own studies in Athens made him acutely aware.⁵²

These exercises, if properly pursued by young men of appropriate talent and disposition, lead to the creation of a perfect type, the ideal orator. In *De Oratore*, or *The Making of an Orator*, Cicero claims that there is only one kind of ideal orator, and reiterates Isocrates' position that this orator will be a man of a good character. Specifically, "the genuine orator must have investigated and heard and read and discussed and handled and debated the whole of the contents of the life of mankind, inasmuch as that is the field of the orator's activity, the subject matter of his study."⁵³ In addition to possessing a comprehensive understanding, this ideal orator must be able to speak well, with eloquence, in order to give the fullest possible expression to such an impressive array of potential subjects.

Cicero identifies the four prerequisites of style for oratory as correct diction (grammar), lucidity, ornament, and appropriateness of style.⁵⁴ Although all are necessary, it is only the mastery of these last two which entitles a man to claim the title "orator," the first two being "quite easy . . . but the remaining ones are big matters, involved, shifting and difficult, and on them depends all success in winning credit for talent and applause for eloquence; for nobody ever admired an orator for correct grammar, they only laugh at him if his grammar is bad, and not only think him no orator but not even a human being; no one ever sang the praises of a speaker whose style succeeded in making his meaning intelligible to his audience, but only despised one deficient in capacity to do so."⁵⁵

The true orator is not merely one who can make himself understood, but rather one who can, additionally, persuade his audience by moving them to accept the truth of the words he speaks. Eloquence exists in tandem with style and expression, and no man can be an orator without it. "Who is thought to be so to say a god among men? It is those whose speeches are clear, explicit and full, perspicuous in matter and in language, and who in the actual delivery achieve a sort of rhythm and cadence—that is, those whose style is what I call artistic."⁵⁶

Cicero was himself a poet, described by one twentieth century biographer as "probably neither better nor worse than his literary contemporaries,"⁵⁷ and by Plutarch as "the best poet of Rome."⁵⁸ Whomever we are to believe, Cicero—like Isocrates—valued poetry as a form of human expression. Cicero describes eloquence, with all of the associated poetical figures, as "one of the supreme virtues . . .

which, after compassing a knowledge of facts, gives verbal expression to the thoughts and purposes of the mind in such a manner as to have the power of driving the hearers forward in any direction in which it has applied its weight." There is, finally, as for Isocrates, a moral element to the training of the ideal orator; indeed, the stronger the power of expression possessed by the speaker, "the more necessary it is for it to be combined with integrity and supreme wisdom."⁵⁹

Regarding wisdom, Cicero blames Socrates and his followers for bringing about the diremption of philosophy and oratory, which had other insidious effects on the tree of knowledge, cutting the early connection between wisdom and eloquence.⁶⁰ "The older masters down to Socrates used to combine with their theory of rhetoric the whole of the study and the science of everything that concerns morals and conduct and ethics and politics; it was subsequently . . . that the two groups of students were separated from one another, by Socrates and then similarly by the Socratic schools," with the effect that "the philosophers looked down on eloquence and the orators on wisdom."⁶¹ This, claims Cicero, the orator should not do. In addition to comprehensive knowledge of his subject matter, the orator needs wide culture,⁶² even as he limits his studies to their practical object.⁶³ The ideal orator shares, moreover, certain traits with a skilled actor; he must control and direct his body movements, and be aware of their effect on his audience. This necessitates his being trained in such arts as wrestling and dancing, in order to master the physical movements and bodily expressiveness required of true oratory.⁶⁴

The ideal orator emerges, then, as at once the most skilled speaker and as the highest human type, who will succeed in giving life to truth by enabling wisdom to speak. For Cicero, expression is integral to wisdom, since wisdom lacking effective voice is mute, like the knowledge of the proverbial wise man on the mountain—the hermit who keeps both his own company and counsel. Such "truth" is without outlet, and hence without purpose. Nonetheless, Cicero does indeed prefer "wisdom lacking power of expression to talkative folly," but his ideal type is "the orator who possesses learning," especially if he is also a philosopher.

Cicero believes that philosophical exposition benefits greatly from style and eloquent expression.⁶⁵ He claims that style has a subconscious effect on audiences, and that it reveals rather than obscures the truth. This is so because everyone is able to "discriminate between what is right and what wrong in matters and proportion by a sort of subconscious instinct . . . they display this . . . in judging the

rhythms and pronunciations of words, because these are rooted deep in the general sensibility."⁶⁶ The ornate rhetoric favored by Cicero is concerned with the proper use of words—including illustrative metaphors⁶⁷—as well as the structure of the sentence, specifically its syntax and its rhythm.⁶⁸

The rhetorician is also, most significantly for the present purpose, a creator of images born of well-constructed language. Near the end of *De Oratore*, Cicero insists on the importance of using language not only to weave together arguments, but also to create visual impressions. These impressions will have a powerful persuasive effect on the reader or auditor, for "a great impression is made by dwelling on a single point, and also by a clear explanation and almost visual presentation of events as if practically going on."⁶⁹

In *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*, Cicero reiterates his earlier positions in *De Inventione* and *De Oratore*, but with some noteworthy additions.⁷⁰ He claims that eloquence consists of language and thought,⁷¹ and is thus not reducible merely to expression, or *elocutio*. Ciceronian rhetoric is far more than mere flourishes and sophistic excess. The mind and character of the orator are constantly in play, as well. The orator must so arrange his words, indeed structure them, that they produce the two effects of rhythm and smoothness,⁷² and he should be possessed of a good memory, since memory "is the foundation" of oratory.⁷³

Cicero here repeats his claim that while there are different styles of oratory, there is only one kind,⁷⁴ and hence the orator is not to be divided "into types, for I am looking for the perfect example. There is only one kind of perfect orator. . . . The supreme orator . . . is the one whose speech instructs, delights, and moves the minds of his audience. The orator is duty bound to instruct, giving pleasure is a free gift to the audience, to move them is indispensable."⁷⁵

This highest type is embodied in the Attic orators and writers, of whom Isocrates was a prominent member. Cicero praises Aeschines, Demosthenes, and Lysias directly and says of the entire group, "Let us imitate them if we can."⁷⁶ As mentioned earlier, Cicero had great praise for Isocrates' school, writing that from it, "as from the Trojan horse, none but real heroes proceeded."⁷⁷ Cicero preserved and refined the rhetorical style of the Attic orators, and thus gave further expression to the voices of the Attic orators, whose teachings were so well summarized by Isocrates. It would be left to yet another great figure to integrate more fully the ebullient rhetorical prowess of Cicero

and the pedagogical theory of Isocrates, thereby creating a system of education which survives, largely intact, to this day.

Quintilian

The Attic rhetorical tradition partially systematized by Isocrates, and more precisely refined and codified by Cicero, received its next significant contribution from the first century A.D. orator and school-master, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus. Quintilian, who lived circa A.D. 35-98, was born in Calagurris (modern Calahorra, Spain). He may have received his elementary education in Spain, but traveled to Rome for advanced education at about the age of 16.⁷⁸ Domitus Afer, a famous orator who had held high office under Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero, took the young Quintilian under his wing, and with this esteemed rhetorician Quintilian served an apprenticeship of sorts, observing his master in the law courts, until his return to Calagurris when he was about twenty five.⁷⁹

Quintilian came back to Rome at the end of A.D. 68, and in 72 became one of the rhetoricians to receive an annual subsidy from Vespasian. By 84, his fame and reputation had grown to such an extent that he merited an epigram by Martial:

Quintiliane, vagae moderator summe iuventae,

*Gloria Romanae, Quintiliane, togae.*⁸⁰

In the year 88, he was appointed head of the first public school in Rome, and was acknowledged as the "first teacher" of the Imperial City.⁸¹ His students included—among others—Tacitus, Suetonius, Juvenal, and Pliny the Younger.⁸²

As the first teacher of Rome, Quintilian made use of earlier models, for which he provided a clearer structure and, as in the case of his insistence on the importance of grammar—a sentiment shared by Isocrates and Cicero—a definitive defense. Morals occupied a place of central importance for Quintilian, as for Isocrates and Cicero. Following Cato, Quintilian defined an orator, and the art of oratory itself, as "*vir bonus dicendi peritus*" or "a good man speaking well (or skillfully)."⁸³ Above all, the orator must "possess the quality which Cato places first and which is in the very nature of things the greatest

and most important, that is, he must be a good man. This is essential not merely on account of the fact that, if the powers of eloquence serve only to lend arms to crime, there can be nothing more pernicious than eloquence to public and private welfare alike, while I myself, who have laboured to the best of my ability to contribute something of value to oratory, shall have rendered the worst of services to mankind, if I forge these weapons not for a soldier, but for a robber."⁸⁴

Quintilian's educational program finds its ultimate inspiration not as much in either Plato or Aristotle, as in the Isocratean trilogy of talent, education, and practice.⁸⁵ Quintilian's contribution to the theory and practice of education, like that of the Roman system itself, was essentially architectonic. Quintilian is, in this sense, emblematic of the overall tenor of Roman education, and—as the first teacher of Rome—is largely responsible for its astounding success. Indeed, as James J. Murphy writes, the Roman education system “worked so well that it outlasted its architects.”⁸⁶

Like Cicero, Quintilian's goal in educating boys to be citizen-orators was to create, not just skillful speakers, but men of high character, who would use their skills in the service of the truth. “We are to form, then, the perfect orator, who cannot exist unless he is above all a good man. We require in him, therefore, not only consummate ability in speaking, but also every excellence of mind.”⁸⁷ Quintilian incorporated into his educational program exercises which had been standard since Cicero's time, and, drawing together these many separate strands, wove them together into a unified, coherent educational program.

Interestingly, embedded within Quintilian's rhetorical approach is the use of earlier exercises as the foundation for more difficult ones, an anticipation of Hegel's use of *Aufhebung*. In his system, “each succeeding exercise is more difficult and incorporates what has been learned in the preceding ones. . . . Each is important for itself, but takes greater importance from its place within the whole.”⁸⁸ Quintilian identifies five elements of a rhetorical education—precept, imitation, composition exercises, declamation, and sequencing.⁸⁹

Quintilian's discussion of the first of the five elements of a rhetorical education, precept, takes up eight of the twelve books of the *Institutio Oratoria*. Directly echoing Cicero, Quintilian identifies precept with what Cicero called the duties of an orator—Invention (*inventio*), Arrangement (*dispositio*), Expression (*elocutio*), Memory (*memoria*), and Delivery (*pronuntiatio*).⁹⁰ Quintilian gives admirable

systematic expositions of each of these duties, more clearly codifying Cicero's earlier efforts.

Imitation, the second element of a rhetorical education, involves the study of models to learn how others have used language. Specific exercises include reading aloud (*lectio*), the schoolmaster's detailed analysis of a text (*praelectio*), memorization of models, paraphrase of models, transliteration to or from prose and verse in Latin and Greek, and the recitation and correction of paraphrase or transliteration.⁹¹ Prominent among the authors to be read were Livy and Cicero, as well as the great Attic orator, Demosthenes,⁹² of whom—Quintilian maintained—Cicero was at least the equal in oratory.⁹³

Composition exercises, the third element of a rhetorical education, consist of a series of writing assignments of gradually increasing degrees of difficulty. One significant aspect of these exercises is the fact that they do not represent discrete tasks, each separate from the others. Each exercise presupposes the mastery of the previous one; thus (as in Hegel's notion of *Aufhebung*) implicit within each are the remnants of those already performed.

These exercises include retelling a fable; retelling an episode from a poet or historian; the amplification of a moral theme (*chreia*); amplification of an aphorism (*sententia*) or proverb; refutation or confirmation of a thing admitted; "commonplace" (or confirmation of a thing admitted); encomium, i.e. eulogy (or dispraise) of a person or thing; comparison of things or persons; impersonation (*ethologia*, *ethopoeia*, *prosopopeia*); description or vivid presentation of details; thesis (or argument for or against an answer to a general question, *quaestio infinita*, not involving individuals); and laws or arguments for or against a law.⁹⁴

The fourth element of a rhetorical education, declamation, was the centerpiece of Quintilian's educational program, with all of the other exercises leading up to it. Preparing students to perform declamations was in fact, as for Hegel's *Gymnasium Illustre*, the goal of the entire educational system.⁹⁵ These speeches on a fictitious or historical theme were of two types: *sauseria*, or deliberative speech advocating or opposing a certain action, and *controversia*, or forensic speech prosecuting an imagined or historical person in a law case.⁹⁶ More than a millennium and a half later, the successful performance of a public declamation remained, for Hegel and all of the other students at the *Gymnasium Illustre* in Stuttgart, the prime pedagogical objective.

The fifth and final element of Quintilian's rhetorical pedagogy is sequencing, the arrangement of classroom activities to accomplish two goals. These goals are, first, movement from the simple to the more complex, and, second, reinforcement, which is accomplished by reiterating each element of preceding exercises as each new one appears, both of which remain integral to education to the present day. Each exercise is to be incorporated into the exercises which follow it, even as it is completed and left behind, with each succeeding exercise dependent on the mastery of those which came before—much like Hegel's use of *Aufhebung*.

In Books I and II of his *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian explains how these five elements are incorporated together into the education of youth. His educational program has three stages. These are, first, early lessons in speech, second, studies with the *grammaticus* or grammarian, and, finally, studies with the *rhetor*.

Quintilian believes that these studies should begin early, and takes exception to those who claim that boys under the age of seven should not be taught due to the small profit they will gain from their studies. Against this position, he argues that "those who are of the opinion which I have mentioned appear, with regard to this part of life, to have spared not so much the learners as the teachers. What else, after they are able to speak, will children do better, for they must do something? Or why should we despise the gain, how little soever it be, previous to the age of seven years?"⁹⁷ Well aware of the limited abilities of such young students, however, Quintilian warns against being an over-strict taskmaster:

Yet I am not so unacquainted with differences of age as to think that we should urge those of tender years severely or exact a full complement of work from them. It will be necessary, above all things, to take care, lest the child should conceive a dislike to the application which he cannot yet love, and continue to dread the bitterness which he has once tasted, even beyond the years of infancy. Let his instruction be an amusement to him; let him be questioned and praised; let him never feel pleased that he does not know a thing; and sometimes, if he is unwilling to learn, let another be taught before him, of whom he may be envious. Let him strive for victory now and then, and generally suppose that he gains it; and let his powers be called forth by such rewards as that age prizes.⁹⁸

Quintilian continues for several pages with specific instructions on the teaching of syllables, spelling, word recognition, and the eventual making of sentences.⁹⁹ He claims that one should begin by instructing the young boy in Greek, rather than Latin, and that public education is to be preferred over private tutors. Since the boy is being groomed as a public speaker, it will hardly do for him to be raised and instructed in a manner more befitting the solitary philosopher than the public man of action, the orator.¹⁰⁰ Writing is central to these early lessons, and "is of utmost importance in our studies, and by it alone sure proficiency, resting on the deepest roots, is secured."¹⁰¹ Even at the earliest stage of education, Quintilian echoes Isocrates' insistence on the significance of the written word, alongside the spoken.

When evaluating a boy's suitability for training as a rhetorician, the "chief symptom of ability . . . is memory, of which the excellence is twofold: to receive with ease, and to retain with fidelity. The next symptom is imitation; for that is an indication of a teachable disposition."¹⁰² The words, phrases, and images accumulated at this stage, if properly received and retained, will form the storehouse of memory for the young rhetorician's later attempts at genuine eloquence. Recollection is key to the orator's task of eloquence, for only such prodigious memory will allow the orator to hold his entire speech in his mind all at once, while he gives it appropriately ornate expression in eloquent language. Eloquence, as *eloqui*, signifies the orator's ability to communicate to the audience all that he has in his mind. The speech is retained in the orator's memory as a whole, as it is gradually unveiled to his auditors via the orator's power of speech. It is recollection alone that allows the orator's speech to be complete and, hence, eloquent.¹⁰³

Upon the successful completion of these early efforts, the boy begins his studies with the *grammaticus*, or grammarian. Following Cicero, Quintilian stresses the importance of proper grammar. "Since all language has three kinds of excellence, to be correct, perspicuous, and elegant (for to speak with propriety, which is its highest quality, most writers include under elegance) . . . let the grammarian consider well the rules for correctness which constitute the first part of grammar."¹⁰⁴ In addition to conducting the expected drills in grammar and proper diction, the *grammaticus* leads the student through detailed analysis of poetry (*praelectio*) and also has them hear poetry read aloud (*lectio*). It is also with the grammarian that students begin

exercises in composition, specifically the retelling of fables, paraphrases of poetry, the writing of aphorisms (*sententiae*), formal application of maxims (*chriae*), and *ethologiae* (character descriptions). They are to study contributory subjects, such as music, geometry, and astronomy—and to receive lessons in enunciation from an actor,¹⁰⁵ much as Cicero had advocated in *De Oratore*.¹⁰⁶

Having completed his work with the *grammaticus*, the young man begins his studies with the rhetor, the teacher of public speaking. The student of the rhetor performs further exercises in composition, similar in many respects to those undertaken under the supervision of the *grammaticus*, but at a more advanced level. The imitation and memorization of first-class models still occupies, as with the *grammaticus*, a central position, preceded by the rhetor's analysis (*praelectio*) and reading (*lectio*) of these models,¹⁰⁷ but is supplemented with original compositions by the students themselves.

These compositions form the core of the students' rhetorical instruction. Students give, first, *praeformata*, speeches from an assigned outline, and later perform declamations (*declamatio*), or speeches on a hypothetical case, either deliberative (*suasoria*) or forensic (*controversia*). To perform a successful declamation was—as for the students of the Gymnasium Illustre—seen as the crowning achievement of both the student and the entire system of education. The ability to give speeches in public was the principal, if not the sole, graduation criterion—a tradition echoed well over a millennium and a half later as Hegel gave his valedictory oration in Stuttgart. Upon mastering the art of the public declamation, the student was to enter society and take an active role in the life of the city, which was the goal of the education of the citizen-orator. The solitary life of the abstract philosopher was anathema to the entire educational program put into place by Quintilian. The orator must be first and foremost a citizen, advocating for the public good of the nation.

Quintilian's influence was both enduring and profound. As the first teacher of Rome (and the first person ever to be awarded a chair of rhetoric supported by the Empire¹⁰⁸), Quintilian was responsible for systematizing and—more significantly—institutionalizing a rhetorically based educational program which was to become the model for the entire Roman Empire. By conquest, assimilation, and imitation, Quintilian's pedagogical system became the standard for the entire Western world, with Quintilian as its ultimate schoolmaster. From the time of Quintilian in the first century A.D. to the fall of the Western Empire, Quintilian's teaching system

and methods were spread to the far corners of the known world, with lasting effect.¹⁰⁹

Notes

¹ Hesiod, *Theogony, Works and Days, Shield*, trans. A. N. Athanassakis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1983), 69-70; Richard Leo Enos, *Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle* (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1993), 1.

² Hesiod, 13-14; Pietro Pucci, *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1977), 91.

³ Enos, 9.

⁴ Ibid. (Enos cites simply Homer, *Illiad*, 9. 443 for this quotation. The same passage is rendered somewhat differently in Samuel Butler's translation, which attributes to Achilles "excellence in speech and action." Cf. Homer, *Illiad*, trans. S. Butler (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1995), 137.)

⁵ Enos, 9.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Pindar, *Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments*, trans. W. H. Race (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1997), 17.

⁸ Enos, 9.

⁹ Ibid.; Xenophon, *Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology*, trans. E. C. Marchant and O. J. Todd (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1997), 273-275, 559.

¹⁰ Cicero, *De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1993).

¹¹ Pseudo-Cicero, *Ad Herrenium*, trans. H. Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1989).

¹² Enos, 3.

¹³ For more on the Homeric origins and significance of heuristic rhetoric, see Enos, pp. 4-8.

¹⁴ Enos, 3; Plato, *Euthydemus*, 278c,d, 282d, 288d,e, trans. W. H. D. Rouse, in Plato, *Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989).

¹⁵ Plato, *Sophist*, 225c, 231e, trans. F. M. Cornford, in Plato, *Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989).

¹⁶ Kathleen E. Welch, "Isocrates," in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*, ed. T. Enos (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), 358.

¹⁷ Cicero, *De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*, 361.

¹⁸ Plato, *Phaedrus*, 278e-279b, trans. R. Hackforth, in Plato, *Collected Dialogues*.

¹⁹ Isocrates, *Isocrates: Panegyricus & To Nicoles: Greek Orators III*, 3.

²⁰ Welch, 359.

²¹ H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. G. Lamb (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), 79.

²² Marrou, 81.

²³ James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula, *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric* (Davis, California: Hermagoras Press, 1995), 46.

²⁴ Marrou, 84.

²⁵ Ibid., 89-90.

²⁶ Isocrates, *Isocrates: Panegyricus & To Nicoles: Greek Orators III*, 7.

²⁷ Ibid., 7, 9; Marrou, 79.

²⁸ Isocrates, *Isocrates: Panegyricus & To Nicoles: Greek Orators III*, 9.

²⁹ Marrou, 85.

³⁰ Murphy, 34.

³¹ Marrou, 80.

³² Ibid., 80-81.

³³ Ibid., 86; Isocrates, *Isocrates: Panegyricus & To Nicoles: Greek Orators III*, 5-6.

³⁴ John F. Dobson, *The Greek Orators* (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1919), 141; Isocrates, *Isocrates*, 3 vols, trans. G. Norlin (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1954-56), Vol II, 163.

³⁵ *Isocrates*, 3 vols, trans. G. Norlin, 165-67.

³⁶ *Isocrates: Panegyricus & To Nicoles: Greek Orators III*, 9.

³⁷ Marrou, 84.

³⁸ *Isocrates: Panegyricus & To Nicoles: Greek Orators III*, 8.

³⁹ Marrou, 85.

⁴⁰ *Isocrates: Panegyricus & To Nicoles: Greek Orators III*, 9.

⁴¹ Ibid., 9-10.

⁴² Ibid., 2; Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, 34 183b 36, trans. W. A. Pickard, in Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

⁴³ *Isocrates: Panegyricus & To Nicoles: Greek Orators III*, 2; Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, 34 183b 16.

⁴⁴ Murphy, 46.

⁴⁵ Cicero, *Cicero on Oratory and Orators*, trans. J. S. Watson (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1970), 108.

⁴⁶ My reasons for neglecting *Orator* have to do with the polemic character of this last work. *Orator*'s central purpose is to defend Ciceronian rhetoric from attacks by those who favored the rhetoric of Calvus and Brutus, and the other "Attici," whose plainer, less ornate style represented a direct challenge to Cicero's more elaborate and exuberant rhetorical approach. The bulk of the treatise centers on *elocutio*, since it was on the point of the proper role of *elocutio* that Cicero and the Attici principally differed. For further discussion see, Cicero, *Orator*, trans. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1997), 297-98.

⁴⁷ Cicero himself later denounced *De Inventione* as nothing more than the notes of a schoolboy. See R. L. Enos, "Cicero," in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*, 104.

- ⁴⁸ Torsten Petersson, *Cicero: A Biography* (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1963), 70.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 71.
- ⁵⁰ Cicero, *De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*, 18-21.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 19.
- ⁵² Richard Leo Enos, "Cicero" in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*, 103.
- ⁵³ Cicero, *De Oratore, Book III, De Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1992), 43.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 31, 78.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.
- ⁵⁷ Petersson, 349-351.
- ⁵⁸ Plutarch, *Plutarch's Lives*, trans. A. H. Clough (Danbury, CT: Grolier Enterprises Corp., 1990), 219.
- ⁵⁹ Cicero, *De Oratore, Book III, De Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria*, 43.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 57.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, 59.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, 65.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 67.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 113.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 155.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 117.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 135.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 161.
- ⁷⁰ Cicero, *De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 357.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, 359.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 357.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 361.
- ⁷⁷ *Cicero on Oratory and Orators*, 108.
- ⁷⁸ James J. Murphy (ed.), *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing* (Cardondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1987), xiv.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, xv.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, xvi. "O Quintilian, supreme guide of unsettled youth, Glory of the Roman toga, O Quintilian."
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸² James J. Murphy, "Quintilian," in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*, 581.

⁸³ *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, xviii; Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, 4 vols., trans. H. E. Butler (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1993), vol. 4, 355.

⁸⁴ Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, vol. 4, 355-57.

⁸⁵ *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, xxviii-xxix. For further discussion of Quintilian's reliance on Isocrates, see Murphy (ed.), *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, Introduction.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, xxviii.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, xxxi.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, xxx-xxxii.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, xxx.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, xxx-xxxii.

⁹² Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, vol. 4, 23-27.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁹⁴ *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, xxxi.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, xxiii.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, xxxii.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15-18.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, xxxii, 11-24.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁰³ For further discussion of *Eloqui*, see Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, Book VII - IX, trans. H. E. Butler (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1996), 185. Cf. Cicero, *De Oratore: Books I - II*, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1996), xxi, 67; and Cicero, *Brutus, Orator*, trans. G. L. Hendrickson, H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1997), 339, 351.

¹⁰⁴ *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, 35.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, xxxiii.

¹⁰⁶ Cicero, *De Oratore*, Book III, *De Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria*, 67.

¹⁰⁷ *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, xxxiv.

¹⁰⁸ George A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994), 177.

¹⁰⁹ *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, xxxviii-xxxix.

Chapter Three

An Enduring Legacy

The *Metalogicon* of John of Salisbury

Quintilian had, as has been shown, an enormous influence on the Roman educational system, which, in turn, educated early Christian leaders such as Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. Augustine was indeed “himself a teacher of rhetoric in a school following Quintilian’s program.”¹ Quintilian figures in the writings of Jerome; and the Roman rhetorician, Julius Victor, “writing in the fifth century, absorbed so much of Quintilian into his own *Ars rhetorica*² that some modern editors have used it to correct the text of the *Institutio oratoria* itself.”³ In Quintilian’s own time, Juvenal and other contemporaries spoke glowingly of the first teacher of Rome, and Tacitus’ *Dialogue on Orators* is noteworthy for, among other reasons, its strict fidelity to Quintilian and his educational program.⁴

Quintilian’s direct influence extended well into the Middle Ages and beyond. He continued to be a source for authors in the early medieval period, and is mentioned by Cassiodorus (480-575), Isidore of Seville (570-636), Servatus Lupus (805-860), and Alcuin—Charlemagne’s aide. Quintilian’s influence gradually waned, however, and sometime in the eighth or ninth century the original text of the *Institutio oratoria* was lost, leaving only a poorly edited and greatly abridged version.⁵ A great resurgence of interest in Quintilian’s work followed the discovery in 1416 of a complete text of

the *Institutio Oratoria* in an old tower at the monastery of St. Gallen in Switzerland by Poggio Bacciolini, who quickly copied the entire opus by hand.⁶

This last fact makes the continuing influence of Quintilian's educational program and the resurgence of interest in his work during the "Renaissance of the Twelfth Century" in medieval France all the more remarkable. Quintilian's program of instruction outlasted the Empire that brought it to the corners of the known world. Well into the 1300's, the Roman educational system established by Quintilian was still in place in France and elsewhere in the former Western Empire, even at a time when the original text upon which his pedagogical system had been based was no longer available. So firmly established was Quintilian's *praxis* that even the loss of the accompanying *theoria* (i.e., the *Institutio Oratoria*) did surprisingly little to diminish Quintilian's enduring legacy. Quintilian had been thoroughly absorbed in the educational practice of Western Europe. Nearly three centuries before Bacciolini's rediscovery of the *Institutio Oratoria* in 1416, John of Salisbury provided an account of his own education in his *Metalogicon*, which is described as "the cardinal treatise of mediaeval pedagogy."⁷ This work describes an educational system still following a curriculum and methodology directly tied to the pedagogy of the *Institutio Oratoria*.

The *Metalogicon* of John of Salisbury (born circa 1115-1120) confirms the prevalence of Quintilian's pedagogical methods in twelfth century Europe.⁸ In it, John provides a detailed account of his own education under the direction of such luminaries as Peter Abelard, Robert of Melun (later Bishop of Hereford), Thierry of Chartres, William of Conches, Richard l'Eveque, Gilbert de la Porree, and Robert Pullen, the English divine, and makes clear the pedagogical debt owed by these men to Quintilian.⁹ (John was also the assistant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, first Theobald, then Thomas Becket, and, on December 29, 1170, was witness to the infamous murder in the cathedral.¹⁰)

The education that John describes at Chartres, following the methods of Bernard of Chartres and his disciples, awards the study of grammar a place of central importance. Grammar is indeed the foundation of the more advanced rhetorical studies to follow. Directly echoing the sentiments of Isocrates and Cicero, John says that grammar includes poetry, since it, like grammar, reflects the natural order.¹¹ The writing and speaking that make up the centerpiece of a

retorically structured education must, accordingly, "take into account, not merely poetical feet and meters, but also age, place, and time, in addition to other circumstances, whose detailed enumeration does not suit our present purpose. Suffice it to say that all of these are products from nature's workshop. . . . I venture to opine that poetry belongs to grammar, which is its mother and the nurse of its study. Although neither poetry nor grammar is entirely natural, and each owes most of its content to man, its author and inventor, nevertheless nature successfully asserts some authority in both. Either poetry will remain a part of grammar, or it will be dropped from the roll of liberal studies."¹² John goes on to call poetry the "cradle of philosophy."¹³

The dual emphasis on both the written and spoken word—a prominent feature of the figures already examined—retains its place in John's prescription for a sound education. Following Isidore's *Etymology*, John defines grammar—the foundation of rhetoric—as "the science of writing and speaking in a correct manner."¹⁴ He also claims that all other studies depend on the mastery of grammar, as when he writes that "grammar prepares the mind to understand everything that can be taught in words."¹⁵

John specifically cites both Cicero and Quintilian in his defense of grammar. He points out that Cicero personally instructed his son in grammar, and that Quintilian "also praises this art to the point of declaring that we should continue the use of grammar and the love of reading 'not merely during our school days, but to the very end of our life.'"¹⁶ John relies heavily on Quintilian in refuting those who challenge the importance of grammar—notably the anti-grammarians known in John's work only by the pseudonym Cornificius, who cites Seneca as an authority for his opposition to grammatical instruction. John invokes Quintilian in censuring Seneca (and, by implication, Cornificius), when he notes that the first teacher of Rome, "while praising Seneca's intelligence, condemns his judgment, and declares that his writings are full of sugar coated faults, and that he was popular with immature boys rather than with the learned."¹⁷ Citing Romulus, Varro, and Catullus, John goes on to claim that it is grammar alone which makes one "lettered," and, further, that grammar permits the development of perfect eloquence, opening the gateway to other philosophical pursuits.¹⁸

The pedagogical system under which John was educated, and which John himself followed and endorsed, was that of Bernard of Chartres, whom John describes as "the greatest font of learning in

Gaul.”¹⁹ Bernard’s methods were followed by John’s own “instructors in grammar, William of Conches, and Richard, who is known as ‘the Bishop.’” The grammarian, according to John, must master and instruct his students in three subjects—the grammatical art, grammatical errors (broken down into “barbarisms” and “solecisms”), and figures of speech.²⁰

In addition, John recognizes seven specific duties of the teacher of grammar: (1) He should have students analyze verses and break them down into their parts of speech. (2) He should point out the nature of the metrical feet which are to be noted in poems. (3) He should indicate and condemn whatever is barbarous, incongruous, or otherwise against the rules of composition. (4) He should not be overcritical of the poets, in matters of violating common grammatical rules. (5) He should point out metaplasms, schematisms, and oratorical tropes, as well as various other forms of expression. (6) He should suggest the various possible ways of saying things, and impress them on his listeners’ memory by repeated reminders. (7) Finally, he should “shake out,” or thoroughly examine, the authors, and, without ridiculing them, “despoil them of their feathers, which (crow fashion) they have borrowed from the several branches of learning in order to bedeck their works and make them more colorful.”²¹

Quintilian’s influence in the system just described is undeniable, pervasive, and direct. John cites Quintilian directly in discussing *lectio* and *prelectio*,²² and invokes the name of Quintilian’s when discussing the duties of the grammarian. “On the authority of the same Quintilian,²³ ‘the teacher of grammar should, in lecturing, take care of such details as to have his students analyze verses into their parts of speech, and point out the nature of the metrical feet which are to be noted in poems. He should, furthermore, indicate and condemn whatever is barbarous, incongruous, or otherwise against the rules of composition.’”²⁴ So great was Quintilian’s influence on John and his teachers, despite the absence of the original text on which their pedagogy was based, that John derived all seven of the grammarian’s duties from Quintilian, and even went so far as to take the first three of them, verbatim, directly from the *Institutio oratoria*.

As significant as it was for John, grammar nevertheless formed only the first of the three legs of the Trivium—grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric—the defense of which was John’s intent in writing the *Metalogicon*. As for Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian before him, John turns to instruction in rhetoric in order to complete a

young man's training in the use of language. The difference for John, which is significant, is his inclusion of more extensive training in dialectic as a companion to the more traditional instruction in the art of rhetoric. Here, John's pedagogy owes much to the Greek tradition, Quintilian having placed relatively little emphasis on training in dialectic, while nevertheless recognizing it as worthwhile field of study.²⁵ Students were also to be instructed in the Quadrivium—arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music—which together with the disciplines of the Trivium constituted the seven liberal arts.²⁶

John's *Metalogicon* stands as witness to the scholastic method's combination of the best from Athens and Rome. His Trivium combines the grammatical and rhetorical focus of Cicero and Quintilian, with the Greek emphasis on dialectic (alongside rhetoric) as necessary in the training of youth. Moreover, the Trivium was developed by Isocrates as the *enkyklios paideia*, indicating a strong pedagogical link between John and Isocrates.²⁷ John's Quadrivium is also itself an echo of Isocrates' lessons to his students on science, arithmetic, and geometry,²⁸ and an even clearer reflection of Quintilian's view that students should learn music, mathematics, and astronomy.²⁹

John's role in this pedagogical-rhetorical genealogy is essentially that of a place hold standing as evidence that the educational system instituted by Quintilian was alive and well in 12th century Europe. So firmly ensconced was Quintilian's program that it survived even the loss of the work on which it was based, the *Institutio Oratoria*. Roman education had become European education, deeply rooted and pervasive in its influence. For the present purpose, John's work is of principally historical interest, evidence of the continuing influence of Quintilian—whose work exercised an immediate and direct influence on Phillip Melanchthon, the founder of the German educational system.

John's work may, however, offer something more. The effective synthesis of the goals of Greek and Roman education in the *Metalogicon* represents a *rapprochement* between rhetoric and philosophy. The twin paths of wisdom and eloquence, diverged in ancient Athens by the Socratics, now begin to converge after well over a millennium. The way is thus charted to the realization (for perhaps the first time ever) of a truly rhetorical philosophy. Such a rhetorical philosophy would avoid the Scylla of the useless, recondite abstraction of the otherworldly philosopher, and the Charybdis of the empty,

flowery verbiage of the demi-literate sophist or rhapsode. It would remain for another great pedagogue, Philip Melanchthon, to follow the trail that these re-united brothers would together cut through the thick woods of Europe, on the way from Athens to Stuttgart.

Melanchthon and the German *Gymnasium*

The German *Gymnasium* was founded on the classical principle of rhetorical eloquence. It arose out of the church-sponsored *Lateinschule*, but gradually assumed a radically different educational purpose and curriculum, if not actual methodology.³⁰ According to the school ordinance of 1500, the goal of the original Latin schools was "to speak, write, and understand Latin."³¹ Later in the sixteenth century, Renaissance humanist ideas and the Protestant Reformation served as further catalysts for moving the Latin Schools away from the church, with many of the schools thereby falling increasingly under the pedagogical and administrative control of Protestants.

The groundwork for the German *Gymnasium* was laid by Philip Melanchthon, the "Protestant Preceptor of Germany," who lived from 1497-1560. In the spring of 1526, the first *Gymnasium* modeled on Melanchthon's philosophy of education was formed in Nuremberg. Melanchthon himself was present at its inaugural ceremonies on May twenty-third, and commemorated the occasion by delivering a brief Latin oration extolling the value of education.³² Honored as the "Creator of the Protestant Educational System of Germany," Melanchthon was responsible for the founding of virtually every Protestant Latin School and *Gymnasium* in the sixteenth century. Even the

Fürstenschulen, *Gymnasia* established by the prince, were organized on Melanchthon's educational model, and at his personal direction. Melanchthon stipulated the curriculum, faculty, and constitutions of *Gymnasia* in fifty-six cities.³³ His textbooks were the standard of instruction in all of the schools he established, and were even used in many Roman Catholic schools.³⁴

The course of study advocated by Melanchthon was a direct reflection of his pedagogical deference to Quintilian. Like Quintilian, he divided students into three classes,³⁵ and stressed the importance of a firm grasp of grammar, as well as knowledge of ancient languages and texts. Much of his prescription for the curriculum of the first and

second classes (absent the references to Christian scripture and a few later writers) reads like parts of the *Institutio oratoria*. "The first class shall study the Primer, which contains the Alphabet, the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, and other prayers. They shall then read Donatus, and listen to a daily explanation of a verse or two from Cato, in order to acquire a good vocabulary.

"The second class shall learn Grammar, including Etymology, Syntax, and Prosody. They shall read the fables of Aesop, the Dialogues of Mosellanus, and the Colloquies of Erasmus, also Terence and Plautus. . . . The third class shall . . . read Virgil, the Metamorphoses of Ovid, the Offices or Letters of Cicero, shall write Latin verse, and study Dialectic and Rhetoric."³⁶

After completing these three classes of the Latin School, students proceeded either to the *Gymnasia* proper, or to the *Fürstenschulen*; students studied Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, in addition to dialectic, rhetoric, mathematics, and cosmology. The works of Isocrates, Xenophon, Plutarch, Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides were prominently featured in the curriculum.³⁷

Melanchthon's program of instruction was not significantly altered until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Hegel was already teaching.³⁸ Melanchthon's lasting influence is largely attributable to his handbooks, which retained their currency for centuries, despite some modest changes made in the standard curriculum in response to Christoph Kaldenbach's *Compendium Rhetorices*. None of these changes, however, decreased the rhetorical content of the educational program or its reliance on Quintilian.³⁹ Melanchthon's works included "textbooks on Latin and Greek Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Psychology, Physics, Ethics, History, and Religion. From 1518 to 1544 his Greek Grammar passed through seventeen editions, and from 1545 to 1622, twenty-six editions were published. Fifty-one editions of his Latin Grammar were published from 1525 to 1737, . . . His *Elements of Rhetoric and Dialectic* passed through numerous editions and reprints."⁴⁰

Arguably the most influential of Melanchthon's works, particularly from a pedagogical perspective, was his *Elementorum Rhetorices libri duo*, which was originally published in 1531. The final revision appeared in 1542. *Elementorum Rhetorices libri duo* was itself a revision of *De Rhetorica libri tres*, originally published in 1519, shortly after Melanchthon's appointment as Professor of Greek at the University of Wittenberg. (An earlier revision of *De Rhetorica*

libri tres was published in 1521 as *Institutionis Rhetoricae*.) The 1519 book, of which *Elementorum Rhetorices libri duo* was a revision, was written as a rhetorical textbook, as was *Elementorum Rhetorices libri duo* itself. *Elementorum Rhetorices libri duo* "was intended for use in the schools, and it was used for two hundred years in the public schools of Germany and foreign lands. His aim was to tell plainly and clearly the manner of putting together orations. . . . Its whole aim was to develop . . . proper speech."⁴¹

Melanchthon sought the beauty of language for its own sake, for the opening of minds through the careful and even ornate expression of ideas. This led to a great change in the nature of humanism. Form, or style, assumed a new prominence. Melanchthon scorned the simplicity of medieval Latin, which sacrificed eloquence of expression in the misguided search for clarity—particularly in comparison with the works of Cicero, who for Melanchthon embodied the ideal orator.⁴² Melanchthon instituted a new program of instruction, in which the study of classical, rather than medieval, Latin predominated; such instruction was supplemented by a revival of the study and translation of classical, rather than New Testament, Greek texts. Scholars and students alike made translations of Aristotle, Plato, Cicero and other ancients in ever-increasing numbers.⁴³

In a direct reflection of the classical tradition, Melanchthon claimed that an orator must address five duties: *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria*, and *pronuntiatio*. Melanchthon's emphasis was on invention, with *dispositio* and *elocutio* also holding positions of importance. Oddly, Melanchthon has little to say about memory, except to claim that a young orator must memorize the duties or an orator, in order to attend to them properly. He says virtually nothing about *pronuntiatio*, since the speaking of words in his time was entirely different from that of the ancient sources on which he relied.

Invention, which Melanchthon considered central to the education of the young, requires familiarity with the kinds of causes. Melanchthon divides the causes into four classes: *genus demonstrativum*, *genus deliberativum*, *genus judicale*, and *genus didascaleaicum*. The first three are taken directly from the classical rhetorical tradition, and correspond to epideictic, deliberative, and judicial rhetoric, respectively. *Genus demonstrativum*, like epideictic (or ceremonial) rhetoric, has to do with the assignment of praise and blame. *Genus deliberativum*, like deliberative (or political) rhetoric, refers to speeches made before a deliberative assembly or political

body. *Genus giudicale*, like judicial (or forensic) rhetoric, is restricted to speeches or arguments made before a judge or jury. The fourth class, *genus didascaleicum*, as its name implies, is the rhetoric of the teacher or minister, intended to instruct and illuminate.⁴⁴ Of these four classes, Melanchthon put the greatest emphasis on the *genus demonstrativum*, the same type of oration delivered by Hegel at the Gymnasium Illustre.⁴⁵

Quintilian, much earlier, had defined elocution (*elocutio*) as the fitting of proper language to invented matter, i.e. arguments which support one's position.⁴⁶ Melanchthon concludes in like manner, stating that invention (*inventio*) and disposition (*dispositio*) center on content, while elocution (*elocutio*) focuses on the words used. Melanchthon understands elocution to include what is currently referred to as "style." The speaker first arranges his arguments in the mind, via invention and disposition, and later explains them with well-chosen words, which signify and communicate as precisely as possible the meaning of the thing expressed.⁴⁷ Only in properly fitting words to argument, by matching appropriate *verba* with the *res*, does the rhetorician achieve the eloquence demanded by the requirement of *eloqui*—both to state all that is in his mind on the topic at hand, and also to present it in a manner that will be intelligible to an audience.

Invention and disposition possess elements of both rhetoric and dialectic. They are dialectical, in so far as they relate to the content of the subject matter itself. Invention and disposition are, nevertheless, also rhetorical in character, since they alone provide the content and organization, respectively, of arguments whose presentation depends on elocution. Elocution, *qua* style, is proper only to rhetoric, and to rhetorical exhibition, since it is via elocution that the rhetorician unveils the subject matter (*res*) to his audience, and may tailor (though not alter) the presentation of the facts for persuasive and explanatory effect. Elocution clothes the dialectical *res nudas* in words, in order to reach an audience. It is thus most accurate to say that elocution is concerned with the form or type of words chosen, not with the words themselves.

Melanchthon identifies three elements of eloquence: grammatically correct speech, figurative expressions, and amplifications. He cites Book III of Cicero's *De Oratore*, where Crassus discusses style (*elocutio*), and rhetoric is presented as inseparable from philosophy. Melanchthon, following Crassus, postulates four requirements of style, viz. that the orator speak in

Latin, with clarity, with embellishments, and to the purpose.⁴⁸ Melanchthon's emphasis on the importance of grammar to good rhetoric echoes Cicero's and Quintilian's view that a firm understanding of the correct use of language is the foundation and cornerstone of a rhetorical education. This emphasis also reflects Melanchthon's agreement with Cicero on the importance of the appropriate use of embellishments (i.e., tropes or figures).

Melanchthon's treatment of the use of "figures," or tropes, is of considerable importance for both the current consideration of Hegel's *Bildung*, or education, and for what will later be presented regarding Hegel's deliberate use of rhetorical tropes. "The Greeks use the term "tropos" [transfer figure] when a word is shifted from the proper meaning to something similar or closely allied, as when Demosthenes says that Philip is drunk with the magnitude of his exploits."⁴⁹ A trope, in sum, consists of a use of language in which a substitution is made of one thing for another that is closely related, as, e.g., in the use of metaphor.

Tropes are generally used to make possible the expression of a state or fact for which no clearly defined term exists. As Melanchthon writes in presenting his rather pragmatic view of the origin of figures, "necessity first engendered figures when fitting terms were lacking."⁵⁰ This does not, however, limit figures to expressing only obscure notions in familiar terms. Melanchthon goes on to claim that figures may also be used for stylistic reasons, even when fitting terms are available.⁵¹ In the first case, tropes are employed for the sake of clarity; in the second, for the sake of ornament. Melanchthon's prescriptions for the appropriate usage of tropes and transfer figures will play prominent role in Chapter Five, in the discussion of the rhetorically based prediscourse for Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

Hegel's Early Life and *Bildung* at the *Gymnasium Illustre*

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart in 1770. His studies began early. His mother, Maria Magalena Fromme, drilled him in the fundamentals of grammar, and his father, Georg Ludwig, hired private tutors to help the young boy to get a good start

on his education.⁵² His father's political connections allowed Hegel to attend a Latin School in his hometown, and Hegel would later graduate as valedictorian of the *Gymnasium Illustre*, also known as the Eberhard-Ludwig *Gymnasium*. His later admission to the University, of Tübingen, on a full scholarship, was due in no small measure to his father's political connections, in addition to the obvious brilliance of the pupil.

Originally a church-sponsored Latin School, the *Gymnasium Illustre*, like most others, had broken away from the church and set itself up as a secular institution. As such, it had dedicated itself not simply to instruction in Greek and Latin in the service of the church, but rather to "the propagation of the Greco-Roman ideal of the *ars bene et sapiendi dicendi*."⁵³ Citing Book X of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, John H. Smith characterizes a classical, rhetorical education as consisting of three stages—early lessons, studies with the grammarian, and finally studies with the rhetor. Smith calls these *imitatio*, *translatio*, and *aemulatio*, respectively.⁵⁴

The first stage of Hegel's education (*imitatio*) began at home. Hegel's mother was instrumental in Hegel's early education, as mentioned earlier. In his fifth year, he entered the Latin School in his hometown.⁵⁵ Hegel's father hired private tutors to give him an advance on the education he was to receive at the *Gymnasium*.⁵⁶

Hegel's *Bildung* at the Latin School owed an obvious debt to Quintilian and Melanchthon. Beginning with the study of Melanchthon's handbooks on grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, students moved on to a curriculum that followed Cicero's and Quintilian's prescription for the training of an orator.⁵⁷ Stage one having been accomplished through a combination of home study and private tutors, Hegel's entrance into the Latin School, which was divided into an upper and a lower group of students, signified the beginning of the stage of *translatio*, characterized by the study of grammar, as stipulated by both Quintilian and Melanchthon.⁵⁸ Among his other studies, he translated and retold the fables of Aesop (an exercise especially commended by Melanchthon,⁵⁹ as well as Quintilian⁶⁰) and studied the New Testament.⁶¹ Upon mastering this second stage, as members of the lower division, students advanced to training in rhetoric and dialectic, among other subjects, in the upper division—a stage that Smith calls "*aemulatio*."

The diary which Hegel kept from June 26, 1785 until January 7, 1787 is evidence of his having advanced to this final stage of his

gymnasial education, as it represents both his increasing skill as a composer of written oratory and his desire to emulate the valedictory declamations performed each year by the best student.⁶² He wrote first in German, and later in Latin.⁶³ The diary was not kept daily, and indeed months sometimes passed between entries. The diary was both a record of the school's curriculum (and the young boy's views on it), and a notebook in which a desire to achieve stylistic mastery supplemented the mere recording of events. His efforts included encomia, such as his eulogy of his favorite teacher, Löffler. In very lofty and elevated language, Hegel praises his late schoolmaster's intelligence, skill, and character. Heartfelt as the boy's sentiments assuredly were, the tone and structure of the passage, like that of his later valedictory address, are clearly that of a laudatory oration, of the *genus demonstrativum*.⁶⁴

In keeping with Melanchthon's program of instruction, Hegel studied the original Greek version of the New Testament letters to the Thessalonians and the Romans, and some Hebrew in the Psalms. He was also exposed to Vida's *Christiad*, large portions of which he learned by heart.⁶⁵ He translated the writings of Longinus, and at the same time began to develop a distinct, and polished, Latin writing style.⁶⁶

On October 31, 1785, Hegel informs us that he has been studying the Psalms. On November 14, 1786, he writes of his study of some of Cicero's letters. In June 1787, the topic is Euripides, and in May of the following year it is the ethics of Aristotle. On July 29, 1788, he discusses the *Oedipus* of Sophocles, of whom he was a diligent student.⁶⁷ At this point, Hegel is clearly engaging in work corresponding to what Smith calls *aemulatio*, the third stage of Quintilian's and Melanchthon's educational program, which specifically advocates reading the letters of Cicero, and writing Latin verse.⁶⁸

Hegel's valedictory address at his graduation—which was his first public declamation—signaled the successful completion of his rhetorical education. In keeping with Melanchthon's belief that speeches of praise and blame, of the *genus demonstrativum*, represented the highest form of rhetoric, Hegel's oration, like his early eulogy of Löffler, was laudatory.⁶⁹ Hegel's audience included, in addition to his teachers and fellow students, Karl Eugen, Duke of Wuerttemberg. Hegel praised the virtues of his alma mater, the quality of his education, and the wisdom of the illustrious Duke.⁷⁰

The principal significance of Hegel's earliest known oration is simply that it was an *oration*—a public exhibition of the fruits of an education specifically focused on the development of the capacity for eloquence. Hegel's valedictory address was itself a remnant of the classical rhetorical-pedagogical tradition from which the German *Gymnasium* was forged. In the world of Ancient Rome, a student was considered ready to enter the law courts or the assembly once he was able to perform just such an oration. His graduation speech thus represents yet further evidence of the *Gymnasium*'s debt to classical pedagogy.

In sharp contrast to the current state of affairs, in which valedictory speeches are typically a formality, the annual valedictory address in the German *Gymnasium* was both a goal toward which younger students strove (as Hegel's earlier exercises in written oratory clearly show) and an illustration of the advantages conferred upon students by a rhetorical education. As such, it was far more than an empty "rhetorical" exercise, since it served as an illustration of the value of a rhetorically based education, which was coming under attack from some educational reformers at the time. To be permitted to give this annual address was the highest honor the school could bestow. Its purpose was both to motivate students to the attainment of the lofty goal of *eloquentia* and to defend it from the criticisms of visiting pedagogues, who advocated changes in the curriculum, in the name of "modern taste," the "spirit (Genius) of the present time," and the "edification of the heart."⁷¹ The annual valedictory address served, in short, as an example of the rhetorical ideal of wisdom speaking.

Hegel's education in Stuttgart grounded him in ancient rhetorical writers and texts. He did not reject this education, but rather embraced it incorporating significant elements of it into his subsequent work. Thus, we should be neither surprised nor dismayed by Hegel's famously opaque prose style, his use of extended metaphors, or what sometimes appears as allegory passing itself off as philosophy. Far from mere stylistic ornaments, such elements are in fact integral to Hegel's approach to philosophy. This internal rhetorical structure of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*⁷² relies on the clothing of the subject matter (*res*) in rhetorical language (*verba*) by means of tropes and transfer figures. As such, Hegel's *Phenomenology* intertwines philosophy and rhetoric in the very ways recommended by the great teachers—most notably Cicero, Quintilian, and Melanchthon—who

shaped the curriculum which, in turn, molded millions of students across the Western world, including the young Hegel.

In the discussion to follow, I will endeavor to illumine both the nature and the extent of Hegel's reliance on rhetoric in the service and dialectic, and in so doing show that the inimitable style of the *Phenomenology* is the result of neither Teutonic turgidity nor deliberate obfuscation. Hegel writes the way he must write, if he is to give a complete and eloquent account of the development of human consciousness and self-consciousness, of man on the way to his realization as Spirit.

Notes

¹ James J. Murphy (ed.), *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing* (Cardondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1987), xxxix.

² See Charles Halm (ed.), *Rhetores latini minores* (Leipzig: 1863), 373-448.

³ *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, xxxix.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xxxviii.

⁵ *Ibid.*, xxxix.

⁶ *Ibid.*, xli.

⁷ Charles Sears Baldwin, *Mediaeval Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), 155.

⁸ John of Salisbury, *The Metalogicon*, ed. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

⁹ *Ibid.*, xvi-xvii.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, xvii.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹² *Ibid.*, 51-2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 63.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 70-73.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 67.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 53-4.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 66.

²² *Ibid.*, 65-6.

²³ Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, 4 vols., trans. H. E. Butler (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1993), Vol. 1, 153. (John's translation differs somewhat from the Loeb edition, although the sense remains the same.)

²⁴ John of Salisbury, 66.

²⁵ John's views on the relationship of dialectic and rhetoric will receive more

extensive treatment in Chapter Four.

26 John of Salisbury, 36.

27 Elizabeth Ervin, "Trivium," in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*, ed. T. Enos (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), 731.

28 James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula, *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric* (Davis, California: Hermagoras Press, 1995), 46.

29 *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, xxxiii.

30 For a fuller discussion of the *Lateinschule* in Germany, see Horst Joachim Frank, *Dichtung, Sprache, Menschenbildung: Geschichte des Deutschunterrichts von den Anfängen bis 1945* (Munich: DTV, 1976).

31 John H. Smith, *The Spirit and its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of Bildung* (Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1988), 62.

32 James William Richard, *Philip Melancthon: The Protestant Preceptor of Germany* (New York: Lenox Hill Publishing, 1974), 132.

33 Richard, 134.

34 *Ibid.*, 136.

35 Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, vol. I, 3-279 (Books I—II.x.). Melancthon differs from Quintilian in precisely what should be studied at the earliest stage, principally due to his Christian faith, but fundamentally agrees with Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, and John of Salisbury on how studies should be conducted. Like these earlier figures, Melancthon makes the second step of the child's education the study of grammar, and the third that of dialectic and rhetoric.

36 Richard, 134-5.

37 *Ibid.*, 135-6.

38 *Ibid.*, 136.

39 Christophorus Caldenbachius, *Compendium Rhetorices* (Tübingen: 1682).

40 Richard, 136.

41 Philip Melancthon, *A Critical Translation of Philip Melancthon's Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*, trans. M. J. La Fontaine (Ann Arbor: MI: UMI, 1993), 42.

42 *Ibid.*, 8-12, 302-304.

43 *A Critical Translation of Philip Melancthon's Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*, 11.

44 *Ibid.*, 44.

45 *Ibid.*, 46.

46 Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, Vol. 3, 195.

47 Philipp Melancthon, *Philippi Melanthonis Opera quae supersunt omnia*, ed. K. G. Bretschneider and H. E. Bindseil (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1963), vol. 13, 419.

48 *A Critical Translation of Philip Melancthon's Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*, 223.

49 *Ibid.*, 233-4.

50 Ibid., 232.

51 Ibid.

52 Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 4.

53 Ibid., 62.

54 Smith, 207.

55 Rosenkranz, 6.

56 Ibid.

57 Smith, chap. 1, esp. 62.

58 See Philip Melancthon, *Philippi Melanthonis Opera quae supersunt omnia*, vol. 26, 90, and Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, Book I.

59 Richard, 134-5.

60 See Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, Book I.

61 Rosenkranz, 7. Such study was a standard part of Melancthon's curriculum. See Philipp Melancthon, *Philippi Melanthonis Opera quae supersunt omnia*, vol. 26, and Richard, 135.

62 Smith, 57.

63 Rosenkranz, 7. On instruction in Latin, Melancthon writes, "The boys are required to speak Latin, and the teachers, so far as possible, shall speak only Latin with the boys, in order that the latter may be inclined to and encouraged in such exercise." (Richard, 135.)

64 Rosenkranz, 10.

65 Ibid., 7.

66 Ibid., 10.

67 Ibid., 11.

68 Richard, 135.

69 On *genus demonstrativum*, see Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (Munich: Max Hueber, 1960), pars. 62-3 and 239-54.

70 Rosenkranz, 18.

71 Smith, 66. It is perhaps worth considering to what extent Hegel's criticisms of education as edification, and of the "beautiful soul" ("die schoene Seele") might have their sources in his alma mater's fight to retain its classical humanistic curriculum and emphasis.

72 G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952).

Chapter Four

Rhetoric, Tropes, and Divine Grammar

Isocrates or Aristotle?

The rhetoricians who contributed to the young Hegel's *gymnasial* curriculum, especially Philip Melanchthon, had specific conceptions of the relationship of rhetoric and dialectic, which directly influenced their views on the place of eloquence in the presentation of the *res nuda*s, the bare, unadorned verity which is the philosopher's Grail. The outlook of these philosophers on this crucial relationship was foundational to Hegel's early education and, hence, to the philosophy which was to emerge from it.

At the very base of the pedagogical genealogy offered in Chapters Two and Three was Isocrates, whose rhetorical method is often compared (generally unfavorably) to that of Aristotle. The conventional wisdom on the famous conflict between their rival schools is that Isocrates focused on style, while Aristotle was more concerned with rhetoric as a well-ordered discipline suited to the discovery of truth. To put the matter somewhat more precisely, Isocrates is thought to have focused on *elocutio* to the detriment of *inventio*, while Aristotle is seen as having accorded each of these oratorical duties its proper place.

Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom on this matter (and readily conceding Aristotle's place as by far the greater philosopher), Isocrates was by far the more influential and successful rhetorician. In his own time, it was Isocrates' school, not Aristotle's, which trained the greatest orators (the Attics, among whom Isocrates himself is

included). Despite Aristotle's indubitable superiority as a philosopher, and his well-deserved prominence in the Western canon, from a rhetorical standpoint it was Isocrates' *paideia* which triumphed. It was not by chance that Speusippus—Plato's successor as head of the Academy—was a student of Isocrates, nor that the rhetorical tradition that informed Roman oratory, and thence the Western World, was that of Isocrates. The man whom Milton would later dub "Old Man Eloquent" left an indelible mark on the education of youth in the West.¹ In the words of H. I. Marrou, Isocrates emerged from the conflict with Aristotle as "the supreme master of oratorical culture, the literary kind of education that was to become the dominant feature of the classical tradition. . . . On the whole it was Isocrates . . . who educated fourth-century Greece and subsequently the Hellenistic and Roman worlds." Moreover, "it is to Isocrates more than to any other person that the honour and responsibility belong of having inspired in our Western traditional education a predominantly literary tone."²

The prevalence of Isocrates' pedagogical methods in the ancient world ensured a place of central importance for rhetoric in the education of youth to Hegel's time and beyond. Isocrates' broad conception of the nature and proper place of rhetoric further guaranteed that the ancient roots of rhetoric in epic poetry would be retained, and even celebrated, as an integral part of his curriculum. Isocrates, the student of Gorgias and self-proclaimed rival to Pindar, combined lyric speech with the moral themes which he deemed central to the education of youth, thereby creating the set-speech—the oration or public lecture—which aimed to be at once moving and edifying. To be merely one or the other—emotive or informative—was considered insufficient, and could not qualify one as an orator. Speech which is emotionally charged, or vacuous but cleverly arranged and presented, is after all the stock-in-trade of the sophist, whom Isocrates condemns. On the other hand, speech which aims merely to edify dulls the mind even as it seeks to sharpen it; such is the plodding, pedantic drudgery of Hegel's *Buchstabenphilosophen* ("literal-minded philosophers").³ The Isocratean orator must combine a passion for truth with the ability to present it in a manner that is at once engaging and illuminating.

Like Aristotle, and unlike Plato (who considered rhetoric simply applied dialectics⁴), Isocrates believed that rhetoric was a separate art from dialectic. His curriculum included training in dialectic, but this was conducted as one element of an education which

was overwhelmingly rhetorical in focus. Despite his agreement with Aristotle on the proper division of rhetoric and dialectic, Isocrates resisted Aristotle's emphasis on extensive training in rhetorical theory, focusing instead on the imitation of, and elaboration upon, first class models. Isocrates rejected the formal rhetoric of the handbooks, including Aristotle's *On Rhetoric*, which emphasized training in method, and often, as in Aristotle's case, placed limits on the use of rhetorical figures or tropes.

For Isocrates, rhetorical figures and tropes were the essence of *elocutio*, the eloquent presentation in words (*verba*) of the bare subject matter (*res nudas*), which clothes the truth in appropriately elegant language. The clothes that suit a pauper are hardly fitting for a king, so Isocrates reserved for the orator a full range of rhetorical elements and techniques, in order that he might speak in a manner suited to the fullest exposition of truth.

Rhetoric and Dialectic

Of the many tropes available for use in rhetorical speech, Aristotle, unlike Isocrates, commends only the use of metaphor, for which he has great praise. In the *Poetics*, he goes so far as to claim that "the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars."⁵ In *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle stresses only metaphor as a useful and legitimate trope, or transfer figure, since the use of metaphor conduces to the speaker's implanting of new ideas in the minds of his auditors, using language that is at once intimately familiar and illustratively graphic.⁶

In any event, through the beginning of the Middle Ages, Aristotle's influence on educational theory and practice was slight at best; the rhetorical-pedagogical views of the tradition represented by Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, and others predominated. Figures like John of Salisbury may have referred to Aristotle when discussing training in dialectics or various other subjects, but whatever Aristotelian elements there may have been were forced to find a place in the context of a pedagogical system traceable back to Aristotle's rhetorical rival, Isocrates.

Isocrates' approach, *contra* Aristotle's, relied heavily on figures, embellishments, and tropes, which were far from mere ornament or ostentatious display. The oratorical education established by Isocrates, "which in appearance is entirely a matter of aesthetics, [and] whose one aim is to create 'wizards with words,' [was] in fact the most effective way of developing subtlety of thought."⁷ The aesthetics involved in the act of speaking were both the pathway to oratorical skill and the means of learning to appreciate and express the nuances of the subject matter (*res*). Isocrates' rhetoric was dominated by illustrations and embellishments,⁸ and aimed to present the truth in an elaborately adorned, and hence appealing, form, which would excite in his auditors an agreement based, in roughly equal parts, on passionate conviction and reasoned assent.

Cicero, too, relied heavily on eloquent presentation and expression in his own rhetorical theory and practice. An incomparably better speaker than the reed-voiced Attic schoolmaster, Cicero's works are less pedagogical than alternately practical or philosophical. Where Isocrates' focus was on teaching, Cicero's works reveal a deep concern for the orator as citizen, the rhetor as the public man of action. Cicero fundamentally agrees with Isocrates' pedagogy, but is far more interested in describing and training the best man, the ideal orator, than in refining the Isocratean educational model on which he relied.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Cicero places the blame for the excesses of sophistry squarely at the feet of Socrates, since it was he who separated oratory from philosophy, the art of public speaking from "everything that concerns morals and conduct and ethics and politics."⁹ This unnatural division of oratory and philosophy had the effect of relieving public speakers of the requirement that they argue for the sake of the truth, rather than merely for victory. As Cicero writes, "the followers of Socrates cut connexion with the practising lawyers and detached these from the common title of philosophy, although the old masters had intended there to be a marvellously close alliance between oratory and philosophy."¹⁰ Having divorced the notion of skill in speaking from the requirement that the speaker be a man of good character, the Socratic school, ironically, fed the very dragon it aimed to slay, by creating the conditions for the growth of sophistry, rather than its effective suppression.

Cicero is clearly no sophist, yet his theory of public speaking is rhetorical through and through. He denies the Socratic position that a concern for truth must override considerations of style and

presentation, arguing instead that eloquence—and the elegant, often elaborate constructions that accompany it—serves both propaedeutically and heuristically as the gateway to truth. He specifically mentions newly coined words and metaphors as intrinsic to the ornate style of rhetoric,¹¹ along with syntax and rhythm.¹² He also places significant emphasis on the visual aspects of rhetoric, as when he writes, “a great impression is made by dwelling on a single point, and also by clear explanation and almost visual presentation of events as if practically going on.”¹³

Why does Cicero so greatly emphasize style and presentation in his rhetoric? Does not, after all, the truth itself possess the power to sway an audience? Cicero would certainly agree that a just cause will prove more persuasive than an unjust one, but only if the just cause is well-presented, both logically and rhetorically, since we do not deliberate merely with our reason. “Everybody is able to discriminate between what is right and what wrong in matters of art and proportion by a sort of subconscious instinct, without having any theory of art or proportion of their own. . . . They display this . . . in judging the rhythms and pronunciations of words, because these are rooted deep in the general sensibility, and nature has decreed that nobody shall be entirely devoid of these faculties. And consequently everybody is influenced not only by skilful arrangement of words but also by rhythms and pronunciations.”¹⁴

In sum, the ideal orator cares for truth, as well as the manner of its presentation. This ideal type will also be a philosopher, whom Cicero defines as “the orator . . . possessing wisdom combined with eloquence.”¹⁵ The philosopher-orator must concern himself with style, since style naturally affects the sensibilities of a speaker’s auditors. The members of an audience, however great or small, reason not merely according to the words presented, but also according to the presentation of the words themselves. “It is impossible to achieve an ornate style without first procuring ideas and putting them into shape, and at the same time . . . no idea can possess distinction without lucidity of style.”¹⁶ Style (as *dispositio* and especially *elocutio*) and substance (roughly distinguishable from these as *inventio*) must combine to form the best, fullest, and most eloquent presentation of the subject matter (*res*).

This highest and best type of man and citizen, this “god among men,” must speak clearly, using explicit and full language, and “in the actual delivery [achieve] a sort of rhythm and cadence.”¹⁷

While malapropisms, barbarisms, or solecisms may excite the animosity or derision of an audience towards a speaker, it is eloquence alone that makes him worthy of praise.

Cicero's invocation of the concept of a man-god in this context is unsurprising, given the poetic and mythic origins of rhetoric. His account of the origin of eloquence in *De Inventione* is at base mythic and heroic, an imaginative reconstruction evocative of portions of Giambattista Vico's *New Science*,¹⁸ and identifies eloquence as the cradle of rhetoric, law, and indeed of all of the human sciences. In recounting the origin of eloquence, Cicero writes:

For there was a time when men wandered at large in the fields like animals and lived on wild fare; they did nothing by the guidance of reason, but relied chiefly on physical strength; there was as yet no ordered system of religious worship nor of social duties; no one had seen legitimate marriage nor had anyone looked upon children whom he knew to be his own; nor had they learned the advantages of an equitable code of law. . . . At this juncture a man—great and wise I am sure—became aware of the power latent in man and the wide field offered by his mind for great achievements if one could develop this power and improve it by instruction. Men were scattered in the fields and hidden in sylvan retreats when he assembled and gathered them in accordance with a plan; he introduced them to every useful and honourable occupation, though they cried out against it at first because of its novelty, and then when through reason and eloquence they had listened with greater attention, he transformed them from wild savages into a kind and gentle folk.¹⁹

This parable illustrates the natural origin of eloquence and exposes the Socratic ideal of non-rhetorical discourse, however nobly intended, as fundamentally misconceived, a stillborn infant lost to even the most skillful dialectical midwifery. Eloquence is natural to man, and is both the mark and the source of his civilization; to reject eloquence in favor of purely philosophical discourse is simply to substitute a new barbarism for an old one, what Vico called the barbarism of reflection for the original barbarism of sense.²⁰

Furthermore, when one speaks, one uses words, which must of necessity be presented, in one form or another, pure logos being

inaccessible to men. Indeed, Isocrates had noted centuries earlier that Plato's most effective expositions were given through myth, poetry, and art.²¹ The Socratic ideal aims too high, as it fails to acknowledge the Pandora story, or heed its warning and lesson. We reason no longer as do the gods, whose language is original *Logos*, and thus simultaneously pure logic, pure speech, and pure reason. We have lost the power of divine speech, and hence of divine reasoning. Rhetoric is the narrow path through the forests of barbarism, leading back to the land—and the language—of the gods.

It is this understanding of the fallenness of human language and reason that informs Hegel's view of the divine nature of language, which directly reverses the meaning of what is said.²² What is meant "*cannot be reached* by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to that which is inherently universal."²³ Human language is incapable of expressing the original unity of the in-itself and the for-itself, and in fact inverts the meaning of what is spoken or written in the very act of expression. It is in the nature of divine language to provide eloquent expression to truth, to give full voice to the primordial, inchoate unity that is unattainable by means of merely human language and thought. Having forgotten divine language, man is left only with the discipline of rhetoric to give the truth proper shape by delivering it in ornate form, mimicking as closely as possible the naturally eloquent expression of divinity.

Tropes and Transfer Figures

Quintilian's discussion of tropes and transfer figures in Book VIII of the *Institutio Oratoria* provides valuable background into the tropological nature of good speech and writing. Following both Isocrates and Cicero, Quintilian claims that, in order to be effective, speech must be eloquent.

While to be a good speaker it is sufficient to say what is necessary, only the really eloquent speaker can do this in ornate and appropriate language. . . . Again, Cicero holds that . . . eloquence belongs to the orator alone, and consequently it was on the rules for the cultivation of eloquence that he expended the greatest care. That he was justified in so doing is shown by the actual name of the art of which I am speaking. For the verb *eloqui* means the

production and communication to the audience of all that the speaker had conceived in his mind, and without this power all the preliminary accomplishments of oratory are as useless as a sword that is kept permanently concealed within its sheath. Therefore it is on this that teachers of rhetoric concentrate their attention.²⁴

Without eloquent expression, the truth itself will remain but imperfectly expressed. In order to speak completely and fully, and thus to communicate to the audience all that is in his mind, the speaker must be an orator, capable of a comprehensive expression of his thoughts, intentions, passions, and beliefs. Without such careful and elaborate presentation, the truth will languish indefinitely within the prison of the tongueless; it may be well fed and cared for, but in the end imprisoned truth remains as impotent as a rusted sword, wedged in its sheath. It is eloquence alone that removes the sword of truth from its scabbard, giving it the power and force of divine speech.

Still, Quintilian is careful not to give a speaker's manner of exposition priority over the subjects which his words are intended to illuminate. He writes, "we should [not] devote ourselves to the study of words (*verba*) alone," since the subject matter (*res*) is "after all . . . the backbone of any speech."²⁵ It represents a kind of base vanity to pursue eloquence of expression without devoting oneself to the mastery of the subject matter. Quintilian condemns those who "disregarding the subject matter (*res*) . . . devote themselves to the futile and crippling study of words in a vain desire to acquire the gift of elegance, a gift which I myself regard as the fairest of all the glories of oratory, but only when it is natural and unaffected."²⁶

Res takes first place over *verba* for Quintilian, if only because *verba* without *res* leads to the sort of sophistry for which Quintilian (along with Isocrates and Cicero) expressed such scornful opprobrium.²⁷ "Tasteful and magnificent dress . . . lends added dignity to its wearer: but effeminate and luxurious apparel fails to adorn the body and merely reveals the foulness of the mind. Similarly, a translucent and iridescent style merely serves to emasculate the subject which it arrays with such pomp of words. Therefore, I would have the orator, while careful in his choice of words, be even more concerned about his subject matter."²⁸

Quintilian here deftly and succinctly illustrates the distinction between sophistry and rhetoric. Sophistry seeks to elevate the *verba* over the *res*, while rhetoric does the opposite, all the while giving the

res its due by presenting it in eloquent fashion. By implication, Quintilian also distinguishes both sophistry and rhetoric from the sort of non-rhetorical philosophy envisioned by the Socratic school. Such non-rhetorical philosophy is *res* without *verba*, truth without eloquent expression, or, to paraphrase Quintilian, the rusted sword fixed in its tattered sheath. Sophistry, conversely, is *verba* without *res*, the degenerately mimetic attempts of putrefied minds to produce sweet-sounding speeches devoid of truth. Neither, on Quintilian's view, is worthy of an orator.

Rhetoric, then, is the coming together of *res* and *verba*, the re-unification of two long-lost brothers, separated in ancient Athens during the internecine strife between the Socratics and the Sophists (both actual and merely so-called). True eloquence, as *verba* expounding upon *res*, will no more think of making *itself* the subject matter than a woman of sound body would "think it her duty to polish her nails and tire [smooth] her hair. . . . For those words which are obviously the result of careful search and even seem to parade their self-conscious art, fail to attain the grace at which they aim and lose all appearance of sincerity because they darken the sense and choke the good seed by their own luxuriant overgrowth."²⁹ The subject matter (*res*) should be the source of the words (*verba*) used to illustrate and expound; otherwise, the words themselves become the subject matter and, like weeds, choke out the very seed with whose nurturance they are charged.

Closely related to Quintilian's concern for the proper balance of *res* and *verba* is his view of the role of memory (*memoria*) in the training of an orator, and the performance of his public speeches. Quintilian commends Cicero's judgment that writing is "the greatest mold of oral skill," and follows Cicero in identifying memory as critical to the successful training of an orator.³⁰ In Book I, Chapter One of his *Institutio Oratoria*, he writes, "Memory . . . is most necessary to an orator, and is eminently strengthened and nourished by exercise."³¹ Two chapters later, he reiterates the importance of memory in the context of evaluating a boy's suitability for training: "Let him that is skilled in teaching ascertain first of all, when a boy is entrusted to him, his ability and disposition. The chief symptom of ability in children is memory, of which the excellence is twofold: to receive with ease, and to retain with fidelity."³²

Why does Quintilian view memory as central to oratory? The answer is linked to his desire to maintain the proper relationship and

balance of *res* and *verba*. "[I]f he will only first form a true conception of the principles of eloquence, accumulate a copious supply of words by wide and suitable reading, apply the art of arrangement to the words thus acquired, and finally, by continual exercise, develop strength to use his acquisitions so that every word is ready at hand and lies under his very eyes, he will never lose a single word."³³ Words must be plentiful in the speaker's mind, well-ordered and ready for service. These words are assembled, marshaled, and deployed via "a long course of preliminary study."³⁴

The orator is not, however, merely a collector of words who uses them in the vainglorious attempt to showcase his talent, peacock-fashion, but rather one who garrisons them in memory, and musters them as appropriate in the service of the rhetorical exposition of the *res*. The greater the store of words, the more appropriate to the subject matter will be the language chosen. "The first necessity is a store of ideas and words."³⁵ Words and ideas are the instruments of the rhetorician's craft. Just as a workman with a full complement of tools is more likely to have the appropriate one for any given task than another with merely a few, so too is the rhetorician who has built up an extensive repertoire of words and ideas more likely to be able to find the correct turn of phrase, perfectly suited to the circumstances, than a speaker whose exposition breaks on the shoals of forgetfulness, and who consequently loses his train of thought (and the audience) as he strains to find the right word. Such a one is no more persuasive than an actor who cannot remember his lines, and is equally deserving of the audience's disdain.

The notion of *memoria* as central to oratory leads to another question, however. Words and ideas may be stored up in the rhetorician's memory, but how are they to be *used*? How can the orator ensure that the sword of truth will not become rusted by remaining too long in its scabbard? To put the question somewhat differently, if *verba* are the soldiers on the battlefield of truth, and orators are their generals, who, or what, will be their captains? What will place them in the desired sequence, and ensure that they are present in the right place, at the right time, and in the proper numbers? How will these countless words and images be brought together into a single encampment, then assembled on the field, for greatest effect? What will be the symphonist of this otherwise orderless cacaphony of words and images? What will give this linguistic chaos rational force and focus?

For Quintilian, the answer is: tropes and transfer figures. These enable the translation (*translatio*), or transfer, of an original meaning into an illustrative or derivative one. Such embellishment, or ornament, is central to the proper exposition of themes. As Quintilian writes, "I now come to ornament, which the orator must use, for only to speak correctly and clearly wins trifling reward. The unskilled often can manage invention, and little learning is needed for arrangement; but the speaker by skilful ornament seeks approval of a wider audience and fights not merely with effective but with flashing weapons. . . . True beauty is never separate from usefulness."³⁶ The rhetorician puts the truth into play by displaying it in its full glory, using words (*verba*) appropriate to the subject matter (*res*).

Quintilian defines a "*tropus*" (trope) as "the changing of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another."³⁷ He elevates metaphor above all other tropes. "Let us begin with the finest tropes, which I call *translatio* ("transfer") and in Greek *metaphora*. . . . Metaphor is a shorter form of simile; for simile compares some object with the thing to be described; metaphor actually substitutes the object for the thing."³⁸ Despite his praise, Quintilian cautions against overuse of metaphor since this "results in allegory and enigma," which serve to obscure the *res*, rather than clarify it.³⁹

Quintilian divides tropes into two groups: those intended to clarify meaning, and those intended to adorn and enhance style.⁴⁰ Chief among the former group are synecdoche and metonymy, although Quintilian also identifies antonomasia, onomatopoeia, catachresis, and metalepsis (or *transumptio*) as members.⁴¹ The trope of synecdoche involves substituting a part for the whole, or the whole for a part. A prime example of synecdoche is to be found at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In "Absolute Knowing," Hegel uses the penultimate, yet consummatory, image in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—the Gallery of Images (*Gallerie von Bildern*), to stand for the recollective history of Spirit's progression through the image (*das Bild*) to the Concept (*der Begriff*). Here, a part of one stage (indeed, an illustrative image from one part of one stage) of the *Phenomenology* is made to stand for the entire work.

Synecdoche is the rhetorical first cousin of *metonymia* (metonymy), which substitutes one name for another, "a figure which Cicero calls *hypallage*."⁴² Metonymy involves replacing a word or concept with a symbolic, though generally recognized or recognizable, substitute. The metonymy of the image consists in its ability to

substitute an imaginative symbol for a concept; thus, e.g., the independence and dependence of self-consciousness become Hegel's Lord and Bondsman, respectively, and their relationship the famous "Master-Servant Dialectic."

Among the tropes intended to adorn and enhance style, Quintilian identifies *epitheton (appositum)*, *periphrasis*, *hyperbole*, *hyperbaton*, and *allegoria (inversio)*. Of these, only the last two are of interest to the present study. The most common use of hyperbaton is simply an intentional deviation from ordinary word order.⁴³ This trope is significant since "our language would be hard and disjointed if the words were always arranged in their natural order. Some words need to be postponed for their proper setting. For we are like masons using unhewn stones; we cannot polish our words, we must take them as they are and find the best positions for them. Prose cannot be rhythmical without artistic altering of word order."⁴⁴ Plato, despite his criticism of rhetoric as an independent discipline, did not hesitate to make full use of hyperbaton. "Plato's four words at the beginning of his *Republic* were found written on his tablets in several orders as he strove to find the best rhythm."⁴⁵

Allegoria (inversio) uses metaphors to present "one thing in words and another in meaning or just the opposite . . . like Horace's 'ship of state,' or the 'Pierian fields' of Lucretius, or Vergil's 'tired literary horses.'"⁴⁶ Allegory emerges as a sub-type of metaphor, and irony—*qua* trope—as a sub-type of allegory. Having already warned against excessive use of metaphor, since such overuse leads to *allegoria* or *enigma*, Quintilian links excessive metaphor to irony, via allegory. "The Greeks are fond of allegory; but often it is so obscure as to become a riddle (*aenigma*). . . . In the kind of allegory where the meaning is contrary to words, we have *irony* or *illusion*, which is made clear by the delivery or the character of the speaker or the nature of the subject."⁴⁷ Irony, uniquely among tropes and transfer figures—the latter of which Quintilian also calls simply "figures," or "schemata"⁴⁸—falls within both camps.⁴⁹ Quintilian is clear in his insistence that there is a significant distinction to be drawn between them and goes so far as to criticize others, like Artorius Proclus, who "have confused the two."⁵⁰ He differentiates tropes and figures, as follows: "A trope is a transfer of meaning from the natural one to another or of an expression from its natural position to another, whereas a figure consists in conforming our speech to a pattern removed from the common and ordinary."⁵¹ A trope involves

substituting one thing for another, or rearranging words for dramatic effect. Figures use language in other than the accustomed way, frequently by simply inverting the meaning of word.

As a trope, irony is a sub-category of a sub-category, a derivative of allegory, which is itself subsumed under metaphor. Tropological irony is thus simply metaphor twice removed, a sort of rhetorical second cousin to this greatest of tropes. Used tropologically, irony typically concerns the use of an ostensibly favorable comparison of one thing or person to another thing or person which is, however, so dramatically inflated as to draw attention to the disparity between the two and, by extension, to the unworthiness of the object of such intemperate flattery. One damns with excessive praise as easily as with faint.

The schematic form of irony is more both more subtle and more powerful, possessing the power to turn day into night, and night into day. Quintilian writes, "Some, I have found speak of *irony* as dissimulation, but irony includes more; the genus irony as a schema [figure] is identical with irony as a tropes; but species do differ. The trope is franker in lying and without pretense. . . . But in the schematic form of irony the meaning is disguised, as the whole life of Socrates was colored by irony; he went about like an ignorant man wondering at the wisdom of others."⁵² Schematic irony says exactly the opposite of what it means, without necessarily comparing one thing to another, as is the case for irony as a trope. It is irony as a schema, *qua inversio*, that gives language what Hegel called "the divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said,"⁵³ and which permitted the wise Socrates to allow fools who thought themselves wise to hang themselves with their own verbal rope. As I will discuss in the chapters to follow, schematic irony lies at the foundation of the dialectic of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as well as the *erotics* of the progression from stage to stage. Schematic irony will also emerge as the basis of *Aufhebung* in general.

Quintilian concludes his discussion of tropes and transfer figures by summarizing the purpose of their use. "There is no one law for all varieties of speech. The judge cannot believe an orator or feel compassion or anger if he thinks the orator is merely indulging in refinements. Rhythms at times should be deliberately changed, . . . Artistic structure (*compositio*) must be decorous, pleasing, varied; its three parts are order, connection, rhythm."⁵⁴ The orator must be so adept at the use of language that what is artistic appears to be natural,

and should invoke the sort of appeal to harmony that Hegel makes when referring to the proper combination of meter and accent.⁵⁵ For Quintilian, "it requires so much care that our rhythms may seem to have a spontaneous flow."⁵⁶

A millennium later in his *Metalogicon*, John of Salisbury focuses on this distinction in the context of the complementary canons of the Quadrivium—consisting of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music—and the Trivium—grammar, dialectics (understood as including logic), and rhetoric. (Isocrates, the inaugurator of the rhetorical tradition under discussion, is generally recognized as having developed the Trivium as the *enkyklios paideia*, providing further evidence for his role in the formation of the educational program which produced Hegel.⁵⁷) John summarizes the roles and relative importance of rhetoric and dialectic in his day in the form of a fable:

He who dreams of teaching philosophy without logic is, in effect, presuming to eliminate the reasons of things from the quest of wisdom, inasmuch as logic presides over these reasons. If we may resort to a fable [to illustrate our point], antiquity considered that Prudence, the sister of Truth, was not sterile, but bore a wonderful daughter [Philology], whom she committed to the chaste embrace of Mercury. In other words, Prudence, the sister of Truth, arranged that [her daughter], the Love of [Logical] Reasoning and [Scientific] Knowledge, would acquire fertility and luster from Eloquence. Such is the union of Philology and Mercury [Eloquence]. Logic derives its name from the fact that it is rational. For it both provides and examines reasons.⁵⁸

The genealogy thus suggested sheds light on John's notion of the relationship of philology, logic, and eloquence, and by extension that of rhetoric and dialectic. The Love of Logical Reasoning (Philology) emerges as the scion of Prudence (Practical Wisdom, *phronesis*). Prudence gives her daughter to Eloquence (Mercury) in marriage, in order that Philology's new husband, the silver-tongued Mercury, might endow her dry discourses with the sheen and beauty of eloquent speech. Philology is god-like, and thus so is her knowledge, but she must speak through Mercury, if her speech is to

appear to be what it truly is—the divinely inspired word of Truth, Philology's aunt. Without the translation of Philology's reasoning and knowledge via Eloquence, the truth might well appear to be the rantings of a madwoman, or the incoherent mutterings of a fool, rather than the revelation of the divine word.

On John's view, eloquence, properly conceived (and wed), does not conceal the truth; it dresses it in royal finery. The view of rhetoric as expressive and persuasive oratory does shift somewhat, however, in favor of rhetoric as the clothing or presentation of dialectical inquiry, on which neither Isocrates, Cicero, or Quintilian spent any considerable effort. Rhetoric, as mercurial Eloquence, will now serve a dialectical mistress, in the person of Philology, and will do so as a rhetorical mid-wife, aiding philology as she struggles to give voice to the truth she knows intimately, but lacks the tongue to express. Rhetoric's ultimate mistress will, however, prove to be dialectical Philosophy herself.

Logic includes demonstration, probable proof (under which John places both dialectic and rhetoric), and sophistry. Demonstration, which "rejoices in necessity," finds its ground in the basic principles of the various sciences, and deduces conclusions from these fundamental notions.⁵⁹ Demonstration is not dialectic, however, because dialectic, like rhetoric, does not yield epistemological certainty. Dialectic shares with rhetoric the realm of probable proof (which John also identifies with logic), since "the dialectician and the orator, trying to persuade (respectively) an adversary and a judge, are not too much concerned about the truth or falsity of their arguments, provided only the latter have likelihood."⁶⁰

Dialectic and rhetoric do not differ, then, in their respective concern for truth, but rather in the audience addressed, which in turn dictates the manner of presentation, i.e. the sort of "clothing" in which the argument must be dressed. This position makes the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric (on the one hand) and sophistry (on the other) rather slippery. John writes that sophistry puts on the airs of probability or necessity, cares nothing at all for fact, and has as its only objective "to lose its adversary in a fog of delusions."⁶¹ Without proper emphasis, and a speaker of good character,⁶² even dialectic quickly becomes a tool of sophistic. Dialectic and rhetoric appear to be morally—if not philologically—equivalent, and equally subject to abuse at the hands of a man of low character.

In spite of the apparent kinship of rhetoric and dialectic, John accords dialectic the higher position, claiming that dialectic occupies an enviable middle place between demonstration and sophistry. Dialectic "makes inquiry into the truth, using the ready instrument of moderate probability."⁶³ Dialectic is the species, where Logic herself is the genus. John defines dialectic as "the science of effective argumentation. This is to be understood as meaning that the effective force is to be found in the words themselves. . . . Our definition is to be understood in such a way that it excludes both the demonstrator and the sophist, neither of whom effectively attains the dialectician's objective," which is to persuade his audience, in this case an audience of one—the dialectician's interlocutor. "For demonstration does not calculate to elicit assent, while sophistry forsakes the truth."⁶⁴ Demonstration eschews persuasion because facts are expected to "speak" for themselves.

Despite John's praise of grammar, he also maintains that dialectic by itself has both limited efficacy and a limited audience, viz. an opponent or judge "to convince whom is its sole goal and purpose."⁶⁵ Dialectic, without the assistance of rhetoric, is also ill-suited to investigate philosophical questions, such as the relationship between goodness and pleasure, or whether or not virtue should be pursued above all else.⁶⁶ Dialectic is a mere *method* of discovering truth; in and of itself, it lacks the substance—the words and ideas—necessary to initiate inquiry into the truth. Dialectic may be well suited in some cases to conduct an inquiry into truth, but such inquiry requires a wise man who is experienced and knowledgeable, and who possesses a copious store of words and ideas, i.e. Cicero's ideal orator—who is both a rhetorician and a philosopher. Rhetoric here retains its central place in the pursuit of truth, and hence in the education of the young.

Rhetoric as Divine Grammar

Just as grammar focuses on the manner in which words are expressed, dialectic takes as its object the words themselves; grammar is concerned with how things are said, while dialectic is concerned with what is said.⁶⁷ The difference is the same as that between presentation and content, between *elocutio* and *inventio*. The subject matter of dialectic is the words themselves and the power represented

by their meanings. The word, in short, stands for a thing (*res*)—whether that “thing” be a physical object, an abstraction, or an idea. As such, *verba* are of necessity *metaphora*, rhetorical (and, generally speaking, ironic) re-presentations of original meanings. The basic nature of the word is metaphoric, since it expresses not itself, but always something else, from which it derives the power which is in the thing. The word is a sign that points to the universal, via the particular.

Put another way, even dialectic depends on the tropological and metaphoric presentation of the *res*. Merely *human* language is insufficient to express the meaning of the thing, since the words used by the dialectician gain their power by re-presenting the thing itself (which is at base something real and divine, rather than linguistic and human) via speech. The word invokes the thing, but cannot do so directly, since it is mediated through human language, through the act of speaking.

Unlike men, who use words to describe the created world and the things in it, divinity actually brings things into being by speaking, via the fecundity of the divine *Logos*, which is at base creative. The word’s goal of tapping into the raw, elemental power of its own genesis—thereby transcending the limits of its merely conventional usage and ascending to its origins in the speech of the gods—is frustrated by its lack of eloquence, its inability to attain divine understanding via merely human language. Philology without Eloquence has no voice; even with Eloquence, Philology attains at best a derivative understanding of the true meaning of the word. Even eloquent human speech inverts and misses the actual sense of what is being said.

Dialectic, to paraphrase John’s fable, is the mute sage, the wise man who knows divine truth, but lacks the divinely inspired speech necessary to give it full and complete expression. Dialectic’s divinity comes from its power to express directly the meaning of what is said, to reflect the thing represented immediately in its expression of the word, thus implicitly recognizing the primordial unity—indeed the indivisibility—of the thing and the word by which it is known. Without the benefit of *elocutio*, however, the arguments devised via the *inventio* so capably practiced by dialectic remain locked in a soundproof vault—the speechless wisdom of the proverbial “brain in a vat.”

Hesiod writes of his and Homer's scattered knowledge of a few divine words—a mere handful, divorced from their roots in divine speech, the elocution of the gods, no more capable of full expression than a child's tongue, which has not yet learned to connect discrete elements of speech into even the most primitive form of discourse. It does the great Greek poets no more good to remember a few divine words, than it does for a child to understand that a single sound refers to a particular thing. The best either can do is to point, while uttering a sound whose significance he himself does not fully grasp.

The poets and the child alike possess a knowledge which is incapable of expression, the latter because of a simple lack of linguistic knowledge combined with ignorance of grammar, and the former because their knowledge has been cut off from the divine tree of language, which alone gives it sustenance and succor by linking it with all of the other divine words, and—most especially—with the manner in which divine words are to be ordered and arranged. The dialectician, who investigates and discovers divine truth, shares the affliction of the poet and the child. They all possess knowledge to which none is able to give full or even adequate voice.

Rhetoric provides for the dialectician what grammar does for the child. It teaches him how to organize and present his knowledge in a manner befitting divine speech; he must borrow the tongue of Mercury and Achilles, the "rhetor of speech and doer of deeds," if he is ever to give proper credit to his divine knowledge. After all, will fine wine be served in a swine's trough, to be drunk after they have consumed the pearls cast before them? The wine, to be appreciated in all of its exquisite savor, must be served in a goblet, if not of silver or gold, then at least of bronze. The divine words of the dialectician must find expression in the divinely ordered speech of the rhetor, if men are to recognize these words for what they are, and heed their warnings, advice, and admonitions.

If wisdom without eloquence is mute, it is, says John (following Cicero), "a well-known fact that 'Eloquence without wisdom is futile,' whence it is clear that eloquence derives its efficacy from wisdom. The utility of eloquence is, in fact, directly in proportion to the measure of wisdom a person may have obtained. On the other hand, eloquence becomes positively harmful when it departs from wisdom."⁶⁸ Eloquence—*qua* rhetoric—serves dialectic, as it is rhetoric that gives eloquent expression to divine words. Without this eloquent expression, these words would have at best a primitive,

inchoate sense—much like the quasi-divine scribblings of the epic poet. As such, they might well strike an emotive chord, but could neither truly persuade nor inspire to action.

Rhetoric provides the linguistic “clothing” for the divine words unearthed by dialecticians. These words have power because of their meanings, which have a divine origin; through his investigations, the dialectician performs a sort of linguistic archeology, unearthing remnants of divine speech and—thus—divine wisdom, which however lack cohesion or overall unity, due to their fragmentary nature. Through its origin in Greek epic poetry, which recounts the end of the period during which men like Homer and Hesiod possessed some knowledge of divine words, the practitioners of a full, robust, and honest rhetoric do some reconstructing of their own. They struggle not to gain divine knowledge directly, but rather to regain understanding of divine speech, and in so doing strive to uncover and emulate what can only be called divine grammar, the correct manner of presentation for divine language.

The thing represented by the divine language uncovered by dialectic is the *res*, the thing itself (or, to use Hegelian terminology, the thing in-itself). Rhetoric clothes this divine language—which is actually nothing else but the thing represented—in eloquent speech that befits the character and quality of the divine language presented, and is appropriate to the audience. The *res* will be revealed to an audience by means of fitting words, *verba*, provided by the rhetorician. Eloquent speech provides divine grammar for divinely inspired wisdom.

Notes

¹ James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula, *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric* (Davis, California: Hermagoras Press, 1995), 44.

² H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. G. Lamb (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), 79-80.

³ G. W. F. Hegel, “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus,” *Werke*, 20 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), 1:234-36; for an English version, see H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 510-12.

⁴ Marrou, 84; Plato, *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton

and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989), 511-519 (265b1 - 274a7).

⁵ Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1479 (1459a5-8).

⁶ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric*, ed. G. A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991), Books I and II.

⁷ Marrou, 90.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁹ Cicero, *De Oratore: Book III, De Fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1992), 59.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 119.

¹² *Ibid.*, 135-37

¹³ *Ibid.*, 161.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 155-57. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 38; *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), 46. Hegel's description of rhythm as the product of the combination of meter and accent, and the similarity of rhythm to the unity of Subject and Predicate in the speculative proposition (*der spekulative Satz*), betrays a distinct sympathy with the view that presentation is a matter of serious concern to the philosopher.

¹⁵ Cicero, *De Oratore: Book III*, 113.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁸ Giambattista Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), 3-26.

¹⁹ Cicero, *De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1993), 5-7.

²⁰ See Alain Pons, "Vico and the Barbarism of Reflection," trans. D. H. Fernald, in *New Vico Studies, XVI* (Atlanta: The Institute for Vico Studies, 1998), 1-24.

²¹ Marrou, 91.

²² *Phenomenology*, 66; *Phänomenologie*, 70.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria, Book VII - IX*, trans. H. E. Butler (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1996), 185. Cf.

Cicero, *De Oratore: Books I - II*, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1996), xxi, 67; and Cicero, *Brutus, Orator*, trans. G. L. Hendrickson, H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1997), 339, 351.

²⁵ Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria, Book VII - IX*, 187.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 189.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ James J. Murphy (ed.), *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1987), xxiv.

³¹ Ibid., 18.

³² Ibid., 25.

³³ Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria, Books VII-IX*, 193.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Charles E. Little, *Quintilian the Schoolmaster* (Nashville: George Peabody College, 1951), Book X, Chapter 1: Lines 5-6.

³⁶ Ibid., VIII, 3:1-10.

³⁷ Ibid., VIII, 6:1.

³⁸ Ibid., VIII, 6:4.

³⁹ Ibid., VIII, 6:14.

⁴⁰ Ibid., VIII, 6:19-67.

⁴¹ Ibid., VIII, 6:19-37.

⁴² Ibid., VIII, 6:23.

⁴³ Arthur Quinn and Lyon Rathbun, "Hyperbaton," in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*, ed. T. Enos (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), 334.

⁴⁴ Little, VIII, 6:62-64.

⁴⁵ Ibid., VIII, 6:64.

⁴⁶ Ibid., VIII, 6:44-46.

⁴⁷ Ibid., VIII, 6:52-54.

⁴⁸ Ibid., IX, 1:1-2.

⁴⁹ Ibid., IX, 1:3.

⁵⁰ Ibid., IX, 1:2-4.

⁵¹ Ibid., IX, 1:4.

⁵² Ibid., IX, 2:44-46.

⁵³ *Phenomenology*, 66; *Phänomenologie*, 78. See also Donald Phillip Verene, *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Albany: State University of New York

Press, 1985), 24-25, 29-30, 38, 90-91.

⁵⁴ Little, IX, 4:143.

⁵⁵ *Phenomenology*, 38; *Phänomenologie*, 46.

⁵⁶ Little, IX, 4:143.

⁵⁷ Elizabeth Ervin, "Trivium," in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*, ed. T. Enos (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), 731.

⁵⁸ John of Salisbury, *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury*, trans. D. D. McGarry (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971), 78-9.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, 70-71.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 100-102.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 80-81.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 93.

Chapter Five

Phenomenological Prediscourse: Rhetoric in the Revelation of Spirit

Image and Metaphor

The preceding observations on the relationship of rhetoric and dialectic are carried further along by Phillip Melanchthon, who established the school system of which the young Hegel was a product. Among Melanchthon's several definitions of rhetoric is "that science that teaches the way and manner of correct and pleasing speech."¹ He claimed that the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric was largely a formal, or stylistic, one. Dialectic, he maintained, aimed to present the truth in its "pure" form, the *res nudas*, while rhetoric sought to clothe the truth in appropriately eloquent language.² Both played significant roles in the education of the young, but of the two rhetoric was the more central pedagogically.

This rhetorical emphasis shows through clearly in Melanchthon's preference for classical over medieval Latin. Melanchthon criticized the medieval writers for stripping Latin of its natural beauty and luster, thinking such things to be mere ornaments, in the interest of "clarity." In so denuding language, Melanchthon claimed, they deprived it of much of its ability to persuade, or teach.³ In short, Melanchthon found fault with medieval Latin for being overly dialectical. By removing the rhetorical ornaments, the medieval philosophers had in fact obscured the truth, since the ornaments, e.g. metaphor and allegory, served legitimate pedagogical

and illustrative ends. Rhetoric, accordingly, clothes the truth in ornate garb, not in order to obscure it, but rather to present it in a manner appropriate to its nature, and to the character of the audience. Eternal truths thus gain temporal expression via appropriate rhetorical presentation. The "undressing" of truth by the dialectician, through which he hopes to grasp the truth on its *own* terms, must necessarily be preceded by an understanding on *human* terms, using human language supplemented by divine grammar.

The stages of a rhetorical education are imitation (*imitatio*), translation (*translatio*), and emulation (*aemulatio*).⁴ The rhetorical approach to the *res* follows a similar course, in effect re-enacting the youth's rhetorical training each time it approaches the subject matter. The *res* must be grasped as it in fact is, but this cannot be done directly. It must be translated, its meaning transferred into human terms via tropes and transfer figures (schema). Only upon having attained such understanding is it appropriate to attempt to grasp the thing as it is in-itself. The thing is always and forever both a thing and a thing for the person observing it. In attempting to seize the thing itself in *its* totality, the literal minded or abstract philosopher denies his own role in its comprehension, but he is there all the same.

The thing is always both an in-itself and an in-itself for us (i.e. for consciousness). There is always both the *Ansich* and the *Ansich* known.⁵ The understanding of the *res* on human terms most certainly does not exhaust its meaning, but such understanding is a necessary precondition for grasping the *res* as it is in-itself. Without it, the literal-minded philosopher emerges as an absurd latter-day Oedipus, never realizing that he himself is the object of his pursuit.

Rhetoric, then, is the *translatio* of the true, the means by which the true makes itself known in terms which men can understand. Rhetoric transfers the *res*, which cannot be known directly, into the immediately intelligible *verbum*. The specialized training of the dialectician may allow him to grasp the *res* in its pure form, on its own terms, but only by first presenting the *res* in a way already familiar to him. To attempt to leap directly to a properly speaking philosophical or dialectical understanding of the subject matter is to make of the *res* something beyond normal human experience. To do so is, indeed, to engage in just the sort of abstract philosophical inquiry of which Hegel is so dismissive.

In order to understand the *res* dialectically, one must first understand it rhetorically. Invention and elocution play crucial roles

in the process of this "translation" of the *res*. Melanchthon claimed that invention was a characteristic of dialectic, or, to speak more precisely, of the dialectical elements of rhetoric, viz. those elements concerned with the presentation of the truth, the *res nudas*. Like *dispositio*, invention is concerned with the content of arguments, with the truth in its pure—indeed logical—form. *Elocutio*, on the other hand, is—properly speaking—rhetorical in character, since it has to do with the presentation, or "clothing," of truth in language. It is in the orator's task of *elocutio* that *res* meets *verba*, that the truth is wrapped in the words on whose eloquent efficacy its proper communication alone depends.

Dialectical inquiry completes this rhetorically "translated" understanding of the *res*, by finding the correct definitions and divisions, and distinguishing well from poorly constructed arguments.⁶ A man trained merely in rhetoric would be as likely to make and accede to bad arguments as to good ones. That good rhetoric must, on Melanchthon's view, be informed by training in dialectic is further supported by Melanchthon's description of eloquence as "the faculty of speaking wisely and well."⁷ This requires knowledge of the subject matter (*res*), facility in speech, and the ability to distinguish the true from the false, which is gained by a study of dialectic. Dialectic without rhetoric lacks eloquence, and rhetoric without dialectic is mere puffery, divorced from wisdom and truth.

Finally, Melanchthon's enthusiasm for tropes and transfer figures (which he, unlike Quintilian, does not clearly distinguish from one another) does not suffer by comparison with the men on whose shoulders he stands. He is, if anything, an even greater advocate of the extensive use of tropes and figures than Cicero, Quintilian, John of Salisbury, and perhaps even Isocrates. Melanchthon claims that the use of figures arose by necessity, "when fitting terms were lacking," but also encourages their use for reasons of style and exposition, even when fitting terms are available.⁸ He also asserts that the use of figures should not be restrained, and should rather enjoy full run of the orator's presentation, a view embodied in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁹

The Tropology of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*

To say that metaphoric language is present in the *Phenomenology* is to utter a commonplace. The relatively young Hegel of the *Phenomenology* employed battalions of images and rhetorical turns of phrase. These elements, while present in other works, are not nearly as prevalent in, e.g., the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia*. Hegel's trademark image of the "Owl of Minerva" in *The Philosophy of Right*, while dramatic, is an illustrative image, and is not doing the same sort of philosophical work as the images of the *Phenomenology*.¹⁰

What explains the great abundance of images and metaphors in the *Phenomenology*? If they are merely illustrative, why is there such a notable change in both the character and frequency of Hegel's use of images in his later works? If they serve some function other than a merely illustrative one, what is it about the *Phenomenology* that demands such an abundance, even an apparent superfluity, of images?

In *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit*, Donald Phillip Verene claims that in the *Phenomenology* images play a central role in both the famous Hegelian dialectic and in the work as a whole. Although many of Hegel's writings can be treated discursively, Verene writes, "the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel's 'voyage of discovery,' can be approached differently. In the *Phenomenology* there is a struggle between imagistic or pictorial ways of thinking and the concept. In this work Hegel is struggling to give the concept birth. The struggle is one of passing through the image to the concept, moving from a language of appearance to a language of reality. In this process, *Bild* and *Begriff* work dialectically against each other. The opposition within Hegel's philosophical doctrine is also present in Hegel's manner of writing."¹¹ On Verene's view, the image (*Bild*) is, in brief, a foil for the concept (*Begriff*), and more. *Begriff* finds its expression in and through *Bilder*. Such indeed is the philosophical work that Hegel's famous images perform in *Phenomenology*. Each of the images presented is, in short, a sign—a picture of something that is being represented.

A few examples should clarify this point. "Sense-Certainty" illustrates the failed attempt to find unmediated truth in the object of sense, since what remains constant in the sensual experience is the observer, not the observed. In "Perception" (*die Wahrnehmung*, literally "truth taking"), consciousness seeks to "take the truth" of the object and make that truth its own. The "topsy turvy world" (*die*

verkehrte Welt) is the result of the thought—indulged by an increasingly philosophic consciousness—that the world could be radically different from the way it appears. “Lordship and Bondage” represents in pictorial fashion the independence and dependence of self-consciousness. Finally, the master image of the *Phenomenology*—the Gallery of Images—is an image constructed in images, which stands for the final realization of consciousness that its experiences up to that point had been merely pictures of the True, not the True itself.

The *Phenomenology's* images are also metaphoric. In the Preface to *Hegel's Recollection*, Verene discusses some of the “master metaphors” used in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. These include “*Das Meinen*,” the inverted (or topsy-turvy) world, the master and servant, the unhappy consciousness, phrenology, the beautiful soul, and closing image of the divine in Absolute Knowing. To this list, I would add the image of the Gallery of Images (*Gallerie von Bildern*), which is also present in the section on Absolute Knowing, and into which Verene provides considerable insight.¹²

Each one of these master metaphors is tropic, or tropological, in character. Hegel's treatment of each of them is, additionally, ironic, as Hegel's description of each reveals it to be self-opposed; its appearance (*Shein*) as imagination (*Vorstellung*) carries with it, in each case, a meaning opposite to its true meaning as concept (*Begriff*). “*Das Meinen*,” e.g., plays on the linguistic ambiguity between the German “*mein*” (“mine”)—as in “belonging to me”), and *Meinen*, or “meaning,” the ultimate discovery being that meaning is always somehow “mine,” i.e. rooted in consciousness.

Hegel's other images serve equally significant philosophical purposes. The image of the inverted world (“*die verkehrte Welt*”) turns meaning on its head, literally and figuratively, as an image that is itself upside down, once again pointing the reader back toward Spirit, or the self, as the source for meaning. The servant in the famous “master-servant dialectic” ends up as the dominant partner, symbolizing the passage from man's existence as a thing to his emergence as a self-directed, self-conscious agent. The unhappy consciousness (*das unglueckliche Bewusstsein*) is “unhappy” because it is self-alienated, and is thus both itself and something other than itself. Hegel's discussions of phrenology and the beautiful soul (*die schöne Seele*) are intended to underscore the inadequacy of the in-itself and for-itself, respectively, as the sole ground of knowledge.

Finally, the closing image of the chalice in Absolute Knowing is itself ambiguous, as it suggests a cup which is ever-filled yet ever-filling, a mere chalice which will somehow hold God's "own infinitude."¹³

These images are far more than mere illustrations of deeper, philosophical insights. They are not, in this sense, representational images, but images which are somehow "real," if only for consciousness. Hegel's images are concept-laden; his *Bilder* are *Begrifflich*. Hegel uses these and other images as tropes, and this tropic or tropological use of images is an essential part of Hegel's method in the *Phenomenology*. It is *only* through these tropes that we encounter "the rational movement of the concept" and "Hegel's philosophical ideas themselves—the in-itself, the for-itself, the transformation of substance into subject, consciousness, experience, absolute spirit, to mention only a few."¹⁴ These tropological images grant the reader access to the "Science of the *experience of consciousness*," as Hegel calls his work in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*.¹⁵

Verene identifies two basic interpretive views of the *Phenomenology*, both of which he finds wanting. The first considers the *Phenomenology* as an early attempt to establish the system, which is superseded by Hegel's later efforts, especially the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia*. The contrasting view regards the *Phenomenology* as a work to be esteemed on its own merits. "This second approach to the *Phenomenology* sees it as a contribution to existential phenomenology and not simply as the pathway to the *Begriff* realized in the *Logic*."¹⁶

On the first view, the youthful speculations of the *Phenomenology* are of at best historical interest, milestones on the path to the Absolute, and the images it employs are but unfortunate flourishes, of which the later Hegel was well-rid. The more sanguine second view, at its extremes, takes the *Phenomenology* and its many images as appropriate topics of independent study, most often in abstraction from the rest of the Hegelian corpus. This is precisely what figures such as Marx, Hyppolite, Kojève, and Sartre have done with the Hegel of the *Phenomenology*.

Not only do such figures treat the *Phenomenology* as separable from the rest of Hegel's work, even parts of the *Phenomenology* itself are considered in abstraction both from all other parts and from the work itself. The vats of ink that have been emptied to greater or lesser effect on the "master-servant dialectic" alone make

this point quite eloquently. Hegel has been made into an icon by those who hold this view, to such an extent that it is "not Kierkegaard, but his great master, Hegel," who is regarded as the inaugurator of existential philosophy.¹⁷

Both of these approaches miss the significance of Hegel's topological images. Recollection (*Erinnerung*, *Er-Innerung*) is the key to the *Phenomenology*, which Verene describes as "a colossus of systematic memory."¹⁸ He continues, "What does it mean to claim that the key to Hegel's *Phenomenology* is *Erinnerung*? Simply put, it claims that speculative knowing, *speculatives Wissen*, presupposes recollection."¹⁹ Verene points out that "to recollect is not to form a proposition, but to form an image. An image is not a proposition nor is it implicitly a proposition. But an image can give access to the proposition. The *Bild* is the basis of the pathway of the process of consciousness of the *Phenomenology*. This pathway is its *Bildung*. The *Bild*, the image, is the form through which *Erinnerung* works."²⁰

The Ironic Image: *Rhetorica contra Rhetoricam*

Recollection or memory, one of the five duties of an orator, here emerges as the key to Hegel's first major work. Having established the fact of Hegel's topological use of images, the precise nature of that use remains to be discussed. I agree with Verene that Hegel's images are used as tropes, rather than mere embellishments, and that these images provide the "logic" for the transition between the stages of the *Phenomenology*. I wish to further Verene's discussion by introducing and discussing the notion of the Ironic Image, and the contribution it makes to Hegel's use of a rhetorical technique known as *rhetorica contra rhetoricam*.²¹

Rhetorica contra rhetoricam, as its name implies, employs rhetoric to overcome rhetoric. It involves using rhetorical argument forms or tropes to oppose other rhetorical forms or tropes. It is thus *aporetic* in character, and amounts, to use somewhat prosaic terms, to fighting fire with fire. The result is a great conflagration, which at best consumes the argument it opposes, and at worst destroys the positions of both parties. In no case does it actually prove anything, leading typically to an impasse, or *aporia*.

In *The Spirit and its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of Bildung*, John H. Smith discusses the role of *rhetorica*

contra rhetoricam in Hegel's *Phenomenology*. Smith begins by quoting a significant passage from the beginning of Hegel's Preface to the *Phenomenology*.

It is customary to preface a work with an explanation of the author's aim, why he wrote the book, and the relationship in which he believes it to stand to other earlier or contemporary treatises on the same subject. In the case of a philosophical work, however, such an explanation seems not only superfluous but, in view of the nature of the subject-matter, even inappropriate and misleading. For whatever might appropriately be said about philosophy in a preface—say a historical *statement* of the main drift and the point of view, the general content and results, a string of random assertions and assurances about truth—none of this can be accepted as the way in which to expound philosophical truth.²²

Smith points out that in this brief passage, Hegel has effectively managed to undermine the philosophical legitimacy of a number of the rhetorician's central tasks,²³ and begins with a paradox. "In the opening paragraphs of the Preface (*Vorrede*), Hegel defines the function of a preface to philosophical works in a manner that his Preface then seems to contradict. In the initial sentences (cited above) he states, for example, that a preface should not contain a summary of the work, or a formulation of its goals and purpose; it should not present a historical discussion of the background of the work, or the personal position of the writer vis-à-vis other works and writers in the same field."²⁴ Given that Hegel goes on to make just such subjects the foci of the Preface, there is at least an apparent contradiction between Hegel's stated goals and the path he follows to reach them. As Walter Kaufmann wrote, on the same subject, "What is so odd is merely that the Preface itself—as Hegel admits with some embarrassment—is an example of the kind of writing that Hegel tries in the Preface to banish from philosophy."²⁵

Despite his apparent banishment of a number of rhetorical themes—e.g. the statement of purpose typical in the exordium of an oration, the rhetor's duty of invention (*inventio*), and the use of *enthymemes*²⁶—Hegel goes on to indicate that the question of representation and depiction, which is by nature rhetorical, will occupy a place of importance in the *Phenomenology*.²⁷ "For, he writes, the central concern of his Preface is the manner in which

philosophical truth is to be depicted (*darzustellen sei*), and thus he must concern himself with the issues of philosophical rhetoric and *elocutio* before dealing with 'philosophy itself.' The paradox of the Preface, which has been mentioned but not yet analyzed in Hegel research, revolves around the uneasy though necessary position of rhetorical issues in philosophy."²⁸

Hegel's appeal to "rhetorical criteria of aptness, purpose, and agreement between the *res* and *verba*, the matter and verbal expression"²⁹ underlines his dependence upon rhetorical forms, even as he attempts to overcome them. "Hegel's interest in a proper mode of depicting truth 'philosophically' cannot avoid rhetorical criteria for dealing with the question of expression. Thus, given its argumentative strategy of employing rhetorical categories even as it rejects them, the Preface to the *Phenomenology* provides a classic example of *rhetorica contra rhetoricam*. The parameters preestablished for all discourse by the *ars rhetorica* still hold in a philosophical discourse that would dispense with them."³⁰

Rhetorica contra rhetoricam serves Hegel well, and it turns the entire *Phenomenology* into a kind of running joke. The corridors of this great philosophical labyrinth appear grand and imposing, but ultimately lead nowhere, ending finally in a cul-de-sac, a Gallery of Images (*eine Gallerie von Bildern*) which is itself nothing but another image, an image constructed in images, designed to remind our wanderer of his entire pilgrim's progress. The visitor in the Gallery of Images sees himself reflected back in them, since he himself made them, unawares.

Hegel thus uses rhetoric in much the same way that Verene sees him using scepticism. Verene claims that Hegel meets the challenge of scepticism by moving within the realm of apparency, thereby creating a science of the *experience* of consciousness, rather than a science of consciousness itself. As each of consciousness' experiences is shown to provide a demonstrably inadequate account of Spirit, it falls away, in favor of the "next" experience. It is only when all of the various forms of apparency are used up, that consciousness, in its despair, turns back toward itself. In so doing, it realizes that it is capable of attaining the level of Spirit, and that it has been all along.

Without the rhetoric of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel's scepticism would be both endless and point-less, in the literal sense of being *Zweck-los*, a journey without a goal. Hegel has a goal, however—the Calvary of Spirit in Absolute Knowing—wherein the

various forms of apparency have exhausted themselves. Once apparency has been exhausted, it is no longer a threat to Hegel's philosophical enterprise; rhetorical tropes have effectively overcome rhetoric and the scepticism that is its frequent traveling companion. Appearance has overcome apparency, and the System may situate itself on firmer philosophical ground. The *Phenomenology*, on this view, emerges as a rhetorical act of foundation laying. Its function is to clear away the earth and debris obscuring Spirit's cornerstone, to remove sceptical and rhetorical barriers to the establishment of Hegel's Science, thereby allowing the True to be founded on something other than the merely apparent.

Rhetoric is essential in this process. Unlike Hegel's other works, the *Phenomenology* is inherently rhetorical and takes place only through the image. Without images, the *Phenomenology* would have literally no substance, being but unexpressed apparency, an unknown thing-in-itself. It is in Hegel's expressions of apparency that the *Phenomenology* finds life. Images are its lymph and its blood, and these images, as already shown, are not mere accidents or illustrations. They are the *Phenomenology*; they are indeed the very essence of the *Phenomenology's* dialectic, its progression from Sense-Certainty to Absolute Knowing. Without rhetorical expression, these images would not be tropes, as they clearly are. These pictorial tropes betray their own inadequacy, which indeed is the entire point. Consciousness must be thoroughly, indeed brutally, disabused of its philosophical materialism, if it is ever to become fully aware of itself as an independent consciousness, which exists for-itself (*für-sich*). Each successive failure of consciousness to find the ground for the true "out there" clarifies the crucial distinction between what is for-itself and what is merely material or in-itself (*an-sich*). Without Hegel's rhetorical images, this vital distinction could not be made with the same sureness and authority, placing rhetoric at the very foundation of the succession of spirits in the *Phenomenology*.

If rhetoric is at the foundation, though, what of dialectic? What is its place? The *Phenomenology* is the account of the embrace, and subsequent overcoming or *Aufhebung* (sublation), of mere apparency (*Schein*). *Schein* is a "garden of error" (*ein Irrgarten*), "in which a sense of the unseen must always be present in order to find its pathway." Furthermore, *Schein* "stands between *das Wahre*, the true, and *Irrtum*, error."³¹ To an individual caught up in imagistic thinking (*bildhaftes Denken*), there is no dialectic, only a seemingly endless

succession of images which eventually exhaust themselves, leaving the weary, bewildered, disoriented pilgrim at the foot of Golgotha, wondering where he is. Why does consciousness at the end of the *Phenomenology* find itself faced with the Calvary of Spirit and ever-flowing chalice, rather than somewhere else? Upon divining his location, the pilgrim asks, quite reasonably: "How did I get here?"

In short, he was tricked. The dialectic that emerged from the rhetorical forms of Spirit deceived him. The movement through apparency seemed random, almost haphazard, but was in fact no such thing. The apparent chaos of the rhetorical forms of consciousness leading up to the Calvary of Spirit in Absolute Knowing was in fact guided all along by a dialectic logic which underlay the tropes and associated images. The ever-present, though hidden, dialectic reveals itself once the experience of consciousness has been objectified in the Gallery of Images. On this subject, Verene writes:

The dialectic of Hegel's *Phenomenology* becomes a kind of ingenuity (*ingenium*) to move the recollection [of the *aufgehobenen* forms of apparency] in the direction of speculative apprehension. . . . The dialectic is not a method but a name for ingenuity, ingenious activity itself, which takes a continually varying shape depending on the content before it. The problem with which consciousness is always struggling is the limitation of the image, the production of the unseen. Or, put another way, it is driven toward the *sight* of the unseen—the transcending optics of a situation. The speculative element is there in the determination of consciousness not to be overcome in any given moment by the shining forth, the apparency caught up in the image. The dialectic is the wiliness of the moment required to be beyond the image, to produce the speculative sense of the unseen. This happens first when the image is transformed into the name. The power of the name is the first glimmer of absolute knowing and this power is seen from the first moment of the *Phenomenology* with the attempt to make here, now, and this into names.³²

In grappling with the image, consciousness is tarrying with the negative, that which is other than itself. As it tries to pigeon-hole its experiences by giving them names, it finds that in so doing it turns the thing experienced into something that it was not initially. In being

named, experience becomes internalized, and the thing experienced becomes part of consciousness, as memory. It changes the object in the very act of perceiving it. In this way, the image is revealed as mere apparency; it is not something "real" for consciousness; it is rather just an appearance which is not reducible to any other categories. After all, if the object were "real," how could consciousness' attention have changed the way in which consciousness perceived it? Consciousness must abandon its attempt to find the ground of the True in the thing before it can turn back on itself and begin to appreciate fully its own role in the act of cognition. Much as *verba* can never fully explicate *res*, so too does the attentive gaze of consciousness make the object into something that it is not, in-itself. The thing is not experienced as it is, but as it is experienced and remembered. The thing becomes merely a name that consciousness represents to itself as an image.

Consciousness' recognition of the object of its regard as a mere image—which consciousness itself created in its attempt to assimilate the object *qua* in-itself—reduces the object to a mere apparency, to an image. The image has precisely the same function for Hegel that irony, as both a figure (schema) and a trope, has for Quintilian. For Quintilian, schematic irony inverts the meaning of what is said by conveying explicitly the opposite of the speaker's true intent, while tropological irony involves making an inappropriate substitution of one thing for another. The deception is revealed either when the speaker gives up the ruse and lets his audience in on the joke, he is caught in a lie or inconsistency, or his position is revealed (whether intentionally or not) as absurd.

Language's "divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said,"³³ finds its ground in schematic irony; in the *Phenomenology* it is Hegel's Ironic Image that carries this water for Spirit. The ultimate Ironic Image, as I will discuss in subsequent chapters, is the Gallery of Images (*die Gallerie von Bildern*), a contentless reflection of our pilgrim's journey through apparency. In Absolute Knowing, this philosophical hall of mirrors is revealed as both a deception and, ironically, as the prelude to the exposition of the True. Indeed, the philosophical orations of the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia* would not even be thinkable, in Hegel's terms, without their exordium, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in which consciousness learns both how to tarry with the negative, and when to

stop. Consciousness has learned to distinguish mere *Schein* from *das Wahre*, apparency from the True.

The image serves as a corrective to consciousness' baseless insistence that the ground of the True must be "out there" somewhere; as each successive image in the *Phenomenology* is revealed as being without content, the store of possible external representations of the True is reduced, until ultimately it is exhausted. Consciousness tarries with the object long enough to learn that it is not real in any but a base, material sense. It lacks the epistemological and metaphysical constancy required of the True, leaving consciousness finally with no choice but to see itself as somehow the source of the Whole which is the True.

This takes place as consciousness goes beyond the *Bild* to the *Begriff*, by unveiling each progressive apparency with which it finds itself presented—from "*das Meinen*" to "the Death of the Mediator"—as but incompletely expressing Spirit's being. When the store of the forms of apparency are spent, and consciousness in its despair turns to itself, the curtain is raised and behind it is an odd kind of mirror, the Gallery of Images, in which our spent protagonist finds himself reflected in the stages of false consciousness through which he has passed on his way to Absolute Knowing. Each of these is a grander illusion than the last, but each was taken, at one time, for the real and the True. Our exhausted pilgrim can finally rest, for a time, in the knowledge that he himself holds the key to the wisdom he has vainly sought in external forms of mere apparency.

The image, in short, is ironic because it conveys a meaning precisely antipodal to the one it appears to bear. Each of Hegel's many tropological images is but a means of exposing its own fraudulence. The image guides consciousness, via the tropological presentation of increasingly complex (and illusory) rhetorical forms, through the *Bild* to the *Begriff*, from Sense-Certainty to Absolute Knowing, the gateway to the *Science of Logic*.

Here, recollection (*Erinnerung*) is indeed the key. If our pilgrim does not see himself in the images collected in the Gallery, then after taking the necessary time to recuperate, he will most likely pick himself up, dust himself off, and start the process all over again. It is only the power of recollection—held by Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian to be a crucial element in the training of a rhetorician—that permits our pilgrim to hold all of these images in his mind at once, and thus recognize them as a Gallery, a collection of the dead forms of

apparency, no more alive than a skeleton with tickets stuck all over it. Such recollection is central to the orator's duty of *eloqui*, of saying all that there is to say on any given subject. Absolute Knowing is consciousness' eloquent moment, in which it presents all of the forms of its experience to itself all at once. Via its journey, consciousness has unwittingly labeled and given names to the apparent forms of Spirit, and understands them as mere apparency, as they hang in the Gallery of Images.

It has, furthermore, thereby overcome the twin dragons of rhetoric and scepticism; both remain with consciousness, as it continues its journey into the *Logic*, but only as states which have been *aufgehoben*, overcome yet retained in memory. By remembering the time it spent tarrying with the image, consciousness avoids repeating its ill-fated infatuation with the in-itself as the source of the True.

The initial paradox of Hegel's preface is thus revealed as both deliberate and ingenious. The *Phenomenology* is a text of human making, not logical deduction; it is an expression not of consciousness itself, but rather of the *experience* of consciousness. Given his contempt for the spirit of edification, Hegel could not have been satisfied with a science merely of the experience of consciousness, when an understanding of consciousness itself was his goal.³⁴ It is this which lies at the base of the paradox, which forms its root, and which is its genesis. The effect of this paradox, and the end to which Hegel intends its use, is nowhere more clearly to be seen than in his Gallery of Images, in which the paradox is "reconciled," and the Gallery is revealed as the gateway to the fuller expression of Spirit in the *Science of Logic*.

Notes

¹ Philip Melancthon, *A Critical Translation of Philip Melancthon's Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*, trans. M. J. La Fontaine (Ann Arbor: MI: UMI, 1993), 43. Hereinafter "La Fontaine."

² Ibid., 44.

³ Ibid., 8-12.

⁴ John H. Smith, *The Spirit and its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of Bildung* (Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1988), 207.

⁵ On the "doubled *Ansich*," see also Donald Phillip Verene, *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit*

(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 15-16.

⁶ Melancthon, *Corpus Reformatorum Melancthon Opera*, (eds. Bretschneider and Bindseil, 28 vols., 1834-60), vol. 20:513. "*Dialectica est ars seu via, recte, ordine et perspicue docendi, quod sit recte definiendo, dividendo, argumenta vera connectendo, et male coaerentia deum falsa retexendo et refutando.*"

⁷ La Fontaine, 78.

⁸ Ibid., 232.

⁹ Ibid., 233.

¹⁰ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1967), 13.

¹¹ Verene, x.

¹² I will claim, in fact, that the Gallery of Images is the Master Metaphor for the entire *Phenomenology*, and that it is the Gallery of Images which makes possible the transition from the *Phenomenology* to the *Science of Logic*.

¹³ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 493; *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), 531.

¹⁴ Verene, x.

¹⁵ *Phenomenology*, 56; *Phänomenologie*, 68.

¹⁶ Verene, 2.

¹⁷ Ibid.; Richard Kroner, "Introduction: Hegel's Philosophical Development," in *On Christianity: Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 46.

¹⁸ Verene, 3.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 3-4.

²¹ "*Rhetorica contra rhetoricam*" is derived from Walter Jen's study of Hugo von Hoffmannsthal in *Von Deutscher Rede* (Munich: Fink, 1969). See also Gerd Ueding, *Einführung in die Rhetorik: Geschichte, Technik, Methode* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1976), for more on this technique as used in the eighteenth century.

²² *Phenomenology*, 1; *Phänomenologie*, 3.

²³ Smith, 3-4.

²⁴ Smith, 1-2.

²⁵ Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 120.

²⁶ Smith, 3-4.

²⁷ Ibid., 4.

²⁸ Ibid. Verene discusses Hegel's abuse of the reader in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* in Verene, 57, 114, 120.

²⁹ Smith, 4.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Verene, 10.

³² Ibid., 11.

³³ *Phenomenology*, 66; *Phänomenologie*, 78. See also Verene, 24-25, 29-30, 38, 90-91.

³⁴ *Phenomenology*, 5, 19; *Phänomenologie*, 6-7, 14.

Chapter Six

Spirit in the Gallery

The Gateway to the *Logic*

The Gallery of Images (*Gallerie von Bildern*) has received relatively little attention in the literature. This omission is made all the more remarkable for the power of the *Phenomenology's* penultimate, though consummatory, image, and the importance which its author ascribes to the *Gallerie*. In fact, as I will argue, the Gallery of Images is to the externalizing of Spirit as recollection is to its inwardizing; the *Gallerie von Bildern* and *Erinnerung* (recollection) are but sides of the same coin, with the Gallery functioning as the storehouse of the images which Spirit must ultimately recollect in order to inwardize; only in this way is Spirit able to sublate (*aufheben*) not merely particular stages of the *Phenomenology*, but rather the entire work itself.

Such is the entire purpose of the Gallery of Images, which Hegel identifies as “double.”¹ The Gallery unfolds in two stages—first as collection, and second as re-collection. The succession of Spirits is first externalized in the various stages of the *Phenomenology*, then inwardized once these discrete images are finally recognized by consciousness as a collection. The images gathered by consciousness on its way to Spirit become a Gallery of Images, once they stand exposed as lacking both life and substance. The Gallery of Images is the creation of an accidental artist, who is late in recognizing his own work.

Once consciousness, as an individual seeking Spirit, has taken this fateful and crucial step and sees through its past "experience" as wholly illusory, it is ready to abandon its initial, naïve view of the *world* as the proper subject of philosophical inquiry, in favor of the examination of Spirit *qua* Spirit provided in the *Science of Logic*. Thus, the *Science of Logic* (as I will discuss in subsequent chapters) depends on the *Phenomenology* as an implicit presupposition, much as Perception depended on Sense-Certainty, and Absolute Knowing on Religion. The experiential, phenomenological account of consciousness provided in the *Phenomenology* is sublated, via recollection and the Gallery of Images, in Absolute Knowing. It is this sublation (*Aufhebung*, *Aufheben*) alone that makes possible a Science of Spirit which will avoid formalism's "abyss of vacuity"—the monistic, undifferentiated metaphysical realm of abstract universality, which attempts "to palm off its Absolute as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black."²

Throughout the *Phenomenology*, Spirit has been engaged in the process of externalizing itself, of making itself intelligible to consciousness. Hegel describes this as "Spirit emptied out into Time. . . . This Becoming presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance."³ The "outer existence" of the Self has given way to its fully realized inner existence, with the outer existence nonetheless preserved.

In short, the Gallery of Images is Hegel's manner of representing and actually bringing about the fulfillment of this process of the "digestion" of the stages of consciousness' movement through apparency to the recognition of *itself* as foundational, the attainment of a knowledge which "is its withdrawal into itself in which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection."⁴ As such, the Gallery is absolutely essential to a proper understanding of the stage of Absolute Knowing and the *Phenomenology* itself.

Despite the importance of the Gallery, there are, to the best of my knowledge, no comprehensive treatments of this image of images to be found anywhere in the literature. Donald Phillip Verene's *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* mentions the Gallery, but does not treat it as a focal point. Verene also does not tie the role of the Gallery directly to his own view, with which I agree, that recollection is the key to the

Phenomenology.⁵ The Gallery of Images is also mentioned in a review of Verene's book, but the review treats the Gallery as a fairly straightforward image, a merely illustrative symbol. Thus, it fails to appreciate its full significance as the consummation of the *Phenomenology*, and as the key to the transition from the *Phenomenology* to the to the *Logic*.⁶

If I may be permitted a liberty with Magritte's various artistic renderings of a pipe with the caption, "This is not a pipe,"⁷ it may be said of the Gallery of Images, "This is not an Image." It is merely the picture of an image, and in fact a picture made up of a large number of other pictures. It is something other than the images which it represents, just as Magritte's pictures of pipes are something other than actual pipes. The Gallery is an image made up of images, and could not exist without them. As the following discussion will illustrate, the Gallery is the Master Image of the entire *Phenomenology*, since through this image, which is in fact an image constructed in images, picture-thinking is sublated (*aufgehoben*), and the gateway is opened to the revelation of the Concept in the *Science of Logic*.

I have already discussed the various senses in which the entire *Phenomenology* up to Absolute Knowing has been an illusion, and indeed a grand series of illusions, each more elaborate than the last. I further claim that as a necessary consequence of this view the images presented in Absolute Knowing must be taken as real, because they are the only images created by a consciousness aware of itself as in contact with Spirit.

The "reality" of the Gallery of Images consists in its being the inversion of an illusion. If the succession of spirits which the Gallery describes and represents was an illusion, then its recognition as an illusion is itself a truth, however limited in scope. This recognition of the illusory nature of the entire *Phenomenology* is, indeed, the culmination of the education (*Bildung*) of consciousness via the image (*Bild*). The cultivated (*gebildete*) consciousness of Absolute Knowing is one that has recognized the preceding salutatory (and false) images; it gives its farewell speech, its valedictory oration, to the Gallery of Images itself. It finally bids farewell to the Gallery which spawned it, to the naïve philosophical standpoint which takes the external for the real.

The oration of Spirit from the standpoint of consciousness, i.e. *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, is a soliloquy, a grand monologue.

The individual consciousness following the highway of despair has been tricked by Spirit into following a path which seems to be its own, but is in fact the path trodden long ago by Spirit and by innumerable others before our pilgrim set out to "repeat" this journey, which to him appears entirely novel. In the Gallery, the individual sees the images with which it is faced not merely as illusions, but as illusions projected from himself, out of his misguided belief in the primacy of the object, the in-itself. Via the Gallery, our philosophical pilgrim sees the object as a mere projected apparency, or, more precisely, as a thing which exists for consciousness, i.e. for itself (understood as meaning, "for consciousness itself"). Hegel himself claims that in order to grasp the object in its totality, it is necessary to recall the earlier shapes of consciousness, which is precisely the function of the Gallery.⁸

Every preceding stage of the *Phenomenology* has been an element of the oration of the false, of consciousness' vain effort to understand the Whole in terms of the external, the in-itself, and hence the merely apparent. Absolute Knowing is at once the *peroratorio* of the *Phenomenology*, and the *proem* or *exordium* of the oration of the True, from the standpoint of consciousness; it is but the prelude to the greater oration of the *Science of Logic*, in which the *res nudas* will emerge from the mere apparency (*Schein*) in which consciousness has mired itself in the *Phenomenology*. The True becomes knowable as the Whole, only when the Whole is seen for what it truly is. The *Phenomenology*, as the science of the *experience* of consciousness, must yield to the *Science of Logic*, in which consciousness itself will be the subject of the inquiry. Experience is illusion; the True is the being of the Self *qua* Spirit, which alone is the Whole. It is to this realm that consciousness gains access upon passing through the Gallery.

Natural Consciousness and the Wisdom of the Animals

Much more remains to be said regarding the Gallery of Images, but for the moment other questions, of a more fundamental nature, remain to be asked and answered. The most basic of these is deceptive in its apparent straightforwardness: How did our pilgrim ever arrive at the Gallery in the first place? How is it that he was so honored as to witness the "Calvary of absolute Spirit (*die*

Schadelstätte des absoluten Geistes)”⁹ And just who, by the way, is being crucified?

As the end makes no sense in abstraction from the beginning, to ask these questions is to put into consideration the rather daunting matter of the origin of the *Phenomenology*. While I will not attempt to provide any definitive solutions to this large and difficult matter, I will argue that the path to the Calvary of Absolute Spirit begins with man’s emergence as a naive philosophical consciousness, and the concomitant rejection of the original wisdom of which man is naturally possessed. This original wisdom is the wisdom of the animals, or what I will call “animal consciousness.” I claim that animal consciousness is the first rung on Hegel’s ladder to the standpoint of Spirit.¹⁰ Two compelling pieces of evidence attest to the truth of this claim. First, Hegel praises the wisdom of the animals and identifies it as prior (and in some ways superior) to consciousness as described in the remainder of the *Phenomenology*. Second, Hegel states in Absolute Knowing that Spirit, in recollecting and thus reassembling the stages of consciousness leading up to Absolute Knowing, ends up right where it began, but “is none the less on a higher level than it starts.”¹¹ If Spirit is returning to the place whence it began, and it ends its journey (at least from the standpoint of the *Phenomenology*) in Absolute Knowing, then its origin must bear a strong resemblance to this, its final destination. That the *Phenomenology* begins with animal consciousness will be demonstrable once we have traced consciousness’ path to Absolute Knowing, and have seen that in animal consciousness alone is there a coming together of the in-itself and the for-itself, as there is—much later—in Absolute Knowing. Consciousness begins and ends at the Calvary of Spirit, the place of the skull (Golgotha) where both the crucifixion and resurrection of consciousness take place.

That said, it is of course true that Sense-Certainty is the first stage of a definitively human consciousness, the first stage at which man, *qua* rational being, recognizes an “out there” and an “in here.” The in-itself and the for-itself are plainly to be seen in consciousness’ efforts to understand the external—the in-itself—as the real, the True, and hence the Whole. There is wisdom that consciousness at the stage of Sense-Certainty has already forgotten, and must in the end recollect in order to reconcile the in-itself and the for-itself. This wisdom is the primal intuition that sensuous things are simply not real.

In this respect we can tell those who assert the truth and certainty of the reality of sense-objects that they should go back to the most elementary school of wisdom, viz. the ancient Eleusinian Mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, and that they have still to learn the secret meaning of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. For he who is initiated into these Mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of sensuous things, but to despair of it; in part he brings about the nothingness of such things himself in his dealings with them, and in part he sees them reduce themselves to nothingness. *Even the animals are not shut out from this wisdom but, on the contrary, show themselves to be most profoundly initiated into it; for they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up.* (My emphasis.)¹²

The animals in their wisdom "know" that the world external to them is not "real," in any substantive sense. Sensuous things come and go; they grow and wither, are born and die. They possess nothing like the permanence necessary for the True. Thus, animals regard objects as a source of sustenance, and nothing more. Were they able to think in such terms, they would likely regard themselves as the only unchanging element, with the world in constant Heraclitean flux. This wisdom is lost, as "animal consciousness" becomes what Hegel calls "natural consciousness."¹³ The wisdom of animal consciousness is not truly lost, however; it is *aufgehoben*, explicitly forgotten but implicitly carried along, if not yet truly recollected.

The first mention of natural consciousness occurs in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, where Hegel describes the exposition of Science as "the path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowledge."¹⁴ Natural consciousness is "the way of the Soul which journeys through the series of its own configurations as though they were the stations appointed for it by its own nature, so that it may purify itself for the life of the Spirit, and achieve finally, through a completed experience of itself, the awareness of what it really is in itself."¹⁵ Natural consciousness is,

however, "only the Notion [*Begriff*] of knowledge" and thus not "real knowledge."¹⁶ In its conceit, however, natural consciousness "takes itself to be real knowledge" with the effect that:

This path has a negative significance for [natural consciousness], and what is in fact the realization of the Notion, counts for it rather as the loss of its own self; for it does lose the truth on this path. The road can therefore be regarded as the pathway of *doubt*, or more precisely as the way of despair. For what happens on it is not what is ordinarily understood when the word 'doubt' is used: shilly-shallying about this or that presumed truth, followed by a return to that truth again, after the doubt has been appropriately dispelled—so that at the end of the process the matter is taken to be what it was in the first place. On the contrary, this path is the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge, for which the supreme reality is what is in truth only the unrealized Notion.¹⁷

As natural consciousness searches for the truth in the natural world, the world of the in-itself, it loses, in stages, its confidence in its original belief (gradually and finally revealed as a conceit) that the natural world can provide definitive knowledge. Natural consciousness is for this reason only the "Notion" (*Begriff*) of knowledge; it lacks the content of the True because it is not yet the Whole. It is not yet the Whole, because its comprehension of phenomenal knowledge is not yet complete. It has not reached the end of the highway of despair, through which alone it is finally disabused of its unfounded confidence in external forms as the source of the True. The statement quoted above also makes clear Hegel's position that the progression of knowledge through sceptical doubt will not permit of an immediate return to a previously held epistemological position. The dialectical movement has an apparently linear progression from stage to stage, always forward and never back, as each is *aufgehoben*, overcome yet carried along to the next stage.

Natural consciousness, unlike what I have called animal consciousness, despairs not of the reality of the object with which it finds itself faced, but its own. Where animal consciousness consumes

the objects around it because it is literally hungry for physically necessary sustenance, natural consciousness engages in an analogical sort of consumption which has, however, a dramatically different motivation and goal. Having despaired of *its own* reality, natural consciousness is compelled to devour the objects around it, owing to its lack of precisely the sort of self-certainty intuitively possessed by the animals.

It is this that causes natural consciousness to view nature, the in-itself, as the source of the True, and to regard sensuous objects as real. As it "consumes" each of its succeeding stages, natural consciousness finds itself unfilled, and thus continues down this dismal path. The fruitlessness of the search finally forces to abandon its hopeless search for the True "out there." This, as I will discuss later, is the lesson of the Gallery of Images, and the sense in which recollection is correctly regarded as the key to the entire *Phenomenology*. Until consciousness recognizes *itself* as the path to the True, it will follow the highway of despair, which leads our pilgrim ever farther from his goal.

Sense-Certainty and the Doubled *Ansich*

The preceding discussion begged a serious question, which now demands to be answered: How and why did animal consciousness ever become human consciousness? This transition occurred when the object, the in-itself or *ansich*, was divided by consciousness into an *ansich* and an *fuer-sich*, or what Donald Phillip Verene calls the "*ansich*" and the "*ansich-fuer-uns*" (in-itself for us or the *ansich* known). Verene describes the "doubled *Ansich*" as "Hegel's fundamental discovery: that there are two moments of consciousness, neither of which can be in any sense reduced to the other. Neither is the ground of the other. These are the two senses of the in-itself, the *Ansich*, that each requires the other. There is, to put it simply (1) a consciousness of something (something that is not a product of consciousness is there in itself before consciousness), and (2) a consciousness that this something is an object for consciousness (a consciousness of the consciousness of the object)."¹⁸

In the very act of attaining this second moment of consciousness—consciousness of the consciousness of the object—an entirely new relationship is established between the viewer and the

viewed, between subject and object, between consciousness and the fleeting focus of its attentive gaze. The animals are not aware of their act of observing the world around them. They lack the consciousness of their role in "creating" the object experienced, and hence do not stand on ceremony in front of sensuous things. The object is not seen as an object, and thus has no special status for them. They just eat it up.

The object's "reality" finds its source in Hegel's natural consciousness. From this new awareness, our philosophical pilgrim quickly learns to adopt a new, "natural" standpoint regarding his own existence. He is now just another object in a world of objects, a body among bodies, with nothing to distinguish either him or his viewpoint as in any way unique. In this moment of anguish, our traveler turns toward the newly discovered immanence of the external world, the in-itself, as his epistemological and metaphysical ground. Knowledge must come from the external world, since natural consciousness sees itself as merely another object in the midst of a plethora of similar objects. Natural consciousness is overwhelmed by the world which the animals confidently consumed.

This is the first moment of despair described by Hegel in the passages on natural consciousness cited above. It is also the entrance into the realm of Sense-Certainty. Sense-Certainty is the logical first choice of natural consciousness, which gives priority to the object (as *ansich*) over itself (as *fuer sich*, or, to use Verene's terminology, the *ansich-fuer-uns*). The True is to be found "out there" in the natural world.

The difficulty encountered by consciousness here is that Sense-Certainty is not itself actual; it is merely a way of describing various "sense-certainties." In consequence, "Sense Certainty" is divided into "countless differences" and "pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two 'Thises', one 'This' as 'I', and the other 'This' as object."¹⁹ Thus, this stage which, owing to its concrete content, is in appearance the richest kind of knowledge fails both epistemologically and ontologically because it lacks the universality of truth, descending rather into an infinity of particular instances.

This initial diremption of the *Ansich* and the *Ansich* as an object for consciousness (Verene's *Ansich-für-uns*) is the fundamental rupture to whose repair the rest of the *Phenomenology* is devoted. The certainty that I, as observer, have of the object is not due to the object itself, but to me as observer; it is the subject rather than the object that

remains constant throughout consciousness' vain attempts to give universal names to its discrete experiences. The object is taken as essence, while the 'I' is understood as the unessential and unmediated, when in fact precisely the opposite is true.

Language is the means of identifying the sensuous content as a universal, even though the 'I' means to identify a single, solitary thing. Language expresses the true, universal content of Sense Certainty, and thereby gives the lie to the 'I's pretension to be identifying an individual thing. Even though we do not envisage the universal, it is the universal that we utter, by the very nature of the language used. Language is necessarily universal in the fact, if not the intent, of its expression. "It is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we *mean*."²⁰

For instance, we may want to identify a time, e.g. "Night," but the particular moment identified as "Night" gives way to another, which eventually stops being "Night" and becomes something quite different, "Day." Hence, the individual instance of time cannot be the basis for the original identification. The only constant element in our identification of successive periods of time is the "Now," the universal element, to which the subject rather than object (in this case, a period of darkness which we designate "Night") alone gives lasting meaning that rises above the transience of the thing or experience described. In other words, the permanent element is the observer, rather than the observed.

The same is true of all objects or experiences. One object always give way to another. The observer constantly "loses" the object of his observation, leaving him alone with himself and the language which he has applied to his sensations. The object is no more, but the Name given to it survives. The object, which consciousness takes to be the basis of our certainty is, in fact, the least constant, and therefore least certain, element of all.

It follows from this that Sense Certainty, despite (or perhaps because of) its immediate concrete content is, paradoxically, the most abstract of all the forms of knowledge to which natural consciousness is privy. Sense-Certainty's unsuitability as the ground of the True derives from the dissonance between its form and its content. An empty form—i.e. a name given to a particular experience, like "Night" or "Here" or "Now"—is filled, willy-nilly, with this or that content, depending wholly on contingent circumstance. Sense-certainty is the

very embodiment of an empty formal category, the essence of abstract universality.

The effect of this dizzying doubling of consciousness into the *Ansich* and *Ansich* known is ultimately to turn consciousness on its head, by inverting the epistemological and ontological priority of the subject and object, the *Fürsich* and the *Ansich*. This is the first inversion of consciousness (*Umkehrung des Bewusstseins*), which impels consciousness toward Perception, in which consciousness focuses its attention on the object as perceived, i.e. as an object for consciousness. Consciousness now recognizes the object as the unessential element, and the act of assimilating the object into itself as the essential element. Despite this crucial insight, however, it is still far from grasping the wholly inessential nature of the object, and, consequently, of the *Ansich*.

Hegel illustrates this point with some ironic word play on "Meinen," which in German is either a neuter noun defined as "meaning" or the possessive pronoun "mine," as in "belonging to me." The truth of the object "is in the object as my object, or in its being mine [*Meinen*]; it is, because I know it. Sense-certainty, then, though indeed expelled from the object, is not yet thereby overcome, but only driven back into the 'I'. . . . The force of its truth lies now in the 'I', in the immediacy of my seeing, hearing, and so on."²¹

Consciousness still relies on the senses for its truth, only now it recognizes *itself* as the constant—and hence the ground for the universal element—in its sense-experiences. Nothing changes fundamentally, however, since different 'I's will have different experiences and therefore different "truths," the effect of which is that these "truths" negate each other. "Both truths have the same authentication, viz. the immediacy of seeing . . . but the one truth vanishes in the other."²²

The dialectic of Sense Certainty is this process of shifting the essential element from the object to the subject, the *Ansich* to the *Fürsich*, and back again. Via the dialectic of Sense Certainty natural consciousness learns the twin truths that neither it nor the object is a sufficient ground for truth, since neither is universal.²³ The real difficulty, though, is not so much simply that neither the object nor the subject is universal. The problem is that the truth which consciousness sees first in the object and then in itself is particular, while the language used to describe it is by nature universal, and thus cannot accurately express the particular experiences recounted by

consciousness at the stage of Sense Certainty. This is the meaning of Hegel's statement, that language "has the divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said, of making it into something else, and thus not letting what is meant *get into words* at all."²⁴ What is said stands for something, but it is not the thing expressed. The *res* (subject matter) is altered in the very act of its expression as *verba*.

There is an absolute, unbridgeable gap between language and consciousness, which necessitates that one will always say the opposite of what one means, i.e. one will refer to a particular by means of language, which can only designate the universal. "If they actually wanted to say 'this' bit of paper which they mean, if they wanted to say it, then this is impossible, because the sensuous This that is meant *cannot be reached* by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to what is inherently universal. In the actual attempt to say it, it would therefore crumble away."²⁵

All attempts to designate individual objects via language fail because they in fact designate only the universal in which they participate. Hegel is quite clear in the passage cited above that consciousness, not the object, is universal. The object known cannot be spoken, and the act of speaking cannot refer to anything that Sense Certainty can know. Sense Certainty fails as the ground for truth since, in expressing what it knows, it quite literally does not "mean" what it says. It means to express the particular, but in fact is forced by the divine nature of language itself to use the language of the universal. The universal knows individual things only by recognizing them as members of larger groups, which have names. The "truth" of Sense Certainty, such as it is, is one that cannot be spoken. "Consequently, what is called the unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant [but is not actually expressed]."²⁶ The True must be utterable; it must be capable of direct expression, of stating its meaning without inverting it.

To claim that the True must be utterable is to claim that it must be translatable into the divine *Logos*. It further follows from this that, since language is universal, so too must be the True, and hence the Whole. Hegel's dialectic is, in sum, an attempt to give the truth fully articulate expression, to give birth to *Logos*—speech, reason, logic—as expressed in the *Science of Logic*. Consciousness must learn how to express the universal directly if it is to represent the truth without inverting it. Consciousness must, in fine, become eloquent.

Sense-certainty is the scribblings of a Pandora who has lost her voice. Her language still bears some resemblance to divine *Logos*, but she has forgotten so many words and so much of the grammar by which they are to be ordered, that her speech makes no sense. She means the particular, yet expresses the universal, and loses the universal in the infinity of moments that make up the particular. The speech of the gods is now beyond her ken. The long journey toward recovering this lost knowledge has completed its first leg, and consciousness as collector now has its first image, Sense-Certainty, which it dutifully stores away in the attic of memory.

Perception, Force and the Understanding, and the Topsy-Turvy World

Consciousness makes the transition from Sense Certainty to Perception when it recognizes the inadequacy of either the in-itself (i.e., objects) or the for-itself (as 'I') as the content for the universal expression which language, by its divine nature, necessarily makes. Consciousness now focuses its attention on the universal element of sense experience. "By *pointing out* this bit of paper, experience teaches me what the truth of Sense Certainty in fact is: I point it out as a 'Here', which is a Here of other Heres, or is in its own self a 'simple togetherness of many Heres'; i.e. it is a universal. I take it up then as it is in truth, and instead of knowing something immediate I take the truth of it, or *perceive* it."²⁷

This move toward the universal promises far more than it can deliver. Perception, like Sense Certainty, fails to establish itself as the ground for the True, but for a different reason. Perception (*die Wahrnehmung*, literally "truth taking") takes as true, i.e. perceives, or takes as true, only the universal element of sense experience, and thus ends up creating only an unconditioned universal. Where Sense Certainty, with its richness of content, created merely a particular which expressed itself in universal language, Perception as *Wahrnehmung* takes the truth of the object of the senses only in its universal element, and thus does not "see" the object with which it is faced, in any straightforward sense. Its "sight" is distorted by its focus on the universal element, and this universal is unconditioned because

it lacks content, in sharp contrast to Sense Certainty. Perception is indeed the inverse of Sense Certainty, and the transition between the two is yet another of Hegel's *Umkehrungen des Bewusstseins*, inversions of consciousness. Perception is the second image in Hegel's Gallery.

Consciousness moves from Perception to Force and the Understanding when it fails to reconcile the two moments of *Ansich* and *Fürsich*, when the subject and object remain separate moments, neither reducible to the other, despite consciousness' best efforts to collapse them into an undifferentiated unity. "When common sense tries to make them true by at one time making itself responsible for their untruth, while at another time it calls their deceptiveness a semblance of the unreliability of Things, and separates what is essential from what is necessary to them yet supposedly unessential, holding the former to be their truth as against the latter—when it does this, it does not secure them *their* truth, but convicts *itself* of untruth."²⁸

In Force and the Understanding, consciousness takes as its task providing content for the unconditioned universal created by Perception. The lack of content of the unconditioned universal creates a "*complete void*, which is even called the *holy of holies*, there may yet be something, we must fill it up with reveries, *appearances*, produced by consciousness itself. . . . Even reveries are better than its own emptiness."²⁹ The "inner world, or supersensible beyond" steps forward to fill this void. The supersensible world "*comes from* the world of appearance which had mediated it; in other words, appearance is its essence and, in fact, its filling. The supersensible is the sensuous and the perceived posited as it is *in truth*; but the *truth* of the sensuous and the perceived is to be *appearance*. The supersensible is therefore *appearance qua appearance*."³⁰ Since the supersensible world is *appearance qua appearance*, it is self-evidently not the True, a point which Hegel is at pains to make perfectly clear. "We completely misunderstand this if we think that the supersensible world is therefore the sensuous world, or the world as it exists for immediate Sense Certainty and Perception; for the world of appearance is, on the contrary, not the world of sense-knowledge and Perception as a world that positively is, but this world posited as superseded (*aufgehoben*), or as in truth an inner world."³¹

The difficulty with adopting this standpoint is obvious: How does consciousness now go about "proving" that there really is a world

out there, which it actually perceives? The dragon of sceptical solipsism here raises its head in Cartesian form. The Understanding itself now becomes the object of consciousness. The content of the Understanding is, in turn, determined by the "play of Forces," which constitutes the immediate content of the Understanding. The True for the Understanding, however, "is the simple inner world [and] the movement of Force is therefore the True. . . . This play of forces is so constituted that the Force which is solicited by another Force is equally the soliciting Force for that other, which only thereby becomes itself a soliciting Force."³² The supersensible world is the third image in Hegel's Gallery.

The second supersensible world emerges from the first when the tranquil kingdom of laws represented by the first supersensible world is thrown into chaos by the thought that the world could be other than it seems to be, that black could really be white, up really could be down. There being no absolute, or even plausible, ground for the True in the supersensible world, such a thought is both inevitable and invincible.

The second supersensible world is a copy of the first, but a negative copy. It is everything that the first supersensible world is not, but could be. It is, in short, consciousness' Concept (*Begriff*) of the inversion of the first supersensible world, i.e. the world as it appears to be, appearance *qua* appearance.

This 'tranquil kingdom' (*ruhiges Reich*) is turned topsy-turvy. What was *ruhig* becomes *unruhig*. Consciousness now finds itself in a topsy-turvy kingdom where fools flourish—where the north pole is the south, criminals are saints, men are women. What has happened in this image? Consciousness has lost its bearings, but how has it lost them? The chaos of the inverted world is due to the fact that oppositions between the two supersensible worlds are equal. . . . The chaos reigns because consciousness has seemingly lost its ability to see the unseen behind the seen. It has created an unseen, a supersensible behind the seen, the appearance, that it cannot convert back into a new perspective on the seen. It has placed itself in a state in which anything is possible, in which things may be just as much one way as the other. Consciousness seems to have put itself in the position where it cannot produce its dialectical relationship with the object.³³

The dialectical relationship with the object has been lost, because there is no object but consciousness itself. Consciousness has become caught in a maze of its own making. "The topsy-turvy world is ingenuity run wild, ingenuity performed for ingenuity's sake. Consciousness must realize that it itself is the reality behind this impossible state of affairs. When it does this, it can experience itself as something other than the thought of the object. It establishes itself as self-consciousness. When it does this, it grasps itself as a new *Ansich* that it then takes up as something for itself. The directionality of opposition is now reestablished."³⁴

By creating a realm of laws, abstracted from the sensuous world from which it draws them, consciousness became ensnared in its own web. Only by recognizing the web as its own can consciousness free itself from this trap. Consciousness is both the spider and the fly. Consciousness now possesses, and in fact is, self-consciousness, as consciousness that has become aware of its own role in the constitution of its knowledge. The dialectic is reestablished once consciousness (now elevated to self-consciousness) sees itself on both sides of the opposition of the in-itself and the for-itself. The Topsy-Turvy World is the fourth picture hanging on the wall of Hegel's Gallery of Images.

Notes

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 184; *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988), 205.

² *Phenomenology*, 9; *Phänomenologie*, 13.

³ *Phenomenology*, 492; *Phänomenologie*, 530.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Donald Phillip Verene, *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).

⁶ Patricia Cook and George R. Lucas, JR., "Bilder Einer Ausstellung: 'Eine (sic) Spaziergang durch die Gallerie von Bildern in Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes*,'" *The Owl of Minerva*, 20, 1 (Fall 1988): 81-96.

⁷ Suzi Gablik, *Magritte* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1985), 128-31. I am referring specifically to Magritte's "*L'usage de la parole*"

("The Use of Words," 1928-29), "*Les deux mystères*" ("The Two Mysteries," 1966), and "*L'air et la chanson*" ("The Air and the Song," 1964). See also Michel Foucault, *This is not a Pipe*, trans. J. Harkness (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984), esp. 1-12, 32-38.

⁸ *Phenomenology*, 480; *Phänomenologie*, 517.

⁹ *Phenomenology*, 493; *Phänomenologie*, 531.

¹⁰ *Phenomenology*, 14; *Phänomenologie*, 20. See also Verene, 31.

¹¹ *Phenomenology*, 492; *Phänomenologie*, 530.

¹² *Phenomenology* 65; *Phänomenologie*, 77.

¹³ I further claim that Hegel's "natural consciousness" is properly divided into two further sub-categories: First, the "human consciousness" of Sense-Certainty, which, second, in turn becomes the philosophic consciousness of the topsy-turvy world (*die verkehrte Welt*).

¹⁴ *Phenomenology*, 49; *Phänomenologie*, 60.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Phenomenology*, 49-50; *Phänomenologie*, 60-61.

¹⁸ Verene, 15-16.

¹⁹ *Phenomenology*, 59; *Phänomenologie*, 70.

²⁰ *Phenomenology*, 60; *Phänomenologie*, 71-72.

²¹ *Phenomenology*, 61; *Phänomenologie*, 72-73.

²² *Phenomenology*, 61; *Phänomenologie*, 73.

²³ *Phenomenology*, 64; *Phänomenologie*, 75-76.

²⁴ *Phenomenology*, 66; *Phänomenologie*, 78.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Phenomenology*, 79; *Phänomenologie*, 91-92.

²⁹ *Phenomenology*, 88-89; *Phänomenologie*, 102-103.

³⁰ *Phenomenology*, 89; *Phänomenologie*, 103.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Verene, 45.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Chapter Seven

The Road to Golgotha

Religion

Many images follow in the sections of the *Phenomenology* between Force and the Understanding and Revealed Religion. The famous Lordship and Bondage passage in The Truth of Self-Certainty section of "Self-Consciousness" is certainly the best known of these. In it, the independence and dependence of self-consciousness are represented by the Lord and the Bondsman, respectively. This fifth image in the Gallery is the most noteworthy, if not the most significant. The self-alienated "Unhappy Consciousness" (*das unglueckliche Bewusstsein*) hangs on the wall next to the Lord and the Bondsman, along with the phrenologist's skull, the spiritual zoo (*das geistige Tierreich*), and the bleeding heart of the beautiful soul (*die schoene Seele*).

These and other images find their way onto the wall of the Gallery of Images once they have been overcome, sublated (*aufgehoben*), and exist only in memory. If they were forgotten altogether, consciousness would fall back into the stages which they represent; the image is thus a shortened form of memory. It is a cipher for the judgment already made regarding the inadequacy of the state represented as the source of the True, and is, additionally, rhetorical in character, since each functions tropologically.

Hegel uses images in a persuasive manner in his exposition of Spirit, because the naive philosophic consciousness described in the *Phenomenology* still thinks first and foremost in imagistic terms. The object of pursuit is indeed the True, which however cannot be grasped

directly. Like the *res nudas*, i.e. the unadorned subject matter, of the ancient rhetoricians and medieval dialecticians, it cannot be grasped directly. The rhetorical *verbum* is necessary to give to the *res nudas* a determinate form, a recognizable shape whereby it can become an object of knowledge. Similarly, the *Phenomenology's* naive philosophical consciousness requires that the True be presented pictorially. This still literal-minded consciousness cannot come to know the True directly, because it cannot "see" in a genuinely philosophic manner. In the effort to see the truth in its pure form, as the *res nudas*, the passage through the picture thinking of the *Phenomenology* is an essential propaedeutic. The *Phenomenology* is the highway of despair, because it does not go anywhere. Its purpose is to give the knower direct and personal experience of the futility of picture-thinking, of mistaking the True for the images by which it is represented.

As such, the *Phenomenology* is the eloquent account of failure of picture-thinking. Rhetoricians up to Melanchthon taught that the clothing of speech in appropriate dress was the only manner of giving a full exposition of the truth. This principle is well illustrated in the *Phenomenology*. Eloquence, as *eloqui*, demands that the rhetorician speak all that is in his mind on the topic at hand. This statement both hides and reveals an important truth: The truth, or better the True, must be spoken. Speech is a physical activity which, by its very nature, is something that must be done in Time; this fact is the source of language's divine power of inversion. The universal cannot be expressed in Time, yet language—which takes place in time—by its very nature attempts to express the universal, thus dooming each of its efforts to failure. Any truth that is spoken immediately becomes something that has been, and no longer is. The only way to prevent the truths uttered from passing away even as they are spoken is to speak all of them, to give a complete, eloquent exposition of the topic at hand. Since the truth cannot be literally spoken, however hard one may try, it must be explicated. It must be *shown*, or rather it must be made to show itself. All of the elements must, moreover, be retained, re-collected, in memory, making the Gallery of Images an extended, externalized form of memory.

Before recognizing his own presence in the Gallery of Images, however, our philosophical pilgrim must perform a sort of final penance, by passing through the stage of Religion. Hegel writes that Religion is the "consciousness of *absolute Being* as such" which "has indeed made its appearance, although only from the standpoint of the consciousness that is conscious of absolute Being; but absolute

Being in and for itself, the self-consciousness of Spirit, has not appeared in those 'shapes'."

Up to this point, consciousness has managed to develop both the inner and the outer side of knowledge, but has failed to bring them together. In other words, both the *Ansich*, as the self-less content of knowledge, and the *Fuersich*, as the contentless knowing self, have been fully realized. Being-In-Itself and Being-For-Itself are both present, but are forced to stare longingly at each other across a seemingly unbridgeable chasm. Being-in-and-for-itself (*An-und-fuer-sich-Sein*) remains an elusive (and illusive) will-o'-the-wisp, even though both elements are present. Beginning with Religion, the search is on for the "*und*" in *An-und-fuer-sich-Sein*, for the element that will bring the in-itself and the for-itself together into something other than an undifferentiated unity. The Gallery is not yet complete, so the journey continues.

Consciousness, *qua* Understanding, "is consciousness of the supersensible or the inner side of objective existence. But the supersensible, the eternal, or whatever else it may be called, is devoid of self; it is only, to begin with, the universal, which is a long way yet from being Spirit that knows itself as Spirit."¹ The Understanding grasps the supersensible as an inner experience of what is other than self. As such, the "experience" of the Understanding is one-sided, revealing only the experience of the in-itself for consciousness. On the other side, "there was the self-consciousness that reached its final 'shape' in the Unhappy Consciousness [*das unglueckliche Bewusstsein*], that was only the pain of the Spirit that wrestled, but without success, to reach out into objectivity."² Consciousness as the Understanding has experience with no self. The Unhappy Consciousness, on the other hand, is incapable of breaking through to the world, and consequently remains the prisoner of its own abstract reveries.

The difficulty is that Spirit has sought either the external existing world (as the Understanding), or itself (as the Unhappy Consciousness) in the *immediate* present.³ The problem does not lie with the shapes themselves in which Spirit has manifested itself. On the contrary, both the in-itself and the for-itself have already reached their final forms. As the quotations above reveal, no more change or development is required of them; what is required is that the two come to understand their proper relationship to one another, a step which has eluded them up to this point.

Religion steps in to fill this breach, as the mediator which will teach both expressions of Spirit—the in-itself and the for-itself—to

seek the truth neither in themselves nor in the other, but rather in the interaction, or movement, between them. The Gallery acquires a number of new images during this portion of the pilgrim's passage. In Natural Religion, which is the first of these new images, Hegel writes that is in the "'shape' in which Spirit knows itself that one religion is distinguished from another."⁴ Among these shapes, or images, are "God as Light," "Plant and animal," and "The artificer," which is the final shape of Spirit in Natural Religion, in which "Spirit is *Artist*."⁵ Natural Religion, which began focused on the in-itself as Nature, has returned to the for-itself, as artist, i.e. the consciousness that represents nature pictorially.

Spirit as artist provides, quite naturally, an abundance of further images. This *ethical* or "*true Spirit*" gives us a religion which is elevated above the real world, "the withdrawal from its truth into the pure knowledge of itself."⁶ Spirit as artist moves through the abstract work of art, which is "immediate . . . abstract and individual"⁷ in which the artist learns that he does not "produce a being *like himself*" but rather something quite different. In "The living work of art," which follows this section, mystical religion reveals the oneness of the worshipper with the divine Being.⁸ The in-itself and the for-itself are thus brought together, but only in an undifferentiated unity, what could be called "*An-für-sich-Sein*," rather than an "*An-und-für-sich-Sein*." This form of Religion comes close to meeting the demands of Spirit, failing only because there is no mediator, no middle term between the in-itself and the for-itself.

In "The spiritual work of art," Spirit unifies the manifold religious appearances into a single Spirit. The separate "beautiful" Spirits "unite into a single pantheon, the element and habitation of which is language."⁹ Religion has here emerged as a highly refined sort of picture thinking (*bildhaftes Denken*), which, in its external form, is language, and in fact "the earliest language, the Epic as such, which contains the universal content of the world, . . . The Minstrel is the individual and actual Spirit from whom, as a subject of this world, it [the world] is produced and by whom it is borne. His 'pathos' is not the stupefying power of Nature but Mnemosyne, recollection and a gradually developed inwardness, the remembrance of essence that formerly was directly present. He is the organ that vanishes in its content; what counts is not his own self but his Muse, his universal song."¹⁰

Only here, near the end of the *Phenomenology*, has Hegel reached the ancient world, the time of the Minstrel and his Epics, in which language was born. (Hegel here also offers confirming

evidence of the thesis I advanced in earlier chapters, viz. that language was born in the ancient world and that, as a consequence, the discipline of rhetoric—can trace its roots there as well.) Picture-thinking, which is thus far Spirit's only means of cognition, is externalized via language. Thus, language is at base imagistic, constructed in, around, and of images. Language is the vehicle for the expression of picture-thinking.

Without a mediator between the in-itself and the for-itself, however, language cannot transcend its mere expressiveness and become a creative principle, since the universality represented by the world of the gods remains separated from the individuality of the Minstrel who recounts the exploits of them and those like them. The Minstrel is the representative of the ancient *aoidoi*, who, while not themselves divine, retain knowledge of divine words which they present through the divine grammar of—first—lyric poetry and—later—rhetoric.

The middle term in this syllogism is particularity, specifically "heroes, who are individual men like the Minstrel, but presented only in idea, and are thereby at the same time universal, like the free extreme of universality, the gods."¹¹ The god blessed heroes, who are also identified in the tradition to which Hegel is here appealing as the founders of rhetoric (Nestor, King of Pylos and Achilles being their exemplars), can serve as the middle term between the abstract universality of the gods and concrete individuality of the Minstrel, because they are universals which possess particular instantiations, what Giambattista Vico called imaginative universals, like Godfrey the true war chief, Thrice-great Hermes, or the wily Ulysses.¹²

Each of these heroes is taken to stand for some quality or qualities, and whoever possesses such qualities is said literally to "be" the person by whom these qualities are represented. It is these heroes who give language to men, along with other divine gifts, including the knowledge of fire, the giving of which by Prometheus to man brought about the wrath of Zeus. The hero is the bearer of the content of the world of pictorial thought, as its middle term, standing halfway between the One of divinity and the Many of humanity.¹³

Nevertheless, a serious problem still remains for Spirit. The gods who represent universality at this stage are still individuals who stand for specific elements or forces, and are thus not yet truly universal in their *content*, however universal their *form*. This necessitates a "relation to others which, in virtue of the opposition involved in it, is a conflict with them, is a concomitant self-forgetfulness of their eternal nature. Determinateness is rooted in their

divine existence and possesses in its limitation the independence of the whole individuality; through this their characters at once lose the sharpness of their peculiar disposition and blend together in their ambiguity."¹⁴ The expression of divinity as the universal is still insufficient, because even the universal expresses itself in an individual manner. The concept of the divine as a plurality of gods must give way to that of a unified deity, if Spirit is ever to find a sufficiently universal expression for divinity.

Revealed Religion, accordingly, is the next stage through which Spirit passes. In transcending the religion of Art, "Spirit has advanced from the form of *Substance* to assume that of *Subject*, for it produces its [outer] shape, thus making explicit in it the act, . . . This incarnation of the divine Being starts from the statue which wears only the *outer* shape of the Self, the *inwardness*, the Self's activity, falling outside of it. But in the Cult the two sides have become one; and in the outcome of the religion of Art this unity, in its consummation, has even gone right over at the same time to the extreme of the Self."¹⁵ In Natural Religion, divinity is represented by inanimate objects, which are rejected in favor of the mystic's union of god and man. This middle position is quickly followed by the other extreme, in which the Self assumes the mantle of divinity. The repeated inversions (*Umkehrungen*) of Spirit are literally dizzying for consciousness. Beginning with the focus on the in-itself, Religion progressed to an inchoate unity of the in-itself and the for-itself, and now, as Revealed Religion, seeks to accomplish an actual *rapprochement* between the two.

Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, much has been accomplished through this process. Revealed Religion has achieved the *content* of Absolute Spirit, lacking only its form. The form of Revealed Religion is still picture-thinking, which Hegel defines as "the synthetic combination of sensuous immediacy and its universality or thought."¹⁶ By correcting the extremes of Natural Religion and Religion as Art (which err in emphasizing the in-itself and the for-itself, respectively), Revealed Religion succeeds in bringing these two sides together in something other than the mystical oneness of the Cult.

The problem with Revealed Religion is thus not philosophical. Philosophically, Revealed Religion is Absolute Spirit, since Revealed Religion has Absolute Spirit for its content. The problem with Revealed Religion is rhetorical; specifically, the problem is that Revealed Religion, which expresses itself imagistically, still employs rhetorical tropes. Revealed Religion has achieved Absolute

Spirit as its content, but this knowledge is still mediated through picture-thinking, which "constitutes the middle term between pure thought and self-consciousness as such, and is only one of the specific or determinate forms."¹⁷ Spirit as Revealed Religion needs a middle term that will bring the two sides together in the way that earlier the hero, as particularity, brought the universality of the gods together with the individuality of the Minstrel.

Picture-thinking as the middle term for Revealed Religion reaches its apogee in the divine Man, whose sacrificial death is the beginning of the end of picture-thinking, and the path to Absolute Knowing. The hero, as a universal individual, was a fitting middle term in the spiritual work of art. The divine Man is the best middle term possible in Revealed Religion for the same reason. He, too, is a universal individual, and his birth and life represent "the coming into existence of God's individual self-consciousness as a universal self-consciousness."¹⁸ This person is both fully God and fully man, indivisibly universal and individual, and is thus the most effective mediator, or middle term, between man and God as universal.

The death and resurrection of the divine Man is a matter of metaphysical necessity. In this instance, death is itself an image that stands for the negative, with which consciousness has been tarrying throughout the *Phenomenology*. Indeed, the *Phenomenology* is precisely the account of just this struggle with imagistic thinking. Thus, it is only through the death and resurrection of the divine Man that the negative is overcome or sublated (*aufgehoben*). "The death of the divine Man, as death, is abstract negativity, the immediate result of the movement which ends only in natural universality. Death loses this natural meaning in spiritual self-consciousness, i.e. it comes to be its just stated Notion [*Begriff*]; death becomes transfigured from its immediate meaning, viz. the non-being of this particular individual, into the universality of the Spirit who dwells in His community, dies in it every day, and is daily resurrected."¹⁹ Death leads to the concept of eternity via resurrection.

Death as negativity is raised to the level of Concept (*Begriff*) by becoming universalized. Death is thereby overcome, in that the individual "self-consciousness therefore does not actually die, as the particular self-consciousness is pictured as being actually dead, but its particularity dies away in its universality, i.e. in its knowledge."²⁰ Spirit will henceforth die and be resurrected daily and so, from the standpoint of Spirit, death has been overcome, even as its drama continues to unfold. The death of the divine Man is the *Aufhebung* of death itself. As Hegel writes, "the death of the Mediator as grasped by

the Self is the supersession of his objective existence or his particular being-for-self; this particular being-for-self has become a universal self-consciousness. . . . The death of the Mediator is the death not only of his natural aspect or of his particular being-for-self . . . but also of the abstraction of the divine Being."²¹ God is real because He has died and been resurrected, and thus overcome His own abstraction. God becomes real by becoming concrete, a particular being both embedded in time, and wholly transcending it.

Even the death of the Mediator cannot raise Spirit out of picture-thinking, however, because the content of Revealed Religion, while in-itself Absolute Spirit, still "exists for it in the form of picture-thinking, and the duality in this thinking still attaches even to the actual spirituality of the community, to its return out of its picture-thinking; just as the element of pure thought was itself burdened with it." Self-consciousness is still laden with "those picture-thoughts which we have considered" even in its emergence from picture-thinking via the death of the Mediator, since the Mediator's death is itself grasped by consciousness as an image—the mental picture of the divine Man nailed to the cross at Calvary—and as such cannot fully liberate self-consciousness from its dependence on picture-thinking.²² The world is only "*implicitly* reconciled with the divine Being"²³ in Revealed Religion, and must find some way of ridding itself of picture-thinking altogether, if this reconciliation is ever to be complete. There must, then, be a second Calvary, the Calvary of Spirit, in which the individual consciousness (standing in for Spirit) is crucified and resurrected. This alone will make actual the merely implicit death of the image that took place at the death and rebirth of the divine man. Calvary is itself an image, so it too must be sublated if picture-thinking is ever to be gotten rid of, once and for all.

The Calvary of Spirit: Absolute Knowing

At the beginning of the section on Absolute Knowing, Hegel writes, "the Spirit of the Revealed Religion has not yet surmounted its consciousness as such, or what is the same, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness; Spirit itself as a whole, and the self-differentiated moments within it, fall within the sphere of picture-thinking and in the form of objectivity. The content of this picture-thinking is absolute Spirit; and all that now remains to be done is to supersede this mere form."²⁴ Through the death of the Mediator, God and man have been implicitly reconciled and man has gained access to the content of Absolute Spirit. Man fails to grasp

Absolute Spirit in its actual form, however, because he cannot "see" it; he can only see the images it casts, like the shadows on the wall of Plato's cave. Man must learn to turn and face the light, if he is ever to know explicitly what he now grasps Absolute Spirit to be implicitly.

The death of the Mediator in Revealed Religion used an image—the crucifixion of the divine Man—to symbolize the overcoming of picture-thinking as the content of Spirit. The death of the Mediator is the "death" of the image, but only implicitly and partially, since the death of the Mediator is itself an image, complete with a coterie of accompanying images, e.g. the chalice, Golgotha (with the implicit image of the skull), and the act of crucifixion itself.²⁵

The *Bild* holds on for dear life even as the individual consciousness, our philosophical pilgrim, comes close to freeing itself from imagistic thinking. The pilgrim has already recognized his reliance on imagistic thinking as a philosophical problem. The positive significance which the object had for him initially became a negative significance for self-consciousness, as the priority of the in-itself gave way to that of the for-itself. In consequence of this inversion, the object as negativity, as that which is somehow opposed to self-consciousness "has a positive meaning for self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness knows the nothingness of the object, on the one hand, because it externalizes its own self—for, in this externalization it posits itself as object. . . . On the other hand, this positing at the same time contains the other moment, viz. that self-consciousness has equally superseded this externalization and objectivity too, and taken it back into itself so that it is in communion with itself in its otherness as such."²⁶

This positive meaning of the object for consciousness has two distinct senses. First, self-consciousness knows the nothingness of the object, and hence makes that very nothingness the object of its attention. In other words, the self-consciousness individual finally understands that the object is nothing, and treats it as such. Returning to the wisdom of the animals, self-consciousness from this perspective regards the object as something to be consumed, i.e. as something which exists merely for self-consciousness. This is also the first sense in which Absolute Knowing represents a return to its origins, and presents further evidence that it is in animal consciousness, rather than natural consciousness, that the *Phenomenology* may properly be said to find its foundation. Self-consciousness knows the object as nothing, but the object nevertheless retains a determinate form.

The second sense of the object's nothingness for self-consciousness is that self-consciousness has overcome its own act of

projecting itself outward into the world, and internalized what had been merely external. Thus, its own division and self-separation is overcome and it is "in communion with itself in *its* otherness as such. This is the movement of consciousness, and in that movement consciousness is the totality of its moments."²⁷ Additionally, however, consciousness must understand both of its moments "from the standpoint of each of them." As a consciousness that has fully grasped the nothingness of the object, the Self now encompasses the in-itself. As a consciousness that understands its own role in cognition, it is also fully for-itself. Finally, the Self is the principle of mediation between these two aspects of its own nature.

Hegel continues, "This totality of its determinations establishes the object as an *implicitly* spiritual being, and it does truly become a spiritual being for consciousness when each of its individual determinations is grasped as a determination of the Self, or through the spiritual relationship to them that was just mentioned."²⁸ As I will discuss shortly, such grasping of consciousness' individual determinations occurs only in the Gallery of Images, in which the entire history of consciousness' passage through the many forms of Spirit is totalized, i.e. presented all at once in its entirety. Only then does the image possess the rhetorical luster necessary to bring about its own supersession, via the successful application of Hegel's extended argument *rhetorica contra rhetoricam*, which has taken up nearly the entire *Phenomenology*.

The object has been implicitly recognized as nothing, yet still possesses a determinate form. The question naturally arises, however, as to how *nothing* can have a determinate form? The object, while implicitly recognized as nothing, as pure negativity, retains a positive significance which self-consciousness must overcome, in order to gain unfettered access to the Absolute Spirit which was the content—though not the form—of Revealed Religion. The image which has thus far been the path to Spirit's content must be overcome if the pilgrim is ever to know Spirit *qua* Spirit, to behold it in its pure Being, rather than glimpse it through the filter of picture-thinking. This is the final lesson given by schoolmaster Spirit to his student—consciousness or what I have called the philosophical pilgrim. This lesson can take place only in the Gallery of Images, the imaginative symbol for the overcoming of picture-thinking, the *Aufhebung* of *bildhaftes Denken*.

The Master Image of the Phenomenology

The Gallery of Images (*Galerie von Bildern*) is mentioned twice in the *Phenomenology*. The first mention occurs in "Observing Reason." "We should have a double gallery of pictures, one of which would be the reflection of the other; the one, the gallery of external circumstances which completely determine and circumscribe the individual, the other, the same gallery translated into the form in which those circumstances are present in the conscious individual: the former the spherical surface, the latter the centre which represents the surface within it."²⁹

The second mention of the Gallery of Images occurs near the end of Absolute Knowing. "This Becoming represents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance. As its fulfillment consists in perfectly knowing what it is, in knowing its substance, this knowing is its withdrawal into itself in which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection."³⁰

The "first" Gallery of Images is the fairly straightforward account of the progression of Spirit through its various instantiations. Viewed in a straightforward manner, this is the non-essential history of consciousness as a mere "succession of Spirits," with neither rhyme nor reason behind their appearance—the Gallery of external circumstances. This is the Gallery of Images as the in-itself, the object for consciousness, the skeleton with tickets stuck all over it. The first Gallery of Images was assembled by consciousness as each of its successive moments were sublated, *aufgehoben*, hung on a wall, then forgotten—but not entirely. They remain as a kind of subconscious residue, such that in the second Gallery of Images (which is actually the same as the first—only regarded from a different point of view), consciousness can be brought to recognize these images as something from its own past, which it itself has made.

The second Gallery of Images is indeed, as Hegel writes, a reflection of the first. The second Gallery of Images is identical to the first, only it is regarded from a different point of view. The two are identical in content, but not in form. It should be recalled that the problem facing self-consciousness throughout "Religion" was making the still-pictorial form of religion tally properly with its content, which is Absolute Spirit. It was unable to do this, because it had not yet grasped the nothingness of the object, which realization takes place in the "second" Gallery of Images. Hegel writes of the second Gallery of

Images that it is "the same gallery translated into the form in which those circumstances are present in the conscious individual."³¹ In this second Gallery of Images, there is a withdrawal into self in which the former outer existence is abandoned and self-consciousness recollects the sublated moments of its journey.

What follows from these observations? To begin, since there is actually only one Gallery of Images, which is doubled, this doubling is perspectival, rather than actual or "real." One Gallery is seen from two different vantage points. The second Gallery is nothing else but the re-discovery of the first Gallery by a self-conscious individual who has become aware of his close relationship with Spirit. Absolute Spirit has been present to consciousness as content since at least Revealed Religion. Absolute Knowing thus has literally nothing to add, other than a fresh perspective. Absolute Knowing is the moment in which the collector becomes the re-collector, when the images which consciousness has stored up in memory are rediscovered and imaginatively recognized as a succession, and hence as a collection of related, rather than disparate or fragmented, moments in consciousness' movement toward its ultimate realization as Spirit.

The lonely pilgrim standing at the foot of Golgotha—observing the crucifixion at the Second Calvary, the Calvary of Spirit—is in for a surprise. As the Roman soldiers pull out the nails from the dead man's hands and feet, finish casting lots for his clothes, and step gingerly around the puddles of water and blood released in a torrent by the spear of Longinus, our pilgrim sees the face and it is—his own. Those are *his* clothes, that is *his* blood that was shed, the journey that led to Calvary's cross was no one's but *his*. The second Gallery of Images plays just this joke on our pilgrim. He has been seeking for truth in the world, in reason, and in God, and has found it where he least expected it—in the place where he has always been. The crucifixion was never real, not in the sense in which he intended the word, nor were any of the other moments of experience he was sure he had on the way to Golgotha. Golgotha is the place of the skull, a dead place where people die, and only here does Spirit find true life.

Properly speaking, then, the first Gallery of Images is not truly a "gallery." A gallery is a gallery, after all, only when the individual images which it contains are recognized as a collection. A common element must be both present and recognized in order for an assortment of items to be understood as a collection. The common element in all of the images hanging on the wall of Gallery is, of course, none other than the individual consciousness itself. A consciousness or self-consciousness caught up in this moment, then

that moment, then the next, can never accomplish such a feat. Herein lies the significance of Hegel's remark that once the outer existence is abandoned, Spirit's existential shape is given over to recollection. Once consciousness abandons its outer shape, it is forced to pause and take stock of its surroundings. Our pilgrim has been walking in a tight circle, effectively marching in place while believing himself to be making a grand voyage of discovery, bringing him ever closer to the True.

The crucifixion is the final illusion, the dropping of the mask which Spirit has been wearing as it secretly guided, tricked, and cajoled consciousness into educating itself on the nothingness of the *Ansich*, via the many twists and turns in the seemingly endless series of rooms, chambers, and trap doors of the *Phenomenology*. Golgotha itself is just another image in the Gallery of Images, which was created by our pilgrim's journey through the succession of Spirits.

The image's power is finally broken. He now sees the other images that he once took for true, from Sense-Certainty to Religion, for what they truly are—dead, static representations of the superseded stages of his quest for Spirit. They were all illusions, and only now as a lonely wanderer in a Gallery of dead Images does consciousness completely understand—if only in principle—its epistemological and metaphysical place. As Spirit, it is the very principle that it has been seeking, but the journey has truly just begun. The best that the *Phenomenology* could do was disabuse our pilgrim of his false beliefs; it is now left to the *Science of Logic* to find the path to the True.

I have argued that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is at base rhetorical, a philosophy spun out of images, which is literally nothing without them. I have also argued that in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel makes use of a rhetorical technique known as *rhētorica contra rhētoricam*, in which one rhetorical approach is made to defeat another. I am now finally in a position to make good on my earlier claims.

Central to the discipline of rhetoric is the notion of eloquence, the orator's duty of *eloqui*—saying all that there is to say about a given subject, or at least all that the orator has in mind. Before the first Gallery of Images is recollected in Absolute Knowing, it is just "a succession of Spirits." Once it is re-collected (i.e. collected again), it can be internalized, *Er-Innert*, paving the way for the conscious individual's continued progression toward Spirit in the *Science of Logic*. The second Gallery of Images both represents and in fact literally is our pilgrim's overcoming of picture-thinking. The *Aufhebung* of picture-thinking is the Second Gallery of Images, and

vice versa. Recollection is the inwardizing of experience, in which what is past is preserved as present, but only in memory. Without memory, the first Gallery of Images would never become the second, and in fact would never even be recognized as a gallery at all.

Spirit only becomes eloquent when it can present all of its experiences in a single moment of time. This, as mentioned earlier, is the trouble with language; it takes place in time, and once a speech has been concluded, it is quite easy to forget what it is that one has heard, and why one ever bothered listening in the first place. This is the function of the *peroratio* which concludes an oration—to remind one's listeners of just what it is that one has heard, why it is significant, and what exactly it means (though not necessarily in that order). In the moment when all of the various forms that Spirit has taken are gathered together and presented—not individually but precisely as a Gallery, a collection of images—the Whole becomes knowable, and thus becomes the True, forever breaking the power of picture-thinking.

The Calvary of Christ was not enough; it was only the prelude to the main event, the Calvary of Spirit at the end of Absolute Knowing. Spirit, however, died only for itself, by suffering itself to be turned into an image of sacrifice and crucifixion, only to realize that it never actually died. The crucifixion was no more "real" than any of the other experiences and images filling the Gallery. The Calvary of Spirit occurs after our pilgrim wanders through the rooms that he himself decorated with the images of his apparently random experience, and sees his past objectified, framed, hanged, and nailed to the wall, as dead as the dead men who bury their own dead.³²

Like Magritte, our pilgrim says to himself, "This is not Spirit. These pictures look like Spirit, but Spirit is alive, and these are just pictures of things." The image—like the experience of consciousness in Sense-Certainty—is "mine," as in "*das Meinen*." The pilgrim finally sees himself in these lifeless images, which he himself created—pale imitations of the infinitude of Spirit, which he is not yet able to grasp.

Upon passing through the entire Gallery again, only this time recollectively, our pilgrim gains the single, but crucial insight that what he beholds is not Spirit; it is death—dead nature, dead reason, the dead divine Man (or at least a picture of him), and a picture of his own "death" at the Calvary of Spirit. By tarrying with the negative in the creation of the first Gallery of images, Spirit has gained itself as its content. In fully comprehending and inwardizing in a single instant the pure negativity of all of its previous experience, Spirit has gained itself as form. It created all of these images, as well as the experiences

from which they spring—which in fact they *are*. It even made the cross upon which it hangs, since its crucifixion, its Calvary, is yet another illusion, the last in a grand series of illusions, each greater than the last, culminating in the conscious individual's recognition of his kinship with Spirit. The final image in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is chalice of Spirit at the end of Absolute Knowing. This chalice is ever-flowing, always filling yet never filled, forever spilling over—a dynamic representation of stable plenitude. Our philosophical pilgrim may now drink from this cup, as he enters the *Science of Logic* through the *Phenomenology's* looking glass.

Notes

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 410; *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988), 443.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Phenomenology*, 417; *Phänomenologie*, 450.

⁵ *Phenomenology*, 424; *Phänomenologie*, 458.

⁶ *Phenomenology*, 425; *Phänomenologie*, 459.

⁷ *Phenomenology*, 427; *Phänomenologie*, 461.

⁸ *Phenomenology*, 437; *Phänomenologie*, 471.

⁹ *Phenomenology*, 439; *Phänomenologie*, 474.

¹⁰ *Phenomenology*, 441; *Phänomenologie*, 475.

¹¹ *Phenomenology*, 441; *Phänomenologie*, 475-76.

¹² Giambattista Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), 38, 59, 205.

¹³ *Phenomenology*, 443; *Phänomenologie*, 478.

¹⁴ *Phenomenology*, 442; *Phänomenologie*, 477.

¹⁵ *Phenomenology*, 453; *Phänomenologie*, 488.

¹⁶ *Phenomenology*, 463; *Phänomenologie*, 498.

¹⁷ *Phenomenology*, 464; *Phänomenologie*, 500.

¹⁸ *Phenomenology*, 475; *Phänomenologie*, 511.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Phenomenology*, 476; *Phänomenologie*, 512.

²² *Phenomenology*, 477; *Phänomenologie*, 513.

²³ *Phenomenology*, 478; *Phänomenologie*, 514.

²⁴ *Phenomenology*, 479; *Phänomenologie*, 516.

²⁵ For more on the significance of "Golgotha," see Donald Phillip

Verene, *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 5, 88-89, 91.

²⁶ *Phenomenology*, 479; *Phänomenologie*, 516.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Phenomenology*, 479-80; *Phänomenologie*, 516-17.

²⁹ *Phenomenology*, 184; *Phänomenologie*, 205.

³⁰ *Phenomenology*, 492; *Phänomenologie*, 530.

³¹ *Phenomenology*, 184; *Phänomenologie*, 205.

³² *Phenomenology*, 44-45; *Phänomenologie*, 53.

Chapter Eight

The Gallery of Images and the *Science of Logic*

The Gallery as the *Aufhebung* of *Bildhaftes Denken*

From Revealed Religion, Absolute Knowing inherited Spirit as content but not yet as form. Put another way, the task of Absolute Knowing was to remove whatever obstacles remained in the way of seeing Spirit, as form, as it truly is, as the content which consciousness has possessed since the death of the Mediator in Revealed Religion. The Calvary of Christ alluded to in Revealed Religion was followed by the Calvary of Spirit in Absolute Knowing. In the “first” Calvary, consciousness gains Spirit as its content; in the second, it gains Spirit as its form, as well.

The Gallery of Images, the Master Image of the *Phenomenology*, alone had the power to accomplish this. To begin, Hegel posits a direct identity between the Gallery of Images and the *Phenomenology* itself when he describes the Becoming of Spirit as “a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images.” This synecdochic metaphor is immediate and unequivocal; the Gallery *is* the *Phenomenology*, and the *Phenomenology* *is* the Gallery. *This* is the Calvary of Spirit, the point at which our solitary pilgrim recognizes that he is not traversing the world; he is merely wandering the halls of a lonely gallery full of static representations of his past experiences.

The Gallery is the accumulated memory of consciousness and, as such, has the power to free consciousness from its dependence on picture-thinking once it recognizes even its own memories as recollections of things unreal, because they are divorced from Spirit

and its inherent life force and dynamism. It is not only the images that are nailed to the wall of the Gallery of Images. Consciousness now understands its own role in creating these images by which it has represented its pilgrim's progress in pictorial fashion. Absolute Knowing is a philosophical epiphany. This individual philosophic consciousness sees *himself* framed, hung, and nailed to a wall. If the incarnate God was crucified in the first Calvary, it is the image, and by extension imagistic thinking itself, that finds itself sacrificed in the second.

The image was overcome, sublated, *aufgehoben* at the moment when the first Gallery of Images "became" the second Gallery of Images, when consciousness—the lonely pilgrim on the highway of despair—came to understand that his entire journey had been an illusion, and that he himself was the goal he had been seeking. Where Oedipus' discovery ended in tragedy though the one made by our pilgrim leads finally to the promise of a hopeful outcome. The apparent cul-de-sac yielded a narrow window through the Gallery of Images to the *Logic*, in which the True may finally become knowable.

Further consideration of the nature of Gallery of Images supports this thesis. Of all of the images in the *Phenomenology*, it alone has literally no content of its own; with the Gallery of Images, we have arrived at the most impoverished expression of Spirit. Where Sense-Certainty was the most immediate, richest, and most abstract form of experience, Absolute Knowing in the Gallery of Images yields experience which is mediated and hence concrete, yet poor in content. Thus, Absolute Knowing does not actually solve the problem which is put to it by Revealed Religion—to match its content, which is Absolute Spirit, to a form capable of expressing that content. The Gallery of Images cannot accomplish this, because it is a copy of a copy of the very *bildhaftes Denken* which has stood in the way of the full expression of Spirit from the very beginning.

The Gallery is, indeed, at once an imaginative symbol for the overcoming (*Aufhebung*) of picture thinking and a tacit acknowledgment of its own failure to do just that. Picture thinking is sublated in the Gallery of Images insofar as consciousness can no longer avoid the conclusion that the True is not to be found in external reflections, yet remains incompletely vanquished, as even the symbol of the overcoming of picture thinking is itself nothing but a picture. Consciousness knows that it is caught within a labyrinth of illusion, but has not yet divined a way out.

Since every attempt to extricate itself from this maze yields only further frustration and failure, in its despair consciousness is left

with no other choice but simply to start all over again. Consciousness goes back to the beginning, and resolves to retrace its steps from its point of origin, recollectively, with full knowledge of the illusory nature of the static representations of experience with which it is now faced. Consciousness may still be forced to see the world of Spirit through the images by which that world is represented, but knowing that it is facing an illusion it learns to see the truth underneath and beyond it.

The Gallery of Images stands halfway between the image (*Bild*) and the Concept (*Begriff*). As an image, it is (as already mentioned) without content and mimetic, being but a copy of a copy of consciousness' experiences. As a Concept, the Gallery of Images fares considerably better. The individual image is connected to the universal Concept via the particularity of the Gallery, in much the same way that the hero, representing the particular, brought together the individual worshipper with the universal gods in Religion. As I will discuss in more detail later in this chapter, the Gallery serves as an imaginative middle term between imagistic thinking (*bildhaftes Denken*) and the speculative thinking peculiar to the Concept (*Begriff*), as revealed in the *Science of Logic*. As such the Gallery of Images is the key to understanding the transition from the end of the *Phenomenology* in Absolute Knowing and the beginning of the *Science of Logic* in "Being."

Before essaying such lofty heights, however, more remains to be said about the path that consciousness has followed to arrive at the Gallery of Images. What has actually taken place in the *Phenomenology* that has brought consciousness to this apparent cul-de-sac in Absolute Knowing, and in what sense is the Gallery of Images the way out?

Bild and Bildung

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, consciousness has undergone a thorough education (*Bildung*) at the hands of the image (*Bild*), which has resulted in its becoming cultured, or educated (*gebildet*). The *Phenomenology* is the oration of a schoolmaster to his pupil; it is the speech given by a consciousness which has become fully educated (*gebildet*), to those still struggling to make their way along the highway of despair. There are actually two accounts given in the *Phenomenology*. The first is that of uneducated (*ungebildet*) consciousness at the various stages of the *Phenomenology*, and the

second is the same account, given from the standpoint of a mature, philosophical consciousness.

Hegel's references to education in the *Phenomenology* are both manifold and extensive, revealing the concern of a pedagogue that his educational program be both properly understood and rightly implemented. Hegel makes twelve direct references to "*Bildung*" or "*Ausbildung*" in the Preface alone; "*bildung*" occurs seven more times as a prefix or suffix. Hegel is quite careful early on to impress on the reader the pedagogical nature of the work.

The first occurrence of the word "*Bildung*" in the *Phenomenology* occurs early in the Preface, where both Miller and Baillie render it as "Culture."¹ Leading up to the first appearance of this word, Hegel has been bitterly criticizing those who engage in "philosophy by antithesis," for which he substitutes the image of the progress of the bud to blossom to the fruit, with the fruit representing the "truth" of the plant. In a similar vein, Hegel sees philosophic or scientific truth as the product of the full development of consciousness as Spirit. He deplores the sort of inquiry that engages in "simple disagreements." The diversity of philosophical systems, in his view, represents "the progressive unfolding of truth," which he compares to the organic unity of the plant, in which different parts are neither distinguished nor truly distinguishable, so long as the plant remains alive.² Such divisions are impositions by an observer who needs a way to understand or conceptualize them. In-itself, the thing is just a thing, undivided and whole.

The truth itself is to be the result of a process of philosophical investigation, in which the power of the negative will figure prominently.³ The negative is the subject matter, the dialectical *res nudas*, which consciousness must learn to approach through a rather lengthy series of exercises. These exercises collectively make up the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with its succession of Spirits, which are gathered together in the Gallery of Images. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel promises a systematic exposition of philosophy itself, in which philosophy is to be transformed from the love of knowing into actual knowing. "The inner necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature, and only the systematic exposition of philosophy itself provides it." The external necessity "lies in the shape in which time sets forth the sequential existence of its moments."⁴ The actual content of Spirit will take various forms, but will always be nothing but Spirit. Spirit cannot make itself actual however, until it has gained full self-expression.

Hegel blames the then-current infatuation with feeling and intuition for the hostility toward his own view that "the true shape of the truth is scientific—or, what is the same thing . . . that truth has only the Notion as the element of its existence." Those who take issue with this view believe that "The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, it is to be felt and intuited; not the Notion of the Absolute, but the feeling and the intuition of it, must govern what is said, and must be expressed by it."⁵

Spirit has suffered a great loss, on Hegel's view, from this approach to philosophy. If the apprehension of the Absolute is to be immediate and intuitive, then what need is there of philosophy at all? Spirit itself, having lost both "the substantial life it formerly led in the element of thought" and thereby "its essential life," has become conscious of its loss, and "now demands from philosophy, not so much knowledge of what it is, as the recovery through its agency of that lost sense of solid and substantial being." Philosophy will rise to the challenge "by suppressing the differentiations of the Notion and restoring the feeling of essential being: in short, by providing edification rather than insight. The 'beautiful', the 'holy', the 'eternal', 'religion', and 'love' are the bait required to arouse the desire to bite; not the Notion, but ecstasy, not the cold march of necessity in the thing itself, but the ferment of enthusiasm, these are supposed to be what sustains and continually extends the wealth of substance."⁶

Hegel is, of course, deeply disdainful of this sort of philosophizing, and in fact here anticipates some of the stages of consciousness' journey through the Gallery of Images, e.g. "the beautiful soul" and "religion." Hegel's antipathy toward feeling and intuition as the basis for philosophizing comes out in his criticism of Schelling's undifferentiated, unified Absolute as "the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black" which he describes as "cognition naïvely reduced to vacuity."⁷ He brutally attacks those who claim that "rapturous haziness is superior to Science," arguing that it is this approach which has denied Spirit its proper nourishment. "By the little which now satisfies Spirit, we can measure the extent of its loss."⁸

Such "modest complacency in receiving" and "sparingness in giving" ill befits Science, and is the bitter and poisonous fruit of a philosophy which "seeks mere edification, and . . . wants to shroud in a mist the manifold variety of his earthly enjoyment and of thought, in order to pursue the indeterminate enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity." A philosopher in grip of such vague reveries "will find

ample opportunity to dream up something for himself. But philosophy must beware of the wish to be edifying."⁹

Spirit, in short, has been denied access to the content of its own being, since it is only as "great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in its exposition."¹⁰ In order to regain its lost content, it must re-collect it, gather it up again, by traversing the Gallery of Images. Here, again, consciousness returns to the wisdom of the animals, or what I have called "animal consciousness." Via the Gallery, consciousness has learned of the unreality of sensuous objects, since in the Gallery each experience is revealed as an image—a mere representation of some more fundamental truth, which is yet to be grasped.

In passing through the *Phenomenology's* succession of Spirits, the conscious individual has acquired extensive experience, which he has externalized via the pictorial representations that make up the Gallery of Images. In finally seeing this collection *as* a collection, a Gallery of Images, he grasps his own essence by a final act of re-internalization and re-collection (*Er-Innerung*). He understands the images to be of his own making, and thereby reclaims as personal and intrinsic what had previously seemed external and incidental.

Those who seek to turn philosophical inquiry into mere edification have denied Spirit its chance to become scientific, preferring to wallow in the warm muck of immediate self-certainty and the mystical union with God that comes to such persons as they draw a veil of self-consciousness over themselves. They surrender the understanding, and thereby hope to achieve divine inspiration in their dreams. Spirit is not, however, a creature of such reveries; it is not to be found in the savant's parlor or reclining on the dilettante's chaise longue. Like the ideal orator of Cicero and Quintilian, Spirit belongs in the world, with all of its contingency, struggles, and rough-and-tumble messiness.

Having recognized its own needless poverty, Spirit is rousing itself from its mystical slumbers and is poised to undertake a great adventure, the discovery of a new world.¹¹ "But this new world is no more a complete actuality than is a new-born child; it is essential to bear this in mind. It comes on the scene for the first time in its immediacy or its Notion. Just as little as a building is finished when its foundation has been laid, so little is the achieved Notion of the whole the whole itself. When we wish to see an oak with its massive trunk and spreading branches and foliage, we are not content to be

shown an acorn instead. So too, Science, the crown of a world of Spirit, is not complete in its beginnings."¹²

The goal of this process is the creation of the "*simple Notion* of the whole," which will emerge as "the whole which, having traversed its content in time and space, has returned into itself." The actuality of this simple whole is "those various shapes and forms which have become its moments."¹³ At the outset the whole is "veiled in its *simplicity*," which presents a serious obstacle to Spirit's development. It—like Schelling's much-derided abstract, undifferentiated absolute—is initially without distinction or character. Fortunately, the wealth of Spirit's previous existence "is still present to consciousness in memory" but is not sufficiently differentiated to match "its former range and specificity of content," the reattainment of which becomes, then, the driving force for the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the science of the experience of consciousness.¹⁴

The full articulation of this recollected experience is essential since without it, "Science lacks universal intelligibility, and gives the appearance of being the esoteric possession of a few individuals. . . . Only what is completely determined is at once exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and appropriated by all."¹⁵ Through the labor of the negative, the abstract universality of the in-itself will gain "the nature of the divine life *to be for itself*."¹⁶ The Absolute will be the result of this great labor, in which the True will reveal itself as the Whole—which is "nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development."

Even so, the Absolute is something already present to Spirit, as the memory of its past experience. In order to regain full possession of this content which has fallen back into the in-itself, Spirit must traverse the corridors of the Gallery of Images—first, as a pilgrim, as a collector of images and the experiences they represent, and, second, as a speculative philosopher, the philosopher of the *speculum* (mirror), who sees clearly his own image in the specula which line the halls of the Gallery. That is, while he sees an external image represented to him, e.g. the Lord and the Bondsman, he no longer regards it from the literal-minded point of view, i.e. as something outside of himself in which he has no part. In the second Gallery of Images, our pilgrim becomes a speculative philosopher; he has grasped the real only after exhausting every possible illusion, and sees himself in the speculum, in what has become quite literally a "mirror image," an image which also reflects back at the viewer his own self-portrait.

The image becomes a speculum, the source of the content of speculative philosophy, when the pilgrim becomes the speculative

philosopher in the second Gallery. To say this is to claim nothing more than that fully self-aware Spirit sees itself reflected back in what otherwise would appear to be merely static representations of past, and hence sublated, experience. The philosophical speculum gives the lie to the conceit that the dead portraits hanging limply on the walls of the gallery are somehow the True, and, ironically, in so doing finally gives them the very life they previously (though falsely) claimed.

As a philosophical account of Spirit embedded in the image, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is inherently speculative, and, as such, represents a philosophy of the speculum, a philosophy of reflection derived not from abstract principles, but concrete experience. The image must be a mirror if it is to achieve Hegel's ultimate goal of forcing the reader to see himself in the Gallery's images. If not, these pictures will simply continue to gather dust, and will fail to bring about Spirit's full self-expression.

Spirit knows the "new" world into whose discovery and ultimate conquest our pilgrim is enticed by the promise of novelty and adventure to be anything *but* novel. This new world is in fact as old as Spirit itself, since indeed Spirit *is* that world. Hegel "sells" the *Phenomenology* as a grand voyage, when it is in fact just a jaunt around the block (albeit a rather lengthy one). Hegel tricks the reader, that pilgrim called consciousness, into retracing the steps that *Spirit* took long ago.

These steps are not initially those of consciousness, nor has consciousness in any sense literally created the images that adorn the walls of the Gallery, but these steps must be taken since "the power of Spirit is only as great as its expression."¹⁷ Our pilgrim has not really collected these images; he has discovered, i.e. re-collected, them. These images belong to Spirit itself, but by forcing consciousness to take such a long journey to end up right back where it started, Spirit has engaged consciousness in an extensive formative education (*Bildung*), which has literally taken our pilgrim through a "succession of Spirits, a gallery of images (*eine Galerie von Bildern*)" at the end of which he has become cultured, educated (*gebildet*). He is now able to grasp the expression of Spirit and indeed to serve as its conduit.

Upon the completion of this *Bildung*, consciousness has arrived back where it began but "is none the less on a higher level" than when it started. Put another way, consciousness is the agent of Spirit's recollection. It is through consciousness that Spirit finds the means to gather together all of its moments, the entire "realm of Spirits" into a gallery, where they are re-collected and internalized (*Er-Innert*). Consciousness goes through the process simultaneously

with Spirit, and goes where it goes, and learns what it learns, only because Spirit has been there before, and already knows the path of the entire journey, especially its end. Consciousness, the philosophical pilgrim, is an accidental student in Spirit's classroom.

Spirit is the teacher, where consciousness is the pupil. More specifically, Spirit is (like Isocrates) the reed-voiced schoolmaster, the mute sage, whose wisdom is unspoken and indeed unspeakable until it finds voice. Like Philology in the myth recounted by John of Salisbury in Chapter Four, Spirit needs the eloquence of Mercury to make its wisdom known. Spirit finds its voice in consciousness, which it raises and educates (*bildet*) from mere consciousness to self-consciousness and finally to Reason and Absolute Knowing. Consciousness becomes the standard-bearer for a paralytic king who cannot make his wishes directly known, but must rather do so through his loyal knights and vassals.

Though as old as Methuselah, Spirit can act only through the living; it quickens dead minds even as it is itself brought back to life by active souls embedded in the world. Spirit and consciousness are the eternal teacher and the eternal pupil, respectively, neither of which is complete without the other. If our pilgrim has been tricked into becoming *gebildet* through the *Bildung* of the *Bild*, he—like Mr. Jabez Wilson in Conan Doyle's "Red-Headed League"—has little cause for complaint, since he has been well-remunerated, viz. in gaining access to the content of the whole which is the True, and has gained knowledge to which he otherwise would never have become privy.¹⁸

Images centered on birth, growth, and education (*Bildung*) figure prominently in the Preface. Those who stress edification and intuition in philosophy "bring to birth in their sleep" dreams of the True, which are in fact but stillborn notions.¹⁹ Hegel describes the period in which he is living as "a birth-time and period of transition to a new era." To this, he ties the idea that "Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation."²⁰ The birth image is continued when Hegel writes, "Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn from a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth—there is a qualitative leap, and the child is born—so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world."²¹ Even so, the new world which will be ushered in by a rejuvenated Spirit "is no more a complete actuality than is a new-born child." The birth imagery continues. "Though the

embryo is indeed *in itself* a human being, it is not so *for itself*; this it only is as cultivated Reason, which has *made* itself into what it is *in itself*.”²²

Later in the Preface, Hegel not only refers to the growth and education of a child, but does so in the context of the stages through which Spirit must pass in the course of its *Bildung*. “The single individual must also pass through the formative stages of universal Spirit so far as their content is concerned, but as shapes which Spirit has already left behind, as stages on a way that has been leveled with toil.”²³ The single conscious individual—the lonely pilgrim on the way of despair—must retrace Spirit’s steps in order to give Spirit the full power of complete expression.

Spirit must express itself through the individual in order to have the force which is proper to it. This has led to a gradual *Aufhebung* within *Bildung* itself; i.e. in the course of its development, *Bildung* has passed through stages whose vestiges are still to be seen in the education of youth. “Thus, as far as factual information is concerned, we find that what in former ages engaged the attention of men of mature mind, has been reduced to the level of facts, exercises, and even games for children.” Hegel compares Spirit’s development to the education of a child, since Spirit has always found its expression through individuals. Therefore, “in the child’s progress through school, we shall recognize the history of the cultural development of the world traced, as it were, in a silhouette.”²⁴ “*Bildung*” means, among other things, “culture” and “education.” Spirit retains and extends its expressive power through a system of formative education that follows the development of Spirit as culture.

What the child learns is “the already acquired property of universal Spirit which constitutes the Substance of the individual, and hence appears externally to him as his inorganic nature. In this respect formative education, regarded from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what thus lies at hand, devouring his inorganic nature, and taking possession of it for himself. But, regarded from the side of universal Spirit as substance, this is nothing but its own acquisition of self-consciousness, the bringing-about of its own becoming and reflection into itself.”²⁵ Substance does not develop; it *becomes*. It becomes the forms that the contingent consciousness of a given age is able to give to it, and can thus never be truly complete (*qua* expression) until it finds perfect voice in the highest culture, with the most educated and cultured (*gebildete*) citizens. The citizens of the new world of Spirit must first be citizens in and of the present world, if

Spirit is ever to bring into being the comprehensive power of its fullest, most eloquent expression.

The *Phenomenology* as Oration

In claiming that the power of Spirit is only as great as its expression, Hegel betrays the rhetorical nature of the attempt to give Spirit full voice. The principle of *eloqui*, the orator's duty to say all that is in his mind (and indeed all that there is to say) about the topic at hand (the *res*), requires that his speech provide as complete an exposition of the *res* as possible. He must expound upon what is literally a universe of discourse, an entire realm of objects and beings, and in so doing comes back, in the *peroratio* (or conclusion) of his speech, to his statement of thesis in the *exordium*.

The evidence in favor of this view is considerable. In previous chapters, I established the following points: First, that the educational system in which Hegel was educated was rhetorical in character; second, that Hegel actively embraced this education, engaging even in extra-curricular exercises such as the keeping of the diary in which he self-consciously strove to eloquence of expression; third, that the *Phenomenology* is itself rhetorical, and specifically tropological in both character and tone.

There is, of course, the additional matter of the numerous references in the Preface of the *Phenomenology* to the formative education (*Bildung*) of consciousness and Hegel's comparison, just discussed, of this formative education of consciousness (from the standpoint of Spirit) to the education of youth. Hegel went so far as to claim that in the education of a child, we see the development of consciousness on its way to Spirit. Thus, *all* education takes place from the standpoint of Spirit, for the express purpose of bringing about Spirit's fullest possible expression. The *Phenomenology*, as the *Bildungsroman* of Spirit, must accordingly be an account of consciousness' formative education.²⁶ Since this education was inherently rhetorical (as established in Chapters Two and Three), the *Phenomenology of Spirit* possesses the form in which rhetorical education is conducted. It is an oration.

What does it mean, though, to claim that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is an oration? Essentially, it means that the *Phenomenology* is the complete account of the shapes of consciousness still bound by the image (literally, "*bildhaft*"). It is the account of Spirit's past shapes, given by Spirit to consciousness. The first Gallery of Images

was created by Spirit as it moved through the stages of its development. This development, as already discussed, has lost its life-force, but is still retained as memory. On the basis of this memory, Spirit "educates" (*bildet, bildet aus*) consciousness via the image (*Bild*). Drawing consciousness through the Gallery of Images, through the succession of Spirits which Spirit has already sublated (*aufgehoben*), Spirit gains a new power of expression for the ancient wisdom, the absolute knowing, that it possesses, and only thus can it give voice to the truth which it so intimately knows. Spirit, like John of Salisbury's Mercurial Eloquence, makes itself known only through someone else. In the case of Philology, Mercury's eloquence provided the outlet for his wife's mute wisdom. Like Philology, Spirit must rely on consciousness to give expression to its ancient wisdom.

As the oration of the experience of consciousness, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* does what all orations do: It clothes the bare truth, the *res nudas*, in appropriately ornate garb, not to obscure the truth, but precisely to *reveal* it. Spirit, as partially expressed in the individual consciousness, is initially only implicitly in possession of its Substance, i.e. it has this Substance only as the memory of its previous shapes. Consciousness benefits from following such a well-worn path, which the individual could have neither found nor followed on his own. Consider the following passage from the Preface to the *Phenomenology*.

Since the Substance of the individual, the World-Spirit itself, has had the patience to pass through these shapes over the long passage of time, and to take upon itself the enormous labour of world-history, in which it embodied in each shape as much of its entire content as that shape was capable of holding, and since it could not have attained consciousness by any lesser effort, the individual certainly cannot by the nature of the case comprehend his own substance more easily. Yet, at the same time, he does have less trouble, since all this has been *implicitly* accomplished; the content is already the actuality reduced to a possibility, its immediacy overcome, and the embodied shapes reduced to abbreviated, simple determinations of thought. It is no longer existence in the form [of an abstract concept], nor submerged in existence—but is now the *recollected in-itself*, ready for conversion into the form of *being-for-self*.²⁷

The full acquisition of the depth and breadth of Spirit's experience is a pre-requisite for this metamorphosis. Via the labor of

the negative, consciousness transforms the recollected in-itself of Spirit's recollections into something for-consciousness; consciousness, led by Spirit through the gallery of images, transforms the in-itself into the for-itself. Out of the entropic grave into which its memories have fallen through disuse and neglect, Spirit raises itself from the dead by means of the life of the individual. This life provides the spark which rekindles the dead or dying flame of Spirit, bringing it back into the fullness of its complete, eloquent expression.

No more will these dead men be left to bury their dead. Through the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and its double Gallery of Images, Spirit has found new life, and proceeds to the next stage of the individual's *Bildung*. The individual has learned to think via the image in passing through the many stages of the Gallery. It has also learned, however, to think past the image, to understand the image as an illusion, in recognizing the contents of the Gallery as actually sublated, dead being. The challenge facing Spirit the schoolmaster is to teach his often-reluctant pupil to think *without* the image, if he can. This task is taken up in the *Science of Logic*.

Notes

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 3; *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988).

² *Phenomenology*, 1-2; *Phänomenologie*, 1.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Phenomenology*, 3-4; *Phänomenologie*, 6.

⁵ *Phenomenology*, 4; *Phänomenologie*, 7.

⁶ *Phenomenology*, 4-5; *Phänomenologie*, 7-8.

⁷ *Phenomenology*, 9; *Phänomenologie*, 13.

⁸ *Phenomenology*, 5; *Phänomenologie*, 8.

⁹ *Phenomenology*, 5-6; *Phänomenologie*, 8-9.

¹⁰ *Phenomenology*, 6; *Phänomenologie*, 9.

¹¹ *Phenomenology*, 6-7; *Phänomenologie*, 9-10.

¹² *Phenomenology*, 7; *Phänomenologie*, 10.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Phenomenology*, 10; *Phänomenologie*, 15.

¹⁷ *Phenomenology*, 6; *Phänomenologie*, 9.

¹⁸ In the story, Mr. Jabez Wilson, a man with fiery red hair, is made a

member of a certain club known as the "Red-Headed League," and is paid four pounds a week to spend four hours per day copying from the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. At the end of eight weeks, he shows up for "work" only to find a cardboard notice attached to the door, to the effect that the League has been dissolved. On complaining to Sherlock Holmes of his misfortune, Holmes reminds Mr. Wilson that he is "richer by some thirty pounds" and has gained "minute knowledge . . . on every subject which comes under the letter A." See Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, "The Red-Headed League," in *The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes* (Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, 1995), 276.

¹⁹ *Phenomenology*, 6; *Phänomenologie*, 9.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² *Phenomenology*, 12; *Phänomenologie*, 16.

²³ *Phenomenology*, 16; *Phänomenologie*, 22.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ *Phenomenology*, 16-17; *Phänomenologie*, 22-23.

²⁶ On the *Phenomenology* as a *Bildungsroman*, see John H. Smith, *The Spirit and Its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of Bildung* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 5, 6, 47, 49-50, 184n16. See also Josiah Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 149-50; M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York: Norton, 1973), 225-37; Donald Phillip Verene, *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the "Phenomenology of Spirit"* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 61; and Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 158. Of the last four, only Verene and Kaufmann use the term, "*Bildungsroman*," but Royce and Abrams presuppose in their discussions a literary quality to Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

²⁷ *Phenomenology*, 17; *Phänomenologie*, 23-24.

Chapter Nine

***Bild* and *Begriff*: From Phenomenology to Logic**

The Origin of the *Science of Logic*

Why does the *Science of Logic*, the successor to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, begin where it does, with *Being*, or more precisely the opposition of Being and Nothing? Hegel acknowledges early in the work that the question of the *Logic's* origin is a serious one, addressing the issue at the beginning of the Introduction:

In no science is the need to begin with the subject matter itself, without preliminary reflections, felt more strongly than in the science of logic. In every other science the subject matter and the scientific method are distinguished from each other; also, the content does not make an absolute beginning but is dependent on other concepts and is connected on all sides with other material. These other sciences are, therefore, permitted to speak of their ground and its context and also of their method, only as premises taken for granted which, as forms of definitions and such-like presupposed as familiar and accepted, are to be applied straight-way, and also to employ the usual kind of reasoning for the establishment of their general concepts and fundamental determinations. . . . Logic on the contrary, cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection and laws of thinking, for these constitute part of

its own content and have first to be established within the science. . . . What logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition. Similarly, it is essentially with the science that the subject matter of logic, namely, thinking or more specifically *comprehensive* thinking is considered; the Notion of logic has its genesis in the course of the exposition and cannot therefore be premised.¹

The difficulty facing the author of the *Science of Logic* consists essentially in creating a science which is itself the foundation of all sciences, and which consequently can be allowed no foundation external to itself. The *Logic* must be self-mediating and self-supported, if it is to avoid being just another regressive step in what will inevitably become an infinite regress. As the foundation of science itself, The *Science of Logic* cannot look to any other discipline for its starting point. Since it is the exposition of scientific method, which will use that same scientific method in the course of the exposition, there is—as the quotation above makes clear—no distinction to be drawn between the method and the content of logic. The method is the content and the content is the method. It is for this reason, as Hegel writes, that logic's content “cannot be stated beforehand”; its content is simply the method that is generated as logic develops.

While aware of the challenge involved, Hegel clearly believes that such a self-supporting fundamental science is possible. Hegel points out that the “problem” of grounding a philosophy is a relatively recent one, and hence not as great an obstacle as it was thought to be in Hegel's time. “It is only in recent times that thinkers have become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty and also the possibility of resolving it has been much discussed.”² Philosophy begins either with what is mediated or immediate, “and it is easy to show that [the beginning] can be neither the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted.”³ Philosophy has sought to establish itself as an objective principle, “the beginning of *everything*,” which is “a particular determinate *content*—water, the one, *nous*, idea, substance, monad, etc.”⁴

On the other hand, the beginning as such is something subjective, in that it is particular—an absolute ground which is

nevertheless known only through particularity. In other words, the universal with which philosophy necessarily begins must be at the same time particular, even individual, and thus appears at first glance to be inherently self-opposed. The universal becomes known only through the particular, the objective only via the subjective. At the same time, however, neither the universal nor the particular (or individual) must ever become subsumed within one another; to do so would be to return to the abstract universality of Schelling, the undifferentiated unity of subject and object, the proverbial night in which all cows are black.

On the identity of the "ground" for the *Science of Logic*, Hegel writes that logic presupposes "the science of manifested spirit, which contains and demonstrates the necessity, and so the truth, of the standpoint occupied by pure knowing and of its mediation. In this science of manifested spirit the beginning is made from empirical, *sensuous* experience and this is *immediate* knowledge in the strict sense of the word. . . . Immediate consciousness is also the first and that which is immediate in the science itself, and therefore the presupposition; but in logic, the presupposition is that which has proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration—the Idea as pure knowledge."⁵

This science of manifested Spirit is none other than the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the science of the experience of consciousness. The *Phenomenology* begins from sensuous experience, and generates immediate knowledge. As such, it forms the basis for the *Science of Logic*. Hegel, indeed, is uncharacteristically clear on this point. He writes that "the Notion of logic [is] . . . the result of a preceding science."⁶ The *Phenomenology* was Hegel's first serious attempt at the creation of a system, and was intended to be the first part of a larger system, of which the *Science of Logic* was the next stage. Hegel continues: "[T]he phenomenology of spirit is the science of consciousness, the exposition of it, and . . . consciousness has for result the *Notion* of science, i.e. pure knowing" (i.e. absolute knowing).⁷

In a final word on this subject, Hegel writes: "In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* I have exhibited consciousness in its movement onwards from the first immediate opposition of itself and the object to absolute knowing. The path of this movement goes through every form of the relation of consciousness to the object and has the Notion of science for its result."⁸ Hegel unequivocally

identifies the *Phenomenology* as the predecessor of, and the precondition for, the *Science of Logic*.

Because of the manner in which the Concept (*Begriff*) came to be, it needs no justification, or external support, apart from that already provided in the *Phenomenology*. The Concept has its genesis in the very process whereby it comes to be; it is, in a sense, self-creating and self-authenticating, and cannot be explained or justified ratiocinatively without losing its true character. Such an attempt will produce, Hegel claims, at best a definition, but in no case will it bring about anything like the truth of the Concept, which is grasped speculatively by passing through the succession of sublated (*aufgehobenen*) Spirits in the *Phenomenology's* Gallery of Images.⁹

Immediate consciousness (or what I have called "animal consciousness") is the presupposition and true starting point of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This presupposition is justified and discharged by the result to which it leads, i.e. the creation of the Notion or Concept (*Begriff*). The starting point of the *Phenomenology* is validated by the fact that, first, it returns to itself, thereby forming a self-supporting and self-justifying circle, and, second, it provides the presupposition for the science of logic which is to follow it. If the starting point had not been a legitimate one, it could not have led to such a useful and salutary conclusion.

Absolute Knowing, then, is the immediate presupposition of the *Science of Logic*. If this is indeed so, the beginning of the *Science of Logic*, "Being," should bear some resemblance to consciousness at the stage of Absolute Knowing. It should possess knowledge of the inseparable nature of the in-itself and the for-itself, but without a complete understanding of the full implications of this view. In this sense, it will also resemble animal consciousness, which possesses an inexpressible wisdom regarding the nothingness of sensuous beings. Being should, in short, be a self-conscious, but still undifferentiated, unity of the in-itself and the for-itself. This is precisely what it will prove to be.

In Absolute Knowing, subject becomes substance, the in-itself becomes the for-itself, and the opposed, self-alienated moments of consciousness are reconciled. This reconciliation is not, however, accomplished at the cost of eliminating the distinction, or indeed the opposition, between them. Subject may be substance, and substance subject, but consciousness is still consciousness, separate from what stands over against it. It is not that they have become a literally

identity; consciousness, the individual, has recognized itself in the universal, and thus no longer sees the universal as a mere thing—something fundamentally other than consciousness and alien to it.

There is none of the mystical unity of Schelling's abstract universality in Hegel's "unification" of the in-itself and the for-itself. Hegel, in fact, goes so far as to describe the word, "unity," as "unfortunate,"¹⁰ noting an uneasiness in his own use of the term. The problem is that unity "expresses wholly *abstract* sameness and sounds all the more blatantly paradoxical the more the terms of which show themselves to be sheer opposites. So far then, it would be better to say only *unseparatedness* and *inseparability*, but then the affirmative aspect of the relation of the whole would not find expression."¹¹ As a couple joined in marriage are said to be "one" person, yet remain two distinct individuals, so too are the in-itself and for-itself joined together without losing their distinctive character. Hegel's is a *concrete* unity, in which the two initially opposed moments are brought, indeed welded, together with the qualities of each remaining fully present in this new creation.

Unlike Absolute Knowing, Being (with which the *Science of Logic* begins) does not use images to represent itself; it is pure being in the most literal sense. Like Absolute Knowing, it posits a unity of the in-itself and the for-itself, of which it is fully aware and in which each member of "unity" is still recognizable as a distinct entity. Like the wisdom of animal consciousness, Being is an "*undifferentiated unity*" which unites the opposites of being and non-being.¹² Also like animal consciousness, Being is pure immediacy, with no mediation from anywhere or anything; as Being, consciousness is alone with itself.

Put another way, Being at the outset of the *Science of Logic* is *explicitly* equivalent to Nothing, since it lacks determinacy and hence has no real content, but is *implicitly* Being. "The beginning is not pure nothing, but nothing from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning. The beginning therefore contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-being."

The beginning of the *Science of Logic* is explicable, first of all, by comparing it to *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The goal of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—Absolute Knowing and the *Aufhebung* of *bildhaftes Denken* (the overcoming or sublation of pictorial

thinking)—is already implicitly present in its beginning. The undifferentiated unity of the in-itself and the for-itself present in animal consciousness becomes the differentiated, self-conscious unity of the in-itself and for-itself in Absolute Knowing.

In a parallel fashion, Being is the appropriate origin for the *Science of Logic*, because the undifferentiated unity of being and non-being will yield the fullest, most detailed and varied exposition of Spirit from the standpoint of logic. The origin is also the goal toward which the science will return. It is, once again, an assumption to be discharged in the course of the “proof” which the *Logic* gives, and in a sense *is*.

The distinction between being and non-being, and hence the justification for the origin of the *Science of Logic*, is defensible furthermore in terms appropriate to rhetoric, lending credence to the notion that there is something of rhetoric at work even here. In the *Logic*, the dialectical *res nudas*—literally the “naked thing” or “bare subject matter”—emerges from the copiousness of speech and expression of the *Phenomenology*. The subject matter and the content of the *Logic* are identical, which requires that there be no presuppositions underlying the *Logic*, other than those present in the *Logic* itself. The *Logic* begins with the undifferentiated unity of Being and Non-Being (Nothing), and thereby appears to attain the presuppositionless character which Hegel claims is essential to it. The *Science of Logic* is indeed presuppositionless, but nevertheless relies—as Hegel openly acknowledges—on the sublation (*Aufhebung*) of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as an implicit and necessary precondition for the *Logic*.

The *Phenomenology* as the Deduction of the Concept

As already discussed, Hegel recognizes the debt owed by the *Science of Logic* to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, to such an extent that the *Phenomenology* clearly emerges as the precondition for the *Science of Logic*. Thus, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* are not merely two different accounts of the experience of consciousness, nor is the *Phenomenology* a mere “rough draft” of the science of Spirit, to be discarded upon having been surpassed in the *Logic*. On the contrary, the *Phenomenology* is sublated, taken up into the *Logic*; even as the pictorial consciousness of the *Phenomenology* is

overcome via the succession of Spirits culminating in the gallery of images, it is retained in memory, as the negative of true knowledge.

The exact nature of this dependence of the *Logic* on the *Phenomenology* reveals much about the relationship of the two works. In short, the *Phenomenology* is the source of the Concept or Notion (*Begriff*). "The Notion of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is nothing other than the deduction of it. Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because, as the course of the *Phenomenology* showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of the object from the certainty of itself is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and certainty with truth."¹³ The Concept was derived through the succession of Spirits in the *Phenomenology*, and became explicit at the moment when sense-certainty was replaced by self-certainty, when our pilgrim regained what was lost—the implicit wisdom of the animals regarding the non-being of sensuous objects, which is reflected back at him in the *specula* of the gallery of images.

The *Science of Logic* considers the notion of cognition, thought *qua* thought, while the *Phenomenology of Spirit* takes as its subject matter the experience of consciousness, i.e. consciousness' thought about its experience. This is what Hegel means when he claims that in the *Logic* content and method are one and the same, in stark contrast to the *Phenomenology*, in which the method emerges only gradually from the muddy path of the highway of despair.

In the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel recognizes the right of the individual "to demand that Science should at least provide him with the ladder" to the absolute standpoint.¹⁴ Our pilgrim is entitled to a guide, or at least a road map. This right is based on the individual's "absolute independence, which he is conscious of possessing in every phase of his knowledge."¹⁵ The individual is not the pawn of Spirit; he is its student. The individual is indeed at each stage "the absolute form, i.e. he is the immediate certainty of himself and, if this expression be preferred, he is therefore unconditioned *being*."¹⁶

It is precisely the individual then, *qua* unconditioned being, who stands at—and in fact is—the beginning of the *Science of Logic*. The *Logic* begins with the individual philosophic consciousness that has been disabused of its false belief in the primacy of the sensuous world, and the images by which it is represented. Without the

pilgrim's progress through the *Phenomenology's* succession of Spirits, its gallery of images, the individual would never have come to regain the wisdom of the animals, which is the same unconditioned being with which the *Logic* begins (albeit seen from a different point of view). The individual's wisdom is higher than that of the animals, but only insofar as he *knows* himself as unconditioned being, as an entity seeking content and determination.

This content and determination is gained by the individual's entering the next stage of his formative education (*Bildung*). In this process, the subject matter (*res*) is the past determinations of Spirit. The individual is trodding a well-worn path, a trail blazed by Spirit long ago. During his journey, our pilgrim is literally following Spirit, and is on the way toward becoming the "universal individual."

The task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge had to be seen in its universal sense, just as it was the universal individual, self-conscious Spirit, whose formative education had to be studied. As regards the relation between them, every moment, as it gains concrete form and a shape of its own, displays itself in the universal individual. The single individual is incomplete Spirit, a concrete shape in whose whole existence one determinateness predominates, the others being present only in blurred outline. In a Spirit that is more advanced than another, the lower concrete existence has been reduced to an inconspicuous moment; what used to be the important thing is now but a trace; its pattern is shrouded to become a mere shadowy outline.¹⁷

In the transition to the *Logic*, the *Phenomenology* remains as the shadowy outline of Spirit's past, of the education of the individual by Spirit, the universal individual. The deduction of the Concept in the *Phenomenology* is really nothing other than the revelation of the Concept through the overcoming of picture thinking (*bildhaftes Denken*). All that the individual learned in the course of the entire *Phenomenology* was that the whole thing was unreal. It was, in effect, an exercise with one single learning point: That the individual had always had within him—and had in fact *been*—unconditioned being. He *is* the starting point for the *Science of Logic*, and he emerges from the image-specula of the Gallery of Images.

The Necessity of the *Logic*

Despite the great progress made by consciousness on its way to Spirit, it is by no means the case that having glimpsed himself in the mirrored pictures of the Gallery of Images, the pilgrim has somehow grasped the True. To make this claim would be merely to replace an undifferentiated absolute with a one-sided one, which therefore also remained undifferentiated. In Absolute Knowing, the distinction between the in-itself and the for-itself is recognized as something other than what it was at first thought to be. It is not some grand eidetic "melting pot" in which all difference is reduced to sameness. Not only must difference be retained, but it must be retained as an individual difference. That is, each individual consciousness must learn the truth on its own. As Hegel writes in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, one may "accept only one's own deed as what is true."¹⁸

Every individual, if he is to grasp Spirit in its entirety and thus attain the Whole which is the True, must also make the True for himself. He must engage in an extensive act of comprehensive recollection. He must re-trace the ancient steps of Spirit, if he is to obtain the knowledge that Spirit *is*. Spirit is the schoolmaster on this journey, and the education which the individual undergoes is rhetorical in character. At the end of the *Phenomenology* and beginning of the *Logic*, the individual is *explicitly* himself (i.e. he is self-conscious and aware of his own role in the process of knowing, which thereby becomes Absolute Knowing—knowing which takes the absolute as its subject) but only *implicitly* Being, since his being is still unconditioned, and unmediated.

The way of despair followed by consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has yielded to the "pathway to truth."¹⁹ This pathway, of course, is still nothing but Spirit's ancient road, and that is precisely why it is no longer a way of despair. The hopelessness of consciousness' search in the *Phenomenology* led it to despair once it realized the nature of the path it was following. Like the lost wanderer in deep, dark woods who stumbles upon the rucksack he abandoned hours or days before, our pilgrim loses heart upon recognizing that he has traveled a great way, but has gotten nowhere. In contrast, the pathway to truth in the *Science of Logic* is a way of hope, because consciousness is now following the true path of Spirit, rather than an

illusory one—that of the *Phenomenology*—whose principal function is precisely to be recognized *as* illusion.

The soul will prove foundational on this new path. “The . . . basis is the soul [*Seele*] itself, the pure Notion which is the very heart of things, their simple life-pulse, even of the subjective thinking of them.”²⁰ Being is the starting point for the inquiry conducted in the *Logic*, because it “is known to be the pure Notion in its own self, and the pure Notion to be the true being. These, then, are the two moments contained in logic. But now they are known to be inseparable, not as in consciousness where each also has a separate being of its own; it is solely because they are at the same time known as distinct (yet not with an independent being) that their unity is not abstract, dead and inert, but concrete.”²¹

Like the *Phenomenology*, the *Logic* will ultimately return to the place it began, to unconditioned being and the life-force of the soul.

The advance is a retreat into the ground, to what is primary and true. . . . Thus consciousness on its onward path from the immediacy with which it began is led back to absolute knowledge as its innermost truth. . . . The essential requirement for the science of logic is . . . that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first. . . . We see therefore that, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to consider as result that into which the movement returns as into its ground. . . . Further, the progress from that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further determination of it. . . . Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determinations.²²

Through the process described, the *Logic's* origin in pure, undifferentiated being “loses the one-sidedness which attaches to it as something simply immediate and abstract; it becomes something mediated, and hence the line of the scientific advance becomes a circle.”²³ The beginning acquires content and mediation through the process of its development, but nevertheless returns to the place whence it began its journey, thus justifying the origin of the *Logic* (unmediated Being) as both foundation and *telos*.

This abstract beginning "already is, but equally, too is not as yet."²⁴ It is thus equally being and non-being, or nothing. "The beginning is not pure nothing, but nothing from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning. The beginning therefore contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-being."²⁵

This undifferentiated unity of being and nothing acquires determinate content through the mediation of becoming, which is "the vanishing of being in nothing and of nothing in being and the vanishing of being and nothing generally." Within this unity, the distinction between being and nothing is nevertheless retained. "It is therefore inherently self-contradictory, because the determinations it unites within itself are opposed to each other; but such a union destroys itself."²⁶ Becoming is determinate being "as this transition into the unity of being and nothing, a unity which is in the form of being or has the form of one-sided *immediate* unity of these moments."²⁷

Being and nothing, through the mediation of becoming, form the true infinity of the circle. The mediation of becoming keeps the original opposition of being and nothing from descending into an abstract universal. The two are kept separated as moments of something which is unified in-itself, without losing sight of their actual unity. The absolute must always have specific determinations if it is to avoid becoming the "night in which all cows are black." What is individual, particular, and hence by nature limited becomes universal by being linked back into itself. The absolute emerges as something like the Worm Ourobours, which bites, but never quite swallows, its own tail, forming a circle as perfect as it is eternal.

Of his true infinite, symbolized by the circle, Hegel writes, "It is only the spurious infinite which is the beyond, because it is *only* the negation of the finite posited as *real*—as such it is the abstract, first negation. . . . The image of the progress to infinity is the *straight line*, at the two limits of which alone the infinite is. . . . The image of the true infinity, bent back into itself, becomes the *circle*, the line which has reached itself, which is closed and wholly present, without *beginning* and *end*."²⁸ Ground and grounded literally contain each other. "*There is nothing in the ground that is not in the grounded, and there is nothing in the grounded that is not in the ground.*"²⁹ The exposition of the absolute is in fact a circle of reciprocal presupposing

that returns to itself.³⁰ Hegel begins at the end and ends at the beginning. What distinguishes the beginning from the end is what happens in between, which is governed by the speculative syllogism.

The Speculative Syllogism: The Gallery as Middle Term

The syllogism is to the *Logic*, as experience was to the *Phenomenology*. It is the lens through which the world is filtered, and the means by which the individual comes to know what he knows. The still-pictorial consciousness of the *Phenomenology* continues to believe in the primacy of the in-itself, the external world, as the source of truth, and hence places its faith in the images by which it represents that world to itself. The individual who emerges in the Gallery of Images has learned—by personal experience—the futility of attempting to attain true knowledge in a manner which does not fully appreciate and account for the knower's role in the act of cognition. Such is the wisdom, however limited, of the individual who begins the journey on Spirit's hopeful path in the *Science of Logic*.

The speculative syllogism directs and orders this passage, just as the image directed and ordered consciousness' journey through the *Phenomenology*. The highway of despair appears to have ended in the Gallery of Images. In fact, however, the highway of despair *was* the Gallery of Images. The apparent journey was an illusion which ran the whole gamut of the experience of human consciousness—from its certainty of the truth of the external object in Sense-Certainty to its final epiphany in Absolute Knowing, in which the external object was revealed as nothingness via the Gallery of Images. No longer can the individual fall back upon a merely pictorial representation of the external world in his investigations. In the *Science of Logic*, the method will be identical with the content, and the content with the method. The *Science of Logic* depends upon the sublation of both picture-thinking and of the concomitant reliance on the external world as the ground for the True which is the Whole.

The syllogism is the ordering principle for the *Science of Logic*. Hegel goes so far as to claim that *everything* is a syllogism, "a universal that through particularity is united with individuality."³¹ This does not mean of course that everything is literally "a whole consisting of *three propositions*,"³² but rather that cognition takes place via the syllogism, by which alone it can gain true knowledge.

Since everything is a syllogism, everything must have a "middle term," or something analogous. This is, *prima facie*, an odd or even untenable epistemological formulation. How, after all, can a thing "have" a middle term? Even to pose the question in this way, however, betrays a lack of appreciation for the depth and profundity of the fundamental insight of the *Phenomenology*, i.e. of the unreality of sensuous beings. To assert, as Hegel does, that everything is a universal that through particularity is united with individuality is to claim no more than that cognition presupposes a universal, i.e. a name representing a concept (e.g. "tree" or "woods"), which must be instantiated in determinate form (e.g., "this tree" or "these woods") by the conscious gaze of an observer.

The proverbial tree falling in the woods—leaving aside the sophomoric and ultimately trivial issue of whether or not it makes any "sound"—will not be perceived, unless there is someone there to perceive it, i.e. an individual consciousness. The universal name "tree" is connected with an individual tree via a particular individual, who both understands what "tree" means, and knows one when he sees it.

Thus, cognition requires a determinate Concept (*Begriff*). This determinate Concept is often, even generally, expressed as a name, e.g. "tree" or "woods." The Concept, as such, is thus unmediated and indeterminate. That is, the Concept is abstract until an example of it is pointed out. Individual instances of the Concept provide the condition for the possibility of determination and mediation, but determination and mediation remain only potential until the things in question are actually observed and made objects of cognition.

A thing (understood as an object for consciousness) comes to be in being known. Consciousness, as the student of Spirit, represents an object to itself, and in the process of so doing "creates" it. There is of course no reason to believe that the material aspect of the object is either illusory or created by consciousness. That is certainly not Hegel's claim. Consciousness' attention to the object does not change it materially, but spiritually, in that the object is now part of the experience of an individual consciousness who is a student of Spirit.

The object continues to possess a significance for consciousness as long as it is retained in memory, but passes again into unmediated being (non-being or nothing) when it is forgotten. The Gallery of Images is the place where all of consciousness' past, and

either forgotten or dimly remembered, experiences are re-collected—collected again. In this place, the individual philosophic consciousness—our philosophical pilgrim—is faced with what he thought was experience of something “out there,” but which in fact turns out to be a series of self-deceptions. At each stage of the *Phenomenology*, consciousness believed that it had found the truth, only to be systematically disabused of this recurring conceit. Forgetting its failures, this individual philosophic consciousness forges on, always one step ahead of the despair it senses close at its heels.

In the Gallery of Images, consciousness reaches a definitive cul-de-sac. Each stage of consciousness' journey has been nothing more than an image that consciousness presented to itself, unawares. Previously, the individual philosophic consciousness was able escape the full implication of its repeated failures by moving on to the next stage, and the next, and the next. In the Gallery of Images, however, there is no “next.” The philosophical pilgrim is forced to stop and, for the first time, to take full stock of the situation in which he finds himself. Recognizing each of the images as being of his own creation, the pilgrim finally grasps the futility of his repeated attempts to find an epistemological and metaphysical in the in-itself. The in-itself is nothing, until consciousness turns its gaze to it, thereby making it an object for consciousness.

The thing as it exists in-itself is of course unchanged, but the thing as it exists in-itself apart from consciousness is, from the standpoint of Spirit, the same as nothing. This is, in fact, how Hegel can justify Being as the beginning of the *Logic*, and still claim that it is identical with nothing. The things that are, and the things that are not, are the same things. What differentiates them from one another is that some of them have been made objects of consciousness, while others have not. Those that have been made objects of consciousness take part in the middle term of particularity, which (like the hero) serves as the mediator between the individual knower and the universal that he is attempting to know.

The middle term, particularity, is “determinateness as such,” i.e. a particular thing apart from its being made an object of cognition.³³ The middle term represents the content of the thing, the means by which the individual—our philosophical pilgrim—gains access to the universal realm of the Absolute Idea at the end of the *Science of Logic*. The middle term is “essence,”³⁴ and essence is illusory being in which “being is non-being,” because its negation is

immediate.³⁵ Essence, as illusory being, *is* reflection, but merely immediate reflection.³⁶ Illusion is the appearance of essence, i.e. manifested essence.

The illusory middle term unites the extremes of the syllogism in such a way that the two terms of the syllogism are in fact identical with the middle term.³⁷ The true relation of subject and predicate is in fact "differenceless identity."³⁸ Subject and object are really one and the same, yet must be seen as distinct if they are to be "seen" at all. The act of cognition presupposes a knower, someone initiating the act of cognition. Without a distinction between the knower and the object of knowledge, Hegel's absolute would quickly degrade into Schelling's. If the distinction between subject and object, and thus of the for-itself and the in-itself, is not maintained, the philosopher will have to settle for the mystic's primal unity, an inchoate sense of the truth of the oneness of all things which lacks the power of expression. It is precisely the voiceless nature of this sort of "wisdom" that makes such mysticism so profoundly unsatisfactory from a philosophical point of view.

The syllogism solves this problem for Hegel, since it holds the opposites of subject and object apart, while allowing them to get close enough to each other to complete this link in the chain of Spirit. They must be mediated, lest they return to the undifferentiated, immediate identity in which they began, nor must they be allowed to separate completely. The syllogism may thus be called "speculative" since it meets Hegel's prime criterion for speculative thought, i.e. that it "consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction," a power which Hegel identifies as a characteristic of life itself.³⁹ The dead bones of ratiocinative thinking are quickened only by this power of speculation to give life to thought by refusing to allow the individual to indulge the slothful conceit of congratulating himself on finding the monistic, undifferentiated absolute. Such mental laziness is the principal obstacle to Spirit's instruction of the individual.

Our pilgrim must remain and complete the lessons put to him by Spirit, the stern but kindly schoolmaster. He must continue to tarry with the negative, with the illusory middle term of particularity. Tarrying with the negative is itself a continual act of recollection. In tarrying with the negative, with that which is other than oneself, consciousness is drawn to remember the path it followed to get to the point where it currently finds itself. Tarrying with the negative reveals the nothingness of the object, of the in-itself, but not in the sense

intended by the mystic or the believer in the undifferentiated unity of a primal Absolute, which possesses neither distinctions nor determinations. What the knower learns thereby is that the object is both something and the appearance of something, i.e. the object is self-opposed. As such, it is both itself, i.e. Being, and other than itself, i.e. non-being or nothing.

The subject, the individual knower, finds himself in a similar situation. He is both himself and something that relates to things that are other than himself. *Contra* the view of Baillie and others, consciousness has not come to anything like absolute *Knowledge* at the end of the *Phenomenology*, nor indeed in all but perhaps the final stages of the *Logic*. Consciousness, the determinate individual, in the *Logic* is still caught up in mediation, and hence in illusion.

From this perspective, the *Logic* appears to offer little more than did the *Phenomenology*. Early on at any rate, it amounts to a re-telling of the *Phenomenology*, but in non-pictorial form. It is in this sense that the Gallery of Images amounts to a sublating, rather than an actual overcoming, of the image. The Gallery teaches the lesson of the illusion of the image, but does not reveal how the illusion is to be overcome; the image is recognized as illusion, but is still seen. The conscious individual must simply learn to filter it out. The image yields to the syllogism. If illusion is to be overcome definitively, it must therefore be via the syllogism, or not at all.

Illusion is overcome as the movement of the syllogism generates the fully realized Concept (*Begriff*). Mediation may be an illusion, but its "illusion" is not that of the ordinary sort. It is taking place, but it is not what it seems to be. Mediation appears to be the act of connecting two entities which are naturally separate, the in-itself and the for-itself. Mediation is in fact the opposite of this. In appearance, mediation is the linking of two separate entities, but in truth it is the separation of two entities which are unified. Through mediation, the transition is made from the primal, inchoate, undifferentiated unity of Schelling's Absolute to the creation by consciousness of distinctions in what is by nature one.

The differenceless identity of subject and predicate is indeed the true relation between them, but it is a relationless relation, a disconnected connection. It is, in short, a relation that is incapable of being thought or grasped without mediation. Thus, the problem with the undifferentiated absolute proposed by Schelling and others is not so much that it is false in-itself, but that the individual requires

differences as a cognitive and epistemological prerequisite. The mind cannot grasp what it cannot know, and it cannot know what it cannot "see." Cows are not *really* all black at night, even in Schelling's absolute; there is simply insufficient light to make out their true colors. Mediation is an illusion, because it divides what is in fact unified. Being is, in-itself, the same as nothing. That is, Nothing is simply Being that has not been made an object for consciousness, and which is consequently merely in-itself.

The Absolute, similarly, is still just the Absolute, whether anyone is aware of it or not, but is so only in-itself, and hence is not an object that can be perceived. In the *Phenomenology*, consciousness tried to "see" the Absolute through the prism of the image. Having failed in that attempt, there is a natural progression in the *Science of Logic* to another way of "thinking" the relationship between the for-itself and the in-itself, this time as subject and predicate.

The subject and the predicate are merely names, determinations of the judgment which will yield to the speculative syllogism.⁴⁰ The Concept (*Begriff*) appears first in the predicate, and passes from the predicate to the subject via the syllogism, the middle term of which is particularity, and the extremes of which are individuality and universality. There are three totalities and the Concept. The simple unity of the three totalities is "*particularity*, which contains in immediate unity the moment of *determinateness* of the individual and the moment of *reflection-into-self* of the universal. These three totalities are, therefore, one and the same reflection, which, as *negative self-relation*, differentiates itself into these two, but into a *perfectly transparent difference*, namely, into a *determinate simplicity* or *simple determinateness* which is their identity. This is the *Notion* [Concept], the realm of *subjectivity* or of *freedom*."

The unity of the three totalities depends on the illusion of mediation. Since mediation is an illusion, a process taking place apparently but not actually, Hegel can claim that individuality, particularity, and universality are one and the same. Were mediation somehow *real*, this statement would be at best nonsensical, and at worst philosophical sleight of hand. They are one and the same because their difference is only an apparent one, an heuristic and propaedeutic illusion, necessary to allow consciousness to follow Spirit through the path of its development. It is important to bear in mind that this is precisely what is still happening. The individual did not cease to be Spirit's pupil upon "graduating" from the

Phenomenology, at the Calvary of Spirit in the Gallery of Images. Spirit continues our pilgrim's education in the *Logic*, and illusion is still Spirit's principal pedagogical tool. The illusion of the image has indeed been overcome, but illusion itself has been merely sublated—overcome in one form (the image), yet retained in another (the syllogism which relates the three totalities).

The Concept which emerges from the dialectical movement of substance is just the manifestation of what is implicit in substance. "Thus the *dialectical movement* of substance through causality and reciprocity is the immediate *genesis* of the *Notion*, the exposition of the process of its becoming. . . . Accordingly the Notion [Concept] is the *truth* of substance."⁴¹ The Concept is thus also nothing new. It represents the full articulation of what substance is, but lacks the power to bring it about in the world, or to express it as the *living* substance manifested in the Concept. The Concept which is brought about by the dialectical movement of substance in the syllogism is substance as an in-itself-for-consciousness.

The individual, under the direction and tutelage of Spirit, carries with the negative represented by substance and transforms it into the Concept via the syllogism. The entire process is of course an illusion, a mimetic act recalling the history of Spirit's actual development, but is nevertheless both real and necessary for the individual. Like a child learning his alphabet, Spirit puts the individual through paces which date back millennia.

The occasional child who believes that he has discovered a new sound or a new word is generally disabused of his conceit in short order. He is still just learning, imitating, recollecting something which to him is altogether new. The word turns out either already to exist or to be nonsense; the "new" sound proves to be just a variation on a theme. As new as these may be to the child, they are in fact anything but. A student who masters these early lessons may or may not go on to bigger and better things. A student who fails to master them, however, is sure to fail. Much as learning one's ABC's is a necessary but not sufficient condition to future academic success, so too is grasping the Concept, learning the distinctions between the three totalities (universality, particularity, and individuality), a necessary precondition for the Hegelian "scientist," i.e. one who wishes to master Hegel's entire Science of Spirit.

The syllogism is, then, itself an imaginative symbol which allows the individual to find his place within the totality of Spirit. He

relates himself to the universal through the particular, but this is not his true relation to the other totalities. He is distinguishable from the particular and the universal only insofar as he himself makes that distinction.

Following the argument above, I claim that the syllogism of the *Logic* is the result of the sublation of the image of the *Phenomenology*. As discussed earlier, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* the tropological image was the means by which consciousness rendered its experience philosophically intelligible. The tropological image functioned in effect as an interpretative principle, a prism through which consciousness could see the world in a form which it could grasp. The image provided the categories—the experiential niches and cubbyholes, the tickets to stick on the skeleton of Spirit—through which its experience of the world could be tagged, labeled, pigeonholed, and understood.

When the Gallery of Images revealed such “experience” as a thorough-going fraud, and the entire pilgrim’s progress along the highway of despair as an illusion, the image was indeed overthrown, but not the principle behind it. The image served as the mediator between the world *qua* universal and the individual consciousness—the same function discharged by the syllogism in the *Science of Logic*. As the image guided consciousness along the various stations of the highway of despair to Absolute Knowing in the *Phenomenology*, so too does the syllogism guide the individual on the path of hope in the *Science of Logic*.

The tropological image is an imaginative symbol for the speculative syllogism, which Hegel first mentions in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, written after the main body of the work, and prior to the *Science of Logic*. The image is, in other words, a metaphor for the syllogism. The transition from Absolute Knowing to Being is thus a logical progression. The tropological image is a *pictorial* mediation of the in-itself and the for-itself. The syllogism is a speculative mediation of the same. Mediation itself is the middle term between the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, each of which differs from the other principally insofar as it gives a different account of the mediation of subject and object, of the for-itself and the in-itself.

The Gallery of Images is both the symbol of and the key to the transition from the *Phenomenology* to the *Science of Logic*. The image is always implicitly a syllogism, a mediator between subject and object. As such, it is a middle term between consciousness and the

realm of sensuous beings. When this middle term is revealed as illusory, our pilgrim is thrown into a fundamental confusion. No longer knowing up from down, he is forced to start the entire procedure over again, but without the dubious benefit of being able to rely on sensuous beings, on the in-itself, or on the images by which consciousness represents that world to itself, as the ground for truth. "Being" is the *Logic's* answer to his dilemma—an epistemological and metaphysical stance based on the immediacy of the subject matter, only without the images. Beginning from the standpoint of the unity of Being and Nothing, Spirit continues its *Bildung* of a philosophic consciousness that has come to despair of the reality of sensuous beings, but does not yet fully grasp its own epistemological and metaphysical role in its own act of cognition.

Notes

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), 42; G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986), 9.

² *Science of Logic*, 67; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 36.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Science of Logic*, 68-69; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 35-7.

N.B. The section of Miller's translation, "With What Must the Science Begin," does not track with the German edition cited earlier. Miller begins his translation of this section with what appears on the second page of the original. Many paragraphs are also out of sequence, making a direct comparison of the translation to the original quite difficult.

⁶ *Science of Logic*, 60; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 29-30.

⁷ *Science of Logic*, 68; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 35-7.

⁸ *Science of Logic*, 48; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 15.

⁹ *Science of Logic*, 48-49; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 15-6.

¹⁰ *Science of Logic*, 91; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 54-5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Science of Logic*, 74; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 39.

¹³ *Science of Logic*, 49; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 16.

¹⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 14; *Phänomenologie des*

Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988), 20.

¹⁵ *Phenomenology*, 15; *Phänomenologie*, 20.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Phenomenology*, 16; *Phänomenologie*, 22.

¹⁸ *Phenomenology*, 50; *Phänomenologie*, 61.

¹⁹ *Science of Logic*, 60; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 29-30.

²⁰ *Science of Logic*, 37. This quotation is taken from the Preface to the Second Edition, which does not appear in the German version cited above.

²¹ *Science of Logic*, 60; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 29-30.

²² *Science of Logic*, 71; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 37.

²³ *Science of Logic*, 71-2; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 37-8.

²⁴ *Science of Logic*, 74; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 39.

²⁵ *Science of Logic*, 73; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 39.

²⁶ *Science of Logic*, 106; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 64.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Science of Logic*, 149; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 94-5.

²⁹ *Science of Logic*, 457; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992), 80.

³⁰ *Science of Logic*, 681; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994), 123.

³¹ *Science of Logic*, 669; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff*, 110.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Science of Logic*, 124; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 81.

³⁴ *Science of Logic*, 391; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen*, 5.

³⁵ *Science of Logic*, 397; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen*, 11.

³⁶ *Science of Logic*, 399; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen*, 13.

³⁷ *Science of Logic*, 403; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen*, 17-8.

³⁸ *Science of Logic*, 629; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff*, 65.

³⁹ *Science of Logic*, 440; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen*, 61.

⁴⁰ *Science of Logic*, 624; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff*, 59.

⁴¹ *Science of Logic*, 577; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff*, 6.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

Res and Verba: The Oration of Spirit

The Logical *Telos*

Spirit, consciousness' schoolmaster and guide, teaches in accordance with the level of maturity its student has obtained. In the *Phenomenology*, still-pictorial consciousness was educated by means of the image. Consciousness' education culminated in the Gallery of Images, wherein each image was revealed as lifeless and static, a merely pictorial representation of one part of Spirit's plenitude. Like snapshots taken on holiday, each image tells a mere fraction of the entire story, and is meaningless until put in the context of the Whole, which is also the True.

The True must be "made" by each individual who seeks to attain knowledge of Spirit's true infinitude. He must retrace Spirit's steps on the way to Absolute, if he is ever to grasp it. What distinguishes Hegel's Absolute from that of Schelling and others, is precisely that it is mediated by the individual who takes part in it, via the act of attempting to know it. The knower's quest contains within it the knowledge which is sought, because in this quest our pilgrim is following Spirit along a well-worn path, trodden by thousands before him, all of them seeking knowledge of the Absolute.

The wisdom gained thereby is that the Absolute is not strictly speaking a *goal*. The Absolute is only a goal insofar as consciousness aims to retrace fully the path Spirit has already taken. Such is the significance of the individual philosophic consciousness' journey along the *Phenomenology's* highway of despair, which leads to the

Logic's pathway of hope. In the Gallery of Images, our pilgrim learns that the external is not a simple collection of objects that can be directly perceived in a naive, straightforward manner. The mere thing, the *res*, must be quickened by the pulse of Spirit, which expresses itself through the *verbum*, if it is ever actually to gain the life by which consciousness represents it pictorially but which in fact the object does not possess in-itself. The philosophical pilgrim ends up at the foot of the cross on which Spirit is being crucified, only to realize that it is not Spirit who has died, but pictorial consciousness, and in a sense the pilgrim himself.

The death of the image on the cross of the second Calvary brings consciousness back to square one, to immediacy as the ground for its reflection. Thus, the *Logic* begins with the opposition of Being and Nothing, which is however simultaneously a union of these opposed moments. Following a philosophical principle parallel to that embodied in the *Phenomenology*, the *Logic* will end at the same place it begins. That is, nothing will change about the *Logic* itself; nothing will be invented or (strictly speaking) discovered. Consciousness will encounter nothing truly "new," at least not from the standpoint of Spirit. What consciousness discovers along the path of the *Logic* is the same thing it found in the *Phenomenology*—itself.

Consciousness saw itself reflected back in the philosophical *specula* of the Gallery of Images, and thus ended where it began—with itself. The revelation, if it can be called such, is that the *Phenomenology* did in fact begin with the individual, that it has been nothing but the catalogue of our pilgrim's adventures on the way to the Absolute. The irony of the *Phenomenology* is dramatic. The mature reader of this work knows that our pilgrim, far from being merely the protagonist in Hegel's great *Bildungsroman*, is in fact its subject, the *raison d'être* of the whole passion play. Mired in picture-thinking, he can never get past himself to see the *res* behind the imagistic *verba* by which he represents the world to himself. What he sees is thus never really the world; he merely sees the world, the in-itself, as reflected from and through himself.

Thus, what truly distinguishes the *Phenomenology* from the *Logic* is the fact that the option of pictorial consciousness is no longer open. As long as the individual remembers the lesson of the *Phenomenology*, he will never be able to limit himself to a pictorial understanding of the Whole in terms of the in-itself. The phenomenological *telos* is essentially negative; it aims at the sublation of picture

thinking. The logical *telos* aims not merely to disabuse our pilgrim of his false world-view, but rather to supply him with some affirmative knowledge of the Whole, which the individual must transform into the True.

If, as Hegel claims, the *Logic* is a presuppositionless circle, it must also be true that its beginning and its end are in fact the same *topos* (place), only viewed from a different perspective, as in the *Phenomenology*. So, the end of the *Logic* must offer us a mediated version of Being and Nothing, a union of opposites which is, however, differentiated fully, rather than merely implicitly.

This is precisely the case. The *Science of Logic* ends with the Absolute Idea, of which Hegel writes, "By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation; the circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member."¹

As a circle, the *Science of Logic* must end where it began, making further consideration of the beginning of the *Logic* an essential propaedeutic to grasping the significance of its dénouement. A few observations drawn from the first parts of the work—the prefaces and the introduction, should illustrate the various senses in which the *Logic* is a circle which comes back upon itself, thereby putting the final section of the work in clearer perspective.

Early in the preface to the second edition, Hegel contrasts philosophy and logic. Philosophy, he writes, is interested in concrete objects—God, nature, and spirit—while logic "is concerned with these thoughts as thoughts, in their complete abstraction."² A profound philosophy must base itself "on the soul itself, the pure Notion which is the very heart of things, their simple life-pulse, even of the subjective thinking of them."³

This pure foundation, however, is just that—the grounding for a future philosophical edifice. It is not enough for Spirit simply to have relations; it must *know* these relations. They must be brought out of Spirit's pure potency in order to manifest themselves in the world and be known in their relation to Spirit by their mediation. While Hegel certainly does not mean by "logic" anything like a system of rules for determining validity or invalidity of arguments or even thought in general, he appears to have chosen logic as a means to an

explication of his absolute method precisely *because* of its indeterminacy.

Logic is, moreover, only in-itself the pure process of cognition. Logic's method must be such that within logic, life can be encompassed. Logic is not to remain a bare method of ratiocinative thinking. The course of the entire *Science of Logic* is aimed precisely at taking logic *qua* mental tool, and transforming it into a means of speculative thinking, whereby "these dead bones of logic can be quickened by spirit and so become possessed of a substantial, significant content."⁴ This enables merely reflective understanding—which, Hegel laments, has taken possession of philosophy—to be supplanted by a method that encompasses dead, inert matter, as well as Spirit.

Transcendental idealism, Hegel claims, has pushed this development along by recognizing "the nothingness of the spectral thing-in-itself left over by the Kantian philosophy, this abstract shadow divorced from all content" and intending "to destroy it completely." Hegel's aim is to bring about a way of philosophizing in which life is given the structure of logic, and logic the vitality of life. Hegel likens the common understanding of logic—which considers it without any reference to metaphysical significance—to grammar, which, when not enlivened by a content (speech), is quite simply dead.⁵

Hegel asserts that logic contains two moments. First, logic is Being as pure Concept (*Begriff*) in its own self. Second, it is the pure Concept as the true being. Hegel writes of these that they are known as "distinct (yet not with an independent being) that their unity is not abstract, dead and inert, but concrete."⁶ Hegel follows with, "Thus what is to be considered is the whole Notion, firstly as the Notion in the form of being, secondly, as the Notion."⁷

In the light of the consideration of the prefaces and the introduction, then, it should come as little surprise that Hegel begins the final section of this work, "The Idea", with a discussion of life. Life is the first stage of the Idea; as pure immediacy, it is the Notion that is simple within itself. Life's manner of existence is individuality, but individuality that has not yet come back to itself as the complete Notion, the absolute Idea. Life sublates itself through its self-reflection, which reveals it to itself as equally an other, and hence as universality.

Life is the most immediate form of the Notion, the Notion which has not yet ascended to the Idea. The Idea of Life appears as the first, most immediate Notion, because it alone can give content to logic. It is the Idea of Life that keeps logic from containing nothing but "empty, dead forms of thought."⁸

This observation helps shed some light on just what Hegel means by "Idea". Hegel's use of the term "Idea" in the context of an Idea of Life, is akin to a "Copernican Revolution" of another sort. In linking "Idea" and "Life" at the very outset, Hegel begins with what appears to be either a manifest contradiction or a mere abstraction. Hegel of course repudiates this position, as when he writes that "we must reject even more vigorously that estimate of the Idea according to which it is not anything actual, and true thoughts are said to be only ideas. . . . Everything actual is only insofar as it possesses the Idea and expresses it. . . . The reality that does not correspond to the Notion is mere Appearance, the subjective capricious element that is not the truth."⁹

In recognizing itself first as a living individual, second, as a life process and, third, as a genus process, the Idea of Life simultaneously returns to itself as individuality and sublates itself in moving toward the universal. The individual is involved in the process of reproduction, whereby an other individual is actually created. The individual thus embodies the vitality of life as both self and other and a series of individual moments each of which "is essentially the totality of all."¹⁰

Reproduction involves the individual in the next stage of the Idea of Life, "The Life-Process." The Idea of Life begins to realize itself in the Life-Process, beginning with need, which contains a first moment of self-determination and a second one of "the urge to posit this other world as its own, as similar to itself, to sublata it and to objectify itself."¹¹ This inner difference causes a self-sundering whose disharmony brings about pain, which "is therefore the prerogative of living natures. . . . It is said that contradiction is unthinkable; but the fact is that in the pain of a living being it is even an actual existence."¹²

This pain brings about the need and the urge which constitute the erotics of the Concept's self-realization in the Absolute Idea. Hegel writes that "the living being is an urge."¹³ The living being gives content and substance to the otherwise barren, merely formal activity of logic. The individual posits itself as a real universal, through the external life process, thus arriving at the genus, which is

the universal and third stage. In arriving at genus, however, the Idea of Life has not thereby come to the end of its journey; it has not yet returned to itself. The genus process arrives at the Idea of Cognition by overcoming the separated, individual lives which concretely "constitute" the genus process; "the death of this life is the procession of spirit." Hegel continues: "The Idea, which as genus is implicit, is now explicit, in that it has sublated its particularity which constituted the living species, and has thereby given itself a reality that is itself simple universality. As such it is the Idea that relates to itself as Idea, the universal that has universality for its determinateness and existence- the Idea of cognition."¹⁴

The Idea of Life becomes the Idea of Cognition when life *qua* life is sublated via its own internal contradiction and particularity in favor of the more abstract structure of thought to which life, as genus, has given rise. The Concept at this stage is the free existence of abstract universality;¹⁵ it is the Concept as Spirit, but not yet as the Absolute Idea, since it contains only one of the two opposing moments of spirit and nature. Cognition makes the transition to the Absolute Idea when it sublates its own sublation of the individual (as the Idea of Life) owing to its inadequate content, and its parasitic relationship to the individual and the Idea of Life.

The "individual" to which cognition returns is, however, one of a different nature from the one which it itself sublated. "The individuality of the subject with which the subject was burdened . . . has vanished. . . . The subject now exists as free, universal, self-identity, for which the objectivity of the Notion is a given objectivity immediately to hand. . . . Cognition is restored and united with the practical Idea. . . . Here [cognition] appears as an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is the Notion. This is the absolute Idea."¹⁶

The absolute Idea, like the Idea of life and the Idea of cognition, thus contains within it a manifest contradiction, the theoretical and practical Ideas, whose relationship Hegel nevertheless calls an "identity."¹⁷ The absolute idea contains both soul and personality and is as such "being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth." It is also "the sole subject matter and content of philosophy."¹⁸

It is interesting to note that at the end of this enormous work Hegel gives serious attention to the issue of beginnings. A beginning must be in some way deficient, in order to be pushed along towards its

self-realization by the urge to carry itself further. This urge is engendered by the pain of the subject's internal disunion and concomitant disharmony. At the same time, however, a beginning must be made with the absolute.¹⁹ The consequence of this is that every beginning must be made with an absolute that is in some way deficient, but capable of rehabilitation.

This is just what Hegel has done, in this and every other section of the *Science of Logic*. Earlier in the work, Hegel identifies the Void as the ground of movement "as the negative relation of the one to its negative."²⁰ He further claims that the Void and the One, or nothingness and determinate being (i.e. individuality), are the first stage of being for self.²¹ Now, at the end of the *Logic*, Hegel has returned to life, as negatively mediated through cognition. Hence, he ends up with a "science" of the relation of life and thought, of being and its negation. Hegel reinstantiates dialectic in the form of logic, as an inter-relation of the oppositions that make up speculative thought. In so doing, he also demonstrates that dialectic can have more than a merely negative end result.

It is for this reason, among others, that it is important to see the coming together of the opposites of life and cognition, of being and nothing, as an identity, rather than a unity, a word which Hegel calls "unfortunate," since it "expresses wholly abstract sameness and sounds all the more blatantly paradoxical the more the terms of which it is asserted show themselves to be sheer opposites."²² Hegel is quite clear that even in the Absolute Idea the internal difference is not wholly sublated; rather, the difference must remain if Spirit and his pupil are to avoid falling back into the inchoate unity of Schelling's Absolute.

The Oration of the Concept and the *Phenomenology*

It is in this sense, to begin, that the *Science of Logic* is an oration. Like an oration, it ends with the same topics, the same subject matter (*res*) with which it began, after explicating their meaning via an exposition of every possible point of view from which the *res* can be regarded. As the deliverer of the oration of the concept in the *Logic*, Spirit meets the requirement of *eloqui*, that the speaker convey to his audience all that there is to say about the *res*. The essence of

eloquence is not empty, flowery verbiage, but a thorough treatment of the *res* using the orator's principal tool—rhetorical *verba*.

This requirement is limited only by the orator's need to address his audience in terms which are familiar to them. Thus, in the *Phenomenology* Spirit gives the oration of the image—the medium in which and through which pictorial consciousness thinks. Having generated the Concept (*Begriff*) through the death of the image in Absolute Knowing, Spirit in the *Logic* uses the Concept, rather than the image, as the basis for its pedagogy. According to Hegel, both the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* end where they begin. Each is also necessarily given from a mature philosophic standpoint. Since neither work wrote itself, it is clear that each presupposes its author's having already passed through the stages it describes.

This is the second sense in which the *Logic* is an oration. It, like an oration, is intended to instruct and guide. The oration was the means by which Isocrates, Quintilian, and Melanchthon conducted their lessons. Students imitated the examples of oratory which they read, as well as the schoolmaster's *praelectio* and performances of oratory. The goal of this educational program was to equip students with the philosophical and oratorical skills necessary to the performance of an eloquent oration, whose goal is, first, to find the truth, and, second, to persuade others. Like Cicero's perfect orator, Spirit in the *Science of Logic* combines a love of the truth with the ability to expound upon it with persuasive effect. The *Logic* is, literally, "wisdom speaking."

In the *Phenomenology*, Spirit took the role of rhetor, the teacher of public speaking who uses tropes, images, and other heuristic devices and methods in his course of instruction. In the *Logic*, Spirit is the dialectician, leading the individual through a series of more elaborate steps toward the full articulation of the Whole, only this time from the standpoint of speculative philosophy, rather than the topological image of the *Phenomenology*.

By passing through both the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*, our philosophical pilgrim has traversed all of pictorial and philosophical consciousness. In so doing, he has "made" them for himself, and only thereby made them true. In other words, he has come into possession of the True, by passing through the Whole. In-itself, the True is akin to Schelling's undifferentiated Absolute. Only in being experienced can the content of the Whole become the True, which is always the True for consciousness. The Whole exists in-

itself; the True exists only as the for-itself once the individual “makes” it, by experiencing the Whole.

This is indeed the final sense in which the *Science of Logic* is an oration. An orator illustrates his subject matter with the use of words; he “makes” the *res* through his *verba*. The *res* is not of course an actual product of his words. Like the in-itself, it exists whether or not anyone is aware of it. From one point of view, it is fair to say that the Absolute simply *is*, but even so it is not anything for-consciousness until it is taken as an object. The eloquence of the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic* does not consist, then, merely in ornate, elegant, or elevated language. What makes them eloquent, and deserving of the title “oration,” is their comprehensiveness, and their concomitant discharge of the orator’s duty of *eloqui*.

In the *Phenomenology*, Spirit has said all that there is to say about the early attempts of consciousness to reduce the Whole to the external. The failure of this project leads our pilgrim to the Calvary of Spirit, with imagistic thinking (*Vorstellung, bildhaftes Denken*) nailed to the cross on which the tropological image suffers a needful death. The imagistic *verba* of the *Phenomenology* lead to the generation and deduction of the Concept (*Begriff*), which becomes the *res* (subject matter) of the *Science of Logic*. No longer burdened by mere *pictures* of the Whole, the individual in the *Logic* thinks *philosophically* about the nature of the Absolute, rather than pictorially. He no longer merely represents it to himself; he “thinks” it, and thereby actually makes it for himself.

Res and Verba

The dialectical inquiry of the *Logic* addresses the same questions tackled in the *Phenomenology*, viz. the nature of the relationship between subject and object, and their combination to form an Absolute which is a unified, yet internally differentiated, Whole. As the deduction of the Concept, the *Phenomenology* is an odd creature indeed—a Gallery of Images which both reveals its own falsehood and points the way toward the truth. The copiousness of language and tropes in the *Phenomenology* is by no means either accidental or incidental to the generation of the Concept, and herein is revealed yet another rhetorical and pedagogical aspect of the *Phenomenology*, the *Logic*, and the articulation between them.

In generating the Concept, the *Phenomenology* performs another of the orator's duties, that of *inventio*—the discovery or "invention" of plausible arguments in support of the thesis. The *Phenomenology* "discovers" the Concept when it finally grasps the futility of picture-thinking, and recognizes that there has been a principle at work all along, which guided our pilgrim through the gallery of images without his ever realizing that his journey was anything but haphazard or random. It is upon recognizing Spirit as the active and quickening principle of the *Phenomenology* and its Gallery of Images that Spirit deduces, or "discovers," the Concept (*der Begriff*).

It is thus that *verba* discover *res*, that words reveal—rather than conceal—the subject matter of the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*. The conceit of Schelling's approach to the Absolute is to claim that it can be immediately grasped, all at once, that the human mind is adequate to the task of understanding the manifold aspects of the Absolute without benefit of mediation, without having to work through the Absolute in a substantive way.

The orations of the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* do just that, by permitting consciousness to work through what Hegel calls the tripartite nature of the thing. The thing is an immediate being, "an othering of itself," and essence, "the form of a universal—corresponding to the Understanding."²³ In order to grasp the thing from each of these three aspects, Spirit must guide the individual along the paths it has previously traveled. In the *Phenomenology*, the thing is initially understood as primary, the ground for the True which is the Whole. As each of the stages of the *Phenomenology* is internalized, *er-innert*, by consciousness, what was once a merely external form of being—the world as seen from the standpoint of pictorial consciousness—becomes something other than itself, an in-itself-for-consciousness, i.e. a for-itself.

The deduction of the Concept in the *Phenomenology* provides the sole presupposition for the *Science of Logic*, the oration of the Concept in which the dialectical bare subject matter (*res nudas*) is the focal point. The *Logic* grasps the essence of what the *Phenomenology* saw as, first, truth as pure immediacy and, second, as the sublation of that pure immediacy, which had not yet, however, been raised into the realm of cognition. The *Phenomenology* ends with a rhetorical promise, the prospect of a full exposition of the *res* which it leaves to the *Logic* to fulfill.

Upon walking the entire pathway of hope, the individual is in possession of the object as essence, and has thus grasped it from each of its three possible determinations—immediacy, mediated being, and essence. Only the complete speech of the image in the *Phenomenology* and the complete speech of the Concept in the *Science of Logic* make such a full articulation possible. Through these two works, Spirit has led the individual consciousness, our philosophical pilgrim, through an extensive process of formative education (*Bildung*). This *Bildung* began with the imagistic thinking (*Vorstellung, bildhaftes Denken*) of the *Phenomenology*, which sees truth as an image (*ein Bild*) or a Gallery of Images (*eine Gallerie von Bildern*). This process renders the individual cultured (*gebildet*), and prepares him for the philosopher's task which awaits him in the *Science of Logic*.

In summary, the individual's *Bildung* via the *Bild* has made him *gebildet* and enabled him to see the illusory nature of *bildhaftes Denken* in the *Gallerie von Bildern*. The copious imagery and language (*verba*) of the *Phenomenology* served the rhetorician's task of clarifying the subject matter (*res*). Via illusion, illusion has been over-come. As already discussed, the *Science of Logic* covers the same ground as the *Phenomenology*, only from the point of view of speculative philosophy, the philosophy of the speculum, the mirror. The differences in treatment are at once stylistic and philosophical. To be precise, the differences in style are due to the different philosophical approaches, and the different philosophical approaches are due to the requirements of style.

In the *Phenomenology*, consciousness' philosophical repertoire is seriously limited by its reliance on picture thinking. It is not yet capable of making objects the focus of *philosophical* consideration; it merely looks at them, and believes that it sees the truth in them. The Gallery of Images teaches our pilgrim that the only truth that was ever in them came from the individual himself, i.e. from the pilgrim himself, and that seeing the truth in a philosophical image (or, more accurately, a literal "mirror-image"), while good for a start, cannot provide a sufficient account of the True and the Whole.

This is the eloquence of Hegel's system as seen in the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*. Together, they cover an entire phenomenological and philosophical landscape; leaving no stone unturned, they expose every pretense and illusion to the light of truth, leaving us not so much with an actual Science, but rather with

the basis for a Science to come. The *Phenomenology* clears the brush and levels the ground, while the *Logic* digs and lays the foundation for a future philosophical edifice. It is well beyond my intention to attempt anything like a comprehensive interpretation of the relationship of the philosophy of spirit and the philosophy of nature to the foundation provided by the *Logic*; it is enough for the current study to point out that Hegel has prepared the ground and laid the supports for these later elements of the System.²⁴

The True must be "made," i.e. experienced, by each individual who wishes to know Spirit. In order to "make" the True, the individual must "learn" the Whole; he must undergo a rigorous process of formative education, which will expose him to all that Spirit has experienced. Only in actually covering the ground himself can he "make" the True out of the entirety of his experiences. In making the True, he must engage in a comprehensive effort of recollection. He must hold all of the moments in his mind all at once in order to make them a Whole, and hence the True. This act of recollection is itself rhetorical, analogous to the orator's duty to sum up his argument in the peroration, which concludes a speech.

The *Phenomenology* was the pilgrim's philosophical penance. It is certainly tempting to believe Schelling and others they tell us that we can take hold the Absolute without the bother of mediation, putting us immediately in touch with all that is. It is Zeus' judgment of Pandora that gives the lie to this pretense. We have lost the power of the divine Logos—whose primal, antediluvian warmth man once unknowingly possessed—but have learned the ability to regain the power of divine speech, through the eloquent consideration of the *res* via the *verbum*.

Throughout this work, I have emphasized the role of rhetoric in providing divine grammar for human speech. Rhetoric is the means by which the merely human can regain the insight—however fleeting—into the divine Logos. The figures studied in Chapter Two and Three shared in common the belief that it was not enough for a speaker to possess eloquence. Although necessary, eloquence without a thorough understanding of the matter at hand, the *res*, is at best vain verbal foppery and at worst intentionally misleading or deceitful speech. Wisdom requires rhetorical expression, because only rhetoric can provide appropriately elaborate and elegant *verba* through which to express the *res*—which is the proper subject matter of dialectical, speculative inquiry. Direct expression and comprehension of the *res* is

not possible, by definition, since it is precisely in being *expressed* that the *res* becomes knowable. Schelling's undifferentiated Absolute is *res* without *verba*. Like Philology in John's parable, it is the mute sage who possesses wisdom which it is unable to express.

Having concluded the oration of the image in the *Phenomenology*, consciousness has gained entry to the realm of speculative philosophy, the sphere of *Logos* itself. In the *Science of Logic*, the merely rhetorical aspects of the *Phenomenology* are stripped away, revealing the dialectical *res nudas*. The copious imagistic and tropological language externalized the in-itself, making it a potential object of philosophical inquiry. Absent such externalization, there could be no study of the pure subject matter, since the subject matter would still be merely implicit, not actually experienced and hence not even potentially knowable.

Very little now remains to be said. The young Hegel was trained as both rhetorician and dialectician, following a course of study that dated back well over two thousand years. Educated through a curriculum instituted by Phillip Melancthon—the Protestant Preceptor of Germany—Hegel became an accomplished orator through a combination of classroom and extra-curricular study (most notably his diary) and displayed his oratorical prowess in his valedictory address at the Gymnasium Illustre. The profound influence of his early education shined through brilliantly in his earliest major work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in which an individual consciousness is tricked, cajoled, and otherwise abused into continuing his trek along the highway of despair, until he finally recognizes the falsehood that lies behind consciousness' belief in the primacy of the sensuous world as the ground of truth.

Disabused of this illusion by the Gallery of Images and the Calvary of Spirit, the individual regains the knowledge of the nothingness of sensuous beings, which constituted the original wisdom of the animals. This "regained" wisdom is nevertheless superior to the original wisdom of the animals, because it is wisdom that has a determinate expression, i.e. it is wisdom which has been mediated through consciousness' experience.

In the *Science of Logic*, the same journey is taken as in the *Phenomenology*, only now it takes place on the pathway of hope, through which consciousness gains the mastery of a method upon which a true Science may be founded. This foundationless foundation establishes the form and content of logic as identical, a circle of circles

which requires no outside support. Hegel solves the Cartesian dilemma of finding an indubitable first principle by thinking outside of the problem; the "sophistry" of such vain attempts at proving first principles is here replaced with a foundation that is the system, and a system that is its own foundation.

Without the *Phenomenology*, there is no *Logic*; without the *Logic*, the *Phenomenology* is a pointless rhetorical exercise. The phenomenon leads to the *logos*, the origin of the divine speech to which rhetoric aims to return. Although rhetoric cannot itself come back to the divine *logos*, the dialectical speculation of the *Science of Logic* can and does. From the combination of the rhetorical *verbum* and the dialectical *res nuda*s comes the divinely ordered expression of divine truth, clothing it in radiant garments which alone make it appear to be what it truly is.

Much as John of Salisbury would have predicted, rhetoric ends up the servant of a dialectical mistress. Mercury's silver-tongued eloquence has no speech of its own to give, but mouths lustrous truths when wedded to the daughter of Prudence, who is herself the sister of Truth. Mercury is chaste, sterile, but beautiful to behold. Homely Philology combines her fecundity with Mercury's divine sheen to give the fullest expression to Truth.

Notes

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993), 842; G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994), 304.

² *Science of Logic*, 34. This quotation is taken from the Preface to the Second Edition, which does not appear in the German version.

³ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁴ *Science of Logic*, 53; G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986), 20.

⁵ *Science of Logic*, 47; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 14.

⁶ *Science of Logic*, 60; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 29-30.

⁷ *Science of Logic*, 61; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Das Sein*, 30-1.

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This work focuses on the role played by rhetoric and images in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and in the transition to his *Science of Logic*. Daniel Horace Fernald argues that the rhetoric and imagery of the *Phenomenology* constitute the work's substance. His conclusion shows the entire *Phenomenology* to be an *aporia*, an impasse designed to teach the central lesson that the 'True,' which is the 'Whole,' is not to be found in phenomenal experience alone. Understanding the structure of *Phenomenology* is essential in the transition to *Science of Logic*.

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